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ABSTRACT 
 
 
After World War II, intrastate conflicts rapidly replaced interstate conflicts as the 
dominant threat to international peace and security, a trend that has become all the more 
evident in the post-Cold War era. Given the prevalence of civil wars, there is increasing 
awareness of the need for post-conflict settlement procedures, development of local 
capacity for conflict resolution, and long-term peacebuilding efforts. 
 
In his 1992 An Agenda for Peace, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
encouraged the international community to take responsibility for the full range of post-
conflict management roles by introducing “post-conflict peace-building.” Even though 
the term “peacebuilding” did not exist prior to Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 An Agenda for 
Peace, the UN from its inception after World War II has engaged in various types of 
operations to maintain peace and to build local capacities for conflict resolution.  
 
In addition to the UN, a number of NGOs in the field of humanitarian relief and 
development, such as World Vision, Oxfam, Save the Children, CARE, Catholic Relief 
Services, and the International Committee of the Red Cross, have decisively responded 
with a resolution offering to support efforts toward peace in the aftermath of intrastate 
conflicts after 1945. The goal of this paper is to investigate theoretically and empirically 
the success of the UN and the NGOs in intrastate peacebuilding operations from 1945-
2002. 
  
My empirical findings indicate that overall UN peacebulding operations contribute to 
promoting sustainable peace for war-torn societies. The findings also point out no 
statistical relationship between the efforts of the humanitarian NGOs and the duration of 
peace. A main reason might be that the NGOs primarily seek to relieve human sufferings 
rather than to remove the root causes of internal violence. For the 21st UN peace 
operations, this study offers several recommendations for an enhanced and strengthened 
UN.      
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1 
 
Introduction to International Peacebuilding 
 
 
 
I. Introduction  
After World War II, intrastate conflicts rapidly replaced interstate conflicts as the 
dominant threat to international peace and security, a trend that has become all the more 
evident in the post-Cold War era.1 One study reports that “more than two-thirds of all 
armed conflicts in the world since 1945 have taken the form of civil wars.”2 Economic 
inequalities; lack of democratic rules, laws, and institutions; and state discrimination 
against minority religions or languages are among those conditions commonly thought to 
favor insurgency.3 The consequences of civil wars are devastating. From 1945 to 1999, 
16.5 million people died in internal conflicts, compared with 3.3 million in interstate 
wars.4 Furthermore, civil wars have raised the humanitarian issues surrounding displaced 
refugees, human rights, mass starvations, and massive internal violence, including 
assassination, rape, and systematic genocide.  
As civil war5 has become the most common form of armed conflict, there is 
increasing awareness of the need for post-conflict settlement, development of local 
capacity for conflict resolution, and building long-lasting peace. This study explores the 
conditions associated with the termination of intrastate conflict and the creation of a 
                                                 
1
 Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 1994, 88. See also Rochester 2002, 122. 
2
 Holsti 1995, 322. See also Boutros-Ghali 1998, 21. 
3
 See Pearson and Rochester 1992, 277. 
4
 Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75. 
5
 Krishna Kumar defines the term “civil wars” as “violent conflicts between two or more parties for control 
of political authority in a state or part of it.” I will use Kumar’s definition of civil war in my study. I will 
also use the terms “intrastate conflict” and “civil war” interchangeably here. More specific definitions of 
civil wars will be discussed later in this study. See Kumar 1997, 2.     
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durable peace, particularly the role of international organization. Inter-governmental 
organizations (IGOs), primarily led by the United Nations (UN) and joined by 
humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)6, have often attempted to support 
efforts toward peace in the aftermath of intrastate conflicts. As the characteristics of 
armed conflict have been increasingly changing, the scope of United Nations 
peacekeeping operations has been expanded over time.7 The traditional peacekeeping 
forces’ major function -- to separate two or more hostile parties in order to prevent the 
recurrence of war -- has been expanded to include various military and nonmilitary 
missions aimed at promoting long-lasting peace among the antagonists.   
In his 1992 An Agenda for Peace, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali encouraged the international community to take responsibility for the full range of 
post-conflict management roles by introducing “post-conflict peace-building.”8 There 
was growing attention being paid to not just stopping hostilities but also initiating long-
term peacebuilding, which refers to “an attempt, after peace has been negotiated or 
imposed, to address the sources of present hostility and build local capacities for conflict 
resolution.”9 Hence, peacebuilding seeks to diminish the existing or potential internal 
threats and develop the social, political, and economic infrastructure in order to stabilize 
or improve domestic capacities. 
An Agenda for Peace was a proposal to the international community and to the 
UN, challenging it to move beyond the traditional forms of peacekeeping and to 
undertake multidimensional peacebuilding missions, such as observing and supervising 
                                                 
6
 “Humanitarian NGOs” refer to aid agencies that seek to prevent and to diminish human suffering during 
or after armed conflicts and natural disasters.  
7
 Holsti 1995, 63. 
8
 Boutros-Ghali 1992, 6.  
9
 Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 779.  
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local elections; disarming combatants; rebuilding economic infrastructure; verifying 
human rights; providing humanitarian relief; and administering various aspects of 
transitions to peace.  
Multidimensional peacebuilding missions require not only an expanded UN role 
but also coordination with other IGOs and NGOs.  Boutros-Ghali emphasized that 
peacebuilding could not be effectively carried out by the UN alone but required 
coordination and cooperation with other world organizations.10 The macro-level actors, 
such as states and IGOs, must accompany the micro-level actors, such as NGOs, business 
communities, public officials, and individual citizens to share responsibility for the 
maintenance of peace.11 Critics may argue that there is a lack of coordination and 
cooperation among international organizations for international assistance. However, 
international organizations have often cooperatively engaged in a wide range of 
peacebuilding missions in the aftermath of intrastate conflicts.  
Even though there exists an extensive amount of literature on peacebuilding that 
investigates cases involving UN and NGO intervention since 1945, the effectiveness of 
these interventions has never been rigorously tested nor have independent variables been 
careful analyzed. It is surprising that very little work has been done to investigate 
theoretically and empirically whether international assistance conducted by the UN and 
the NGOs, indeed, contribute to peace that is more stable. Despite the severity of 
intrastate conflicts, civil wars have been studied far less than interstate conflicts and are 
not properly understood.  
                                                 
10
 Boutros-Ghali 1992, 4-5. 
11
 Ibid., 22. 
 4 
One of the most significant challenges that the UN faces today is to determine 
whether peacebuilding, as it has already been defined, is an effective approach to 
promoting durable peace in the aftermath of a civil conflict. It has not been clear whether 
peacebuilding has been a significant tool in preventing states from relapsing into chaos. 
This study investigates the effectiveness of third-party intervention, primarily focused on 
the UN and the NGOs, in peacebuilding operations in the aftermath of civil wars. Even 
though the term “peacebuilding” did not exist before Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 An Agenda 
for Peace, the UN (since its inception after World War II) and humanitarian NGOs have 
engaged in various types of operations to maintain peace and to build local capacities for 
conflict resolution. I wish to investigate whether international assistance promotes peace 
in the aftermath of civil wars. The objective of this research is to examine whether 
durable peace can be attained after peacebuilding operations have been launched. I will 
consider the following four research puzzles, using “durable peace”12 as my dependent 
variable. 
1. I will examine how the level of local hostility affects the promoting of durable 
peace. 
 
2. I will examine how the level of local development affects the promoting of 
durable peace.    
 
3. I will examine the extent to which various types of UN military operations 
promote durable peace. 
 
4. I will examine how various activities of NGOs in peacebuilding affect the 
promoting of durable peace. 
 
A number of studies report that the level of hostility is one of the most significant 
determinants of war duration (Licklider, 1995; Regan and Abouharb, 2002) and the 
                                                 
12
 The terms “durable peace,” “long-lasting peace,” “self-enforcing peace,” and “sustainable peace” will be 
used interchangeably in this study. 
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likelihood of war recurrence (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2003, 2004; Hartzell, 
Hoddie, and Rothchild, 2001; Walter, 1997). However, very interestingly, their 
explanations are mixed. One reports that highly intensive conflicts cause unavoidable 
emotional and psychological barriers, which eventually increase the likelihood of 
initiating war recurrence.13 Another reveals an opposite finding, that intensive hostilities 
reduce the capability of the contending parties to rebound and reinitiate war.14 I wish to 
resolve the contradictions. 
The second puzzle relates to Boutros-Ghali’s prediction, and my theoretical 
assumption, that peace and security are promoted as the level of economic development 
and the level of political stability are increased. That is, internal peace is expected to be 
promoted as economic inequality, social injustice, and political instability are gradually 
decreased by reconstructing, reforming and stabilizing economic, social, security, and 
political sectors.15 This involves establishing economic climates promising reliable 
business transactions, rules, and regulations; restoring social services, such as health, 
nutrition and education; and creating democratic rules, processes, laws, and institutions.16  
The third puzzle has to do with which type of UN military operations works best 
to promote durable peace. Various types of UN military operations may be employed in 
any given conflict. I divide these into the following four operations: (1) monitoring or 
observer missions, (2) traditional peacekeeping, (3) peace enforcement, and (4) 
multidimensional peacebuilding.17 A few studies have investigated the effectiveness of 
UN military operations, but their findings are somewhat contradictory and outdated 
                                                 
13
 Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 785. 
14
 Walter 1997, 354. 
15
 Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 787-789. 
16
 Kumar 1997, 3, 14, 25. 
17
 The definitions of the four UN operations will be addressed later in this chapter. 
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(Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, 2001; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2003, 2004). 
Finally, despite the rapidly growing involvement of NGOs in peacebuilding, very 
surprisingly, no writings have empirically examined the success of their peacebuilding 
efforts.  
To elucidate the existing confusions and to cover the huge gap in the literature, I 
reconstructed and updated the data originally put together by Doyle and Sambanis18 
(hereafter “D&S”). The data include 124 civil wars from 1945 to 2002 that fit the 
definitions of civil wars employed by the authors. A civil war is defined as an armed 
conflict that causes more than 1,000 battle deaths in at least a single year,19 that 
challenges the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state, that involves the state as 
a principal combatant, that occurs within the recognized boundary of that state, that 
includes rebels with the ability to mount organized military opposition to the state, and 
that has parties concerned with the prospect of living together within a defined political 
unit after the end of the war.20  
As I investigate the correlates of peacebuilding by examining the four research 
puzzles, I should be able to find not only a way to measure the effectiveness of 
peacebuilding but also a way to offer the most feasible possibilities for an enhanced and 
strengthened UN and humanitarian NGOs. In the next section, I begin to analyze how 
domestic conditions after civil wars are associated with the promotion of durable peace, 
and how I intend to resolve the first two puzzles of this study. I also discuss the 
termination and the initiation of civil wars, and how they are correlated to the promotion 
                                                 
18
 Doyle and Sambanis 2000. 
19
 The data were gathered based on the total number of battle deaths (not measured annually as in 
Correlates of War definition). See also Small and Singer 1982, 214-215. 
20
 Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 783. 
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of stable domestic conditions for peace. Next, I analyze Boutros-Ghali’s peacebuilding 
plan and discuss how I am going to employ his theory as I resolve the third research 
puzzle. Finally, I will discuss the rapidly growing involvement of humanitarian NGOs in 
peacebuilding and how I will measure the success of their missions. 
II. Domestic Conditions for Sustainable Peace 
 A number of studies conclude that intrastate wars are more difficult to end than 
are interstate wars. One simple explanation might be that the opponents of interstate wars 
eventually draw back to their own territories. However, in the aftermath of civil wars, the 
opponents cannot remain separate and often retain their own armed forces. As a result, 
civil wars can be more difficult to end. In general, civil wars are eventually resolved by 
negotiated settlements or a military victory of one side. Licklider reports that of the 57 
civil wars from 1945 to 1993 that ended, 25 percent (14) ended by negotiation, while 75 
percent (43) ended in military victory.21 Licklider also finds that only 15 percent of the 
military victories as opposed to 50 percent of the negotiation settlements experienced war 
recurrence five years after the termination of the war.22 According to Licklider, 
“Negotiated settlements of civil wars are less likely to endure than are the results of 
military victories.”23 On the other hand, military victories will make potential rebels more 
difficult to confront in the future by disarming them and destroying the organizational 
identity of the losers.24 As a result, military victories tend to endure compared with 
negotiated settlements.  
                                                 
21
 Licklider 1995, 684. 
22
 Ibid., 685. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Wagner 1993, 261-262. 
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Discovering the causes for the breakdown of a peace accord is significant because 
they are associated with the conditions for domestic hostility and capacity. There are 
three explanations for the breakdown of negotiations. First, negotiated settlement in civil 
wars may fail when the antagonists are not committed to maintaining what they agreed to. 
After the negotiation, the rivals may find a strong incentive to withdraw their positions 
and to achieve their particular interests. In addition, they may strategically sign the peace 
settlement to obtain a reward or to temporarily avoid heavy pressure from the 
international community. Walter argues that leaders have many strategic reasons to 
participate in talks and even sign settlements they have no intention of actually 
supporting.25 Second, negotiations may fail when the contending parties can not divide 
the stakes in a mutually agreeable way.26 There are many indivisible resources, such as 
sovereignty, political, economic, and cultural values. “Stakes are usually less divisible in 
civil wars than in other types of war, and this makes settlements less likely.”27 Third, a 
peace accord may fail when the rebels and the government place equally high value on 
winning the war.28 The contending groups may realize that their winning chances are still 
very high, causing little chance for compromise. Negotiated settlements generally create 
a balance-power condition among the combatants.29 The internal balance of power makes 
the new government function effectively.30 As Organski and Kugler argue, the balance of 
power promotes peace as long as it is maintained.31 However, maintaining the internal 
                                                 
25
 Walter 1999, 40. 
26
 Ibid., 41. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Wagner 1993, 261 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Organski and Kugler 1981, 14. 
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balance is as fragile as the international one because “many things happen that will lead 
antagonists to expect a more favorable outcome from the attempted use of force.”32   
Restoring trust, transforming conflicts constructively, and creating a sustainable 
peace are never easy tasks. Nevertheless, they can be successful when a peace accord 
would integrate the contending parties into a single state, make a new government 
capable of accommodating their interests, and create a new nonpartisan national military 
force.33 According to Hartzell, the antagonists negotiating a settlement seek to create laws 
and institutions that seek to balance, divide, or share power among them.34 The goal of 
peacebuilding is to construct the social, economic, and political institutions that manage 
group conflict without violence but with authority and legitimacy and create a self-
enforcing peace.35 A self-enforcing or sustainable peace is defined as a situation 
characterized by “the absence of physical violence; the elimination of unacceptable 
political, economic, and cultural forms of discrimination; a high level of internal and 
external legitimacy or support; self-sustainability; and a propensity to enhance the 
constructive transformation of conflicts.”36 In short, peacebuilding attempts to create 
preconditions for sustainable peace.   
Exploring the preconditions is a cornerstone of promoting sustainable peace. 
There are three significantly interrelated preconditions for peace. First is the 
establishment of reintegration, which refers to an effort to build mutual confidence 
among former contending factions, thereby reducing the risk of renewed hostilities.37 The 
                                                 
32
 Wagner 1993, 261. 
33
 Walter 1999, 43. 
34
 Hartzell 1999, 6.   
35
 Kumar 1997, 12. 
36
 Reychler 2001, 12. 
37
 Kumar 1997, 11. 
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process of reintegration involves building expectations of mutual benefits as a result of 
cooperation, a dismantling of psychological or emotional barriers, an assimilation of the 
common values that will show the way in the future, and a commitment to cooperate.38  
Furthermore, it involves demobilization, which refers to “the formal disbanding of 
military formations and, at the individual level, to the process of releasing combatants 
from a mobilized state,”39 and rehabilitation of former combatants to reintegrate into 
society. In other words, the establishment of reintegration seeks to address the present 
sources of conflict and to diminish the potential hostility. The establishment of 
reintegration is the most effective way to eliminate former combatants’ ties to their 
fighting units and permits a means for them to provide for their dependents.40 To assist 
the process effectively, it is crucial to create a communication, consultation, and 
mediation system at different levels and between the former warring groups.41  
The process of reintegration seeks to minimize the potential internal threats and to 
promote the domestic stability. Hence, the success of reintegration seems to be associated 
with the level of local hostility, which is one of the most significant variables forecasting 
the duration of sustainable peace. I plan to conduct empirical analysis of how the local 
hostility is correlated to the promotion of long-lasting peace. 
A second condition for peace is the establishment of structural reforms in the 
political, economic, social, and judicial sector. Political reform refers to the establishment 
of democratic norms, values, laws, and institutions that allow citizens to participate in the 
political process freely and equally. Cousens and Kumar argue that peacebuilding efforts 
                                                 
38
 Reychler 2001, 13. See also Assefa 2001, 340. 
39
 Berdal 1996, 39. 
40
 Spear 2002, 145. 
41
 Reychler 2001, 12. 
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should focus on the factors that allow a stable political process to emerge.42 Post-conflict 
elections might be a good example. Despite negotiated peace settlements, war-torn 
societies43 are unstable, highly fragmented, and on the brink of violence. According to 
Kumar, the most significant objective of post-conflict elections is to transfer power to a 
democratically installed government that enjoys national and international legitimacy and 
to begin rebuilding the country.44 In addition, Walter reports that the likelihood of a 
return to war would be increased when a former combatant’s quality of life remains at a 
critically low level and has barriers to political participation.45  
Economic reform includes the establishment of a free market economic 
environment. Primarily, it involves a restoration of economic institutions and activities 
that can be managed by socially accepted rules, regulations, and contracts governing 
business transactions and legal rights defining ownership of private property.46 Social 
reform must include two main tasks. One is to restore general social services providing 
health care, education, policing, and child welfare. The other is to help war victims 
resettle. The efforts include providing shelters and humanitarian relief to refugees, 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and orphans and offering rehabilitation services for 
war widows and sexually abused women.47 Providing humanitarian needs for these 
groups is a crucial element in creating political, social, and economic stability. Finally, 
judicial reform refers to an establishment of an efficient and legitimate judicial system.    
                                                 
42
 Cousens and Kumar 2001, 183. 
43
 The term, “war-torn societies” refers to countries in the aftermath of violent internal conflict. See Kumar 
1998, 5. 
44
 Kumar 1998, 6. 
45
 Walter 2004, 385. 
46
 Kumar 1997, 25. 
47
 Ibid., 15. 
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The establishment of structural reforms attempts to accommodate various interests of the 
antagonists. The reforms require a creation of rules, laws, and institutions in political, 
economic, social, and judicial sectors. Creating or restoring basic infrastructures for war-
torn societies seems to be a significant determinant improving the local capacity. The 
duration of peace after civil wars is expected when the level of local capacity is increased. 
The relationship will be tested later in this study. 
The establishment of reintegration would prevent the potential for hostility and 
reintegrate former fighting groups into society. Structural reforms in the political, 
economic, and social sectors would boost the local capacity and accommodate the 
interests of the warring groups. There remains the last precondition for sustainable peace 
-- the establishment of international assistance, which can accelerate the transition to 
peace. The three preconditions are expected to be interrelated and are equally critical 
components of durable peace. By investigating the three conditions, I intend to measure 
the success of peacebuilding.  
III. International Assistance for Sustainable Peace 
The degree of international assistance is one of the most significant variables used 
when forecasting the duration of peace in the aftermath of civil wars. Traditionally, 
international assistance focused on economic development. In recent years, international 
actors have increasingly implemented programs for political and social development. In 
the political sphere, the programs generally have focused on institution building, 
promotion of elections, human rights monitoring, and demobilization and reintegration of 
former combatants. 48 In addition, the UN and NGOs have been particularly important 
actors in social rehabilitation programs for the resettlement of refugees and IDPs, for 
                                                 
48
 Ibid., 5. 
 13 
unaccompanied and traumatized children, and for sexually abused women.49 In the 
economic sphere, the international community has provided a wide range of economic 
rehabilitation programs and economic resources such as loans, grants, and technical 
expertise as well as promoting reforms in agriculture, physical infrastructure, and 
macroeconomic50 to attract foreign investments. Primarily focused on the UN and 
humanitarian NGOs, this study attempts to reveal the relationship between the duration of 
long-lasting peace and the role of international organization. The third and the fourth 
research puzzles will be resolved as I empirically explore the relationship. Further 
discussion of these puzzles will be presented in the following sections.  
The United Nations 
The end of the Cold War marked the turning point for the UN in terms of 
enlarging the perspective of its missions in internal conflicts. In the post-Cold War era, 
the practice of peacebuilding has involved much more extensive civilian components, 
such as electoral observation, police monitoring/training, civilian administration, and 
humanitarian affairs.51 During the Cold War, the UN was generally not in the business of 
keeping peace among the antagonists within states. There were four reasons why the UN 
inactively responded to intrastate conflicts. First, traditionally international organizations 
such as the UN reluctantly intervened in matters within the internal or domestic 
jurisdiction of a sovereign state. The principle of state sovereignty, referring to a supreme 
political authority within a territory, presented an argument against UN action in the 
internal politics of a state.52 Furthermore, the UN involvement in most civil wars in the 
                                                 
49
 Ibid., 15. 
50
 Ibid., 25. 
51
 Fortna 2004, 271. 
52
 Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2004, 203. 
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post-World War II period was problematical because there was the East-West ideological 
conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States.   
Second, the UN Charter was designed not to deal with internal conflicts but to 
manage interstate wars, which are generally characterized by the invasion of one state by 
another.53 The lack of a clear constitutional basis caused a discord among the members of 
the Security Council to intervene in civil wars. In many internal conflicts, the lack of full 
support from the Security Council on peace operations frequently caused a vague and 
unobtainable goal of the mission.54 In addition, the UN troops were not well trained to 
manage the issues of refugees, genocide, human rights, and massive starvation.   
Third, related to the issue of state sovereignty, the UN was reluctant to send its 
troops because of the complex nature of civil conflicts. In many cases of internal conflicts, 
it was very difficult for the UN to identify the contending parties and to get consent to 
intervene from them when there was no government.55 Furthermore, the UN frequently 
experienced problems to set a standard rule in terms of balancing between state 
sovereignty and its responsibility for initiating peace operations.56  
Finally, historically the UN suffered from budgetary problems and the lack of a 
reserve body of trained forces. In fact, the budget for UN peace operations has lagged far 
behind demand.57 The financing problem for the UN still continues today. For example, 
in 2003, the annual budget for the UN was about $1.3 billion58, which was only 3 percent 
                                                 
53
 Ibid., 105. 
54
 Ibid., 39-40. 
55
 Walter and Snyder 1999, 18. 
56
 Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2004, 105. 
57
 Ibid., 108. 
58
 United Nations 2004. According to the UN, the entire UN system (including the UN, the UN 
peacekeeping, the programs, and funds) spends about $13 billion a year, which is less than one-third of 
New York City’s budget in 2003. 
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of New York City’s budget ($43 billion).59 The UN’s budget is smaller than the 
University of Minnesota ($1.9 billion) and Metropolitan Tokyo's Fire Department ($1.8 
billion).60                                                                       
The UN continues to face these challenges. However, state sovereignty has been 
weakened in the post-Cold War era. The rapid growth of IGOs, NGOs, and international 
norms, rules and laws, the development of global telecommunications, and the expansion 
of economic interdependence have diminished the centrality of the state as the primary 
actor in world politics.61 The principle of state sovereignty has been gradually eroded 
during the past few decades. The erosion created a new potential for multilateral action in 
internal affairs.62      
Furthermore, humanitarian issues, such as starvation, refugees, and genocide, 
have now become global problems and have given international organizations, such as 
the UN, a basis for taking their own actions. However, humanitarian intervention, which 
refers to an action whose objectives are generally limited to the direct relief of human 
suffering without attempting to influence the political outcome of a conflict,63 remains 
very controversial. Opponents argue that humanitarian intervention can become an 
abusive use of force that permits a stronger power or group of powers to assert their 
will.64 According to Glennon, the majority of UN members oppose the concept of 
humanitarian intervention because they worry about the infringement of sovereignty.65 
                                                 
59
 The City of New York 2004, i. New York City’s budget in 2003 was about $43 billion. 
60
 United Nations 2004. 
61
 Mingst and Karns 2000, 11. See also Mingst and Karns 2000, 105-106. 
62
 Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2004, 105 
63
 Mortimer 1998, 126. 
64
 Harris 1995, 3. 
65
 Glennon 2001, 2.  
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Glennon condemns humanitarian intervention by individual states and coalitions of states 
without Security Council approval.66  
On the other hand, proponents support the idea of intervention in order to prevent 
or punish a massive violation of humanitarian law. They claim that humanitarian 
intervention can be deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Mortimer asserts that 
even though it is somewhat vaguely stated, Article 39 gives the Security Council absolute 
discretion to determine that an internal conflict constitutes a threat to the peace67 and to 
authorize humanitarian intervention by member states. Even though the issue of 
humanitarian intervention remains debatable, it seems to constitute a new norm in 
international affairs. In this and other ways, the post-Cold War environment has posed 
new challenges and opportunities for the UN in internal politics. 
Boutros-Ghali’s peacebilding plan was introduced under these circumstances. It 
was designed as preparation for the post-conflict management roles, which the 
international community poorly implemented during the Cold War. He believed that 
peace would be promoted as economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression 
within states were diminished.68 Critics argue that Boutros-Ghali’s proposal could not be 
fully implemented since it exceeded the capacities and expectations of individual states 
and the UN.69 Despite the criticisms, it remains a good road map for multilateral conflict-
management roles that international organizations like the UN might play.70 To 
strengthen and enhance the opportunity for successful post-conflict resolution, Boutros-
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Ghali outlined the following five interconnected roles that the UN would play in the post-
Cold War era: 
• Preventive diplomacy refers to actions that “prevent disputes from arising 
between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, 
and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.”71 
 
• Peace enforcement refers to action “with or without the consent of the parties 
to ensure compliance with a cease-fire mandated by the Security Council 
acting under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.”72 Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter lays out direct military intervention and various enforcement 
mechanisms, such as economic, diplomatic, financial, and military sanctions, 
to deter or prevent threats to international peace.73 
 
• Peacemaking refers to actions that bring hostile parties to agreement through 
peaceful means, such as those found in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.74 
 
• Peacekeeping refers to “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the 
fields, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally 
involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently 
civilians, as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities 
for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.”75   
 
• Multidimensional Peacebuilding refers to activities including “disarming the 
previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and 
possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training 
support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to 
protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions 
and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.”76 In 
addition, peacebuilding activities include mediation and confidence building 
among the conflict parties, humanitarian assistance (including food aid, water, 
sanitation, and health care), stabilization of economic structures, information 
and the establishment of educational structures, campaigns informing and 
educating people regarding peacebuilding missions.77  
 
Peacebuilding encompasses a wide range of post-conflict management missions. 
Peacebuilding operations should be designed to address the specific needs of a particular 
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conflict. In other words, a different type or level of peacebuilding operation should be 
planned to address a different type or level of a particular conflict. As Cousens and 
Kumar argue, “Peacebuilding should not be equated to the entire basket of postwar needs, 
as multiple and complex as they are.”78 Implementing peacebuilding operations to 
address the specific needs of a conflict is a strategy of peacebuilding. Furthermore, UN 
peacebuilding has been one of the devices to be pursued at different stages of a conflict. 
“Peacebuilding can occur in advance, alongside, or even in the absence of a peacekeeping 
operation or a formal peacemaking effort, although it will face different constraints and 
enjoy fewer resources.”79 In this sense, these forms of UN missions are mutually 
supportive and closely interconnected.  
The third research puzzle is to investigate which type of UN military operations 
works best to promote durable peace. Since various types of UN military operations 
should deal with a different level of hostility, I wish to divide them into the following 
four operations: (1) monitoring or observer missions, (2) traditional peacekeeping, (3) 
multidimensional peacebuilding, and (4) peace enforcement. The purpose of monitoring 
or observer missions is to monitor the negotiated treaty and assist in the negotiation of a 
peace settlement with the presence of military and civilian observers. Traditional 
peacekeeping involves the insertion of UN troops between the armies of two or more 
hostile parties after a cease-fire has been agreed to by the parties to the conflict. 
Disarmament becomes the most essential responsibility of the peacekeeping operations 
because the contending parties in civil conflicts fight with light weapons.80 
Multidimensional peacebuilding refers to an arrangement of strategies to build a self-
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sustaining peace, ranging from traditional peacekeeping operations to the development of 
local capacities and institutional rebuilding.81 In general, war-torn societies require 
comprehensive reform in their social, economic, political, and security sectors. This 
involves creating new or reorganizing the existing institutions to address specific needs 
and to enforce socially accepted rules.82 Peace enforcement refers to a variety of 
enforcement mechanisms, such as direct military intervention and a range of economic 
and military sanctions. Even though Boutros-Ghali’s proposal was not fully implemented, 
exploring the potential validity of his assumptions and the potential of various conflict 
roles he proposes for the UN will be a critical factor in reforming and enhancing the 
capacity of the world’s largest organization.  
Humanitarian NGOs  
In recent decades, humanitarian NGOs have grown significantly and have 
participated aggressively in a wide range of peacebuilding missions saving hundreds and 
thousands of lives in the aftermath of civil wars. The leading international NGOs,83 such 
as the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), World Vision International, 
International Save the Children Alliance, Catholic Relief Services, Care International, 
Oxfam International, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), and Christian Children’s 
Fund, are the most powerful actors in regional conflict along with the UN. In fact, “the 
top level of the humanitarian system is occupied by the big multinational NGOs.”84 They 
are highly professional, leading campaigners, financially strong and highly visible in the 
media. Katarina West reports that the international humanitarian NGO community is a 
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rich world of professional bodies, local organizations, mammoth multinationals, charities, 
advocacy groups, business-like organizations, and voluntary associations.85  
Table 1. Annual Income* of Larger Humanitarian NGOs 1999−2004 ($US million) 
 
Year The 
ICRC86 
World Vision 
International  
International 
Save the 
Children 
Alliance 
Care 
USA87 
Catholic 
Relief 
Services 
The IRC Oxfam  
Great  
Britain88 
1999 670 774 N/A 426 N/A N/A 30089 
2002 632 1003 467 421 269 157 344 
2004 71890 1550 772 572 552 169 339 
*The annual income generally includes contributions (from governments, international organizations, and 
private citizens), grants, net assets, contracts, investment returns, loan administration fees and other. 
Sources: The ICRC’s 1999, 2002, 2003 annual reports. World Vision International’s 2004 annual report. 
International Save the Children Alliance’s 2002 and 2004 annual reports. Catholic Relief Services’ 2003 
and 2004 annual reports. The IRC’s 2002 and 2004 annual reports. Oxfam Great Britain’s 2000 – 2004 
annual reports. 
 
The growth of humanitarian NGOs has been particularly remarkable in the last 
two decades. For example, in 1989, 180,000 tons of food were channeled through 
European-based humanitarian NGOs, and the amount was significantly increased to 
450,000 tons in 1991.91 The U.S. official aid to humanitarian NGOs skyrocketed in ten 
years, from $ 32 million to $1 billion in 1994.92 Table 1 presents the total income of the 
leading humanitarian NGOs in the past half decade. According to Table 1, the income of 
NGOs has steadily increased and ranges from hundreds of million dollars to more than $1 
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billion. Between 1999 and 2004, the increased rate of revenue ranged from 7 percent (the 
ICRC) to more than 100 percent (World Vision International). As of 2004, the world’s 
largest humanitarian NGO, World Vision International, alone raised $1.5 billion. CARE 
USA and Oxfam Great Britain compete with other multinational NGOs by raising $572 
million and $339 million respectively. The dynamism of humanitarian NGOs activities is 
closely associated with the levels of their finances.93 One of the main reasons for the 
rapidly growing involvement of humanitarian NGOs is that they provide fast, quality 
services. “They are flexible and speedy, they disregard state borders, are cheaper in 
relative terms, have links at grass-roots levels, and are not bureaucratic.”94 NGOs are in a 
much better position compared with IGOs when it comes to providing the current 
humanitarian activities, which require an immediate deployable capacity with expertise. 
This is because the decision-making process of IGOs is much more cumbersome than 
that of their counterparts. Hence, it is not surprising to witness the rapid involvement of 
NGOs in regional conflict.  
In general, NGOs carry out their humanitarian relief action at the grassroots level, 
which is labor intensive.95 Humanitarian relief action refers to an effort to prevent, 
alleviate or eliminate human suffering during a natural disaster and a man-made armed 
conflict.96 It includes emergency assistance and political, social, and economic 
rehabilitation programs and is often conducted as a critical part of peacebuilding 
operations. West categorizes a wide variety of humanitarian relief operations as follows: 
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• Preventive operation refers to efforts to anticipate humanitarian crises rather 
than to improve them.97 Its mechanism includes election monitoring, fact 
finding missions, early-warning systems, regional or international mediation, 
peace monitoring, lobbying and information sharing, and development 
assistance.98 At this stage, NGOs raise international awareness regarding 
“alarming humanitarian developments and pressure governments and IGOs to 
take action.99    
 
• General operation refers to efforts to raise international or national awareness 
of humanitarian issues in donor countries and to develop general principles of 
humanitarian action. These actions include public advocacy, lobbying, and 
campaigning at the national and international level in order to raise awareness 
of humanitarian issues.100  
 
• Protective operation refers to efforts to maintain basic order and to shield 
civilians from fighting. It includes prison visits, landmine clearance, and 
maintaining minimum standards in refugee camps.101 Protective action 
frequently works with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
which manages massive refugee arrivals.102 
 
• Relief operation refers to efforts to alleviate human sufferings in conflict 
regions by providing clothing, shelter, food, medicine, and other basic 
necessities for survival. The scope of the relief operation can expand to 
include sanitation, health care, and the construction of temporary and more 
long-term shelters, etc.103 
 
• Restorative operation refers to efforts to deal with the most urgent human 
distress and damage caused by fighting and to manage psychological, social, 
economic, and administrative rehabilitation. According to West, restorative 
action is divided into conflict resolution, which attempts to find an agreement 
among the antagonists in order to terminate fighting, and peacebuilding, 
which aims to “improve general security, establish a legitimate government 
and rehabilitate the local economy and civil society.”104  
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• Forcible operation refers to efforts to enforce penalties for severe violations of 
international humanitarian law [e.g. UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 
827 for the former Yugoslavia in 1993] and for severe human rights violations 
[e.g. UNSC Resolution 794 for Somalia in 1992].105 It generally works with 
assistance from UNSC. Humanitarian NGOs attempt to speed up enforcement 
of humanitarian law violations.   
 
These six categories illustrate that humanitarian NGOs are engaged in almost 
every aspect of peacebuilding operations for war-torn societies. Preventive, general, and 
forcible operations are often coordinated with the UN and other IGOs. According to 
Alger, NGOs are increasingly involved in IGOs because most important peacebuilding 
issues are placed on the agendas of the UN and other IGOs.106 Alger claims that 
successful completion of NGO tasks requires cooperation and coordination with the UN 
as well as other IGOs.107 Protective, relief, and restorative operations seek not only to 
recover the trust and a sense of community but also to offer a better life for the victims of 
war and armed conflict, allowing them to begin the peacebuilding process. Humanitarian 
NGO activities include the process of “reconciliation,” which provides for a conflict-
handling mechanism that addresses deep emotional wounds.108 In this way, humanitarian 
NGO attempt to establish a new, favorable relationship among previous warring groups.   
As West claims, humanitarian NGO tasks are expanded, diversified, detailed, 
complicated, and extremely significant. Governments of war-torn societies are generally 
incapable of providing basic humanitarian relief programs in the aftermath of prolonged 
intrastate conflicts. When a government fails, violates, or refuses to protect rights and to 
provide basic goods and services for its citizens, individuals or groups may seek help 
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from external actors to express their concerns and even to protect their lives.109 Then, the 
international community begins to put pressure on the host government and attempts to 
deploy aid agencies that generally channel between the host government and its citizens. 
In fact, the field agents of the UN and humanitarian NGOs frequently work as mediators 
negotiating with the authorities to address the various needs of individual citizens and 
obtaining the authorizations needed to implement a wide range of peacebuilding 
activities.110 Mediation is one of the most significant duties that the field agents must 
carry out.111 Furthermore, the field agents are involved in protecting rights and providing 
goods and services that the host government fails to deliver.   
The final research puzzle of this study is to measure the success of humanitarian 
NGOs in the aftermath of civil wars. I intend to explore how the leading humanitarian 
NGOs have engaged in different types of field operations, as West categorizes, and how  
their operations from 1945 to 2003 correlate with the promotion of long-lasting peace.     
IV. Organization of This Study   
 The next chapter develops a theoretical framework by exploring the most 
dominant theories of international relations, such as neorealism, neoliberalism/neoliberal 
institutionalism, and constructivism. I intend to summarize their major assumptions, 
analyze how they differ from each other, and evaluate which school of thought offers the 
most appropriate explanations that aid our understanding of international peacebuilding. 
Chapter 3 outlines the existing literature on international assistance for war-torn societies 
and its relationship to efforts that promote sustainable peace. Chapter 3 also highlights 
the most significant explanatory variables that are associated with the success of third-
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party intervention. I will incorporate and apply them to construct my empirical models, in 
an effort to fill in the gaps in the literature.  
Chapter 4 introduces research methods and various statistical models to solve the 
four research puzzles by testing the hypotheses of this study. In addition, in Chapter 4,  
I outline my findings and offer an extensive analysis of international peacebuilding 
operations after civil wars. Based upon my theoretical and quantitative findings,  
Chapter 5 addresses the current challenges surrounding the UN and discusses several 
recommendations for revitalizing UN peace operations. The concluding chapter reviews 
theoretical and empirical findings of this study and briefly discusses how the scope of this 
study can be enlarged.            
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2 
 
Theoretical Perspectives on the Termination of Violence and the  
Creation of Sustainable Peace in the Aftermath of Intrastate Conflicts 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
As civil war has become the most dominant form of armed conflict in the global 
system, conflict analysts have focused on applying the dominant theoretical frameworks 
to understand the conditions associated with the initiation and the termination of 
intrastate conflict and the creation of durable peace. Neorealists find that there are 
similarities between the anarchical international system and the lack of a central authority 
within war-torn societies. In their view, neorealism helps in understanding how civil wars 
begin and end, and offers prescriptions.  
Neoliberal institutionalists disagree. In their view, neorealists simply neglect to 
discuss what happens in the aftermath of civil wars. Neoliberals assert that ending civil 
wars requires not only the absence of physical violence but also the creation of the social, 
political, and economic infrastructures for reinstating domestic order. According to their 
view, neorealists fail to provide an analysis of the conditions associated with the 
processes by which former warring groups mutually develop new governing 
institutions.112  
Constructivists claim that both neorealists and neoliberals focus only on 
explaining states’ materially based interests and are unable to explain the sources of 
states’ motivations for international moral action, which is generally defined as “an 
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international action that advances a moral principle rather than a selfish one.”113 
Constructivists emphasize that they have better explanations for the role of states and 
international organizations in international moral action than neoliberals. Neorealists 
respond that arguments made by neoliberals and constructivists are exaggerated and 
inadequate to reflect the reality of intrastate conflicts today. Hence, neorealists call them 
idealists and utopians. The arguments among the three schools of thought continue today 
and seem to be endless. 
This study explores the conditions associated with the termination of intrastate 
conflict and the creation of a durable peace, particularly the role of international 
organization. This chapter clarifies which school of thought offers the best explanation of 
these conditions. This process involves the identification and application of the major 
assumptions made by neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism. Even if 
neorealism could be arguably a dominant theory in explaining the creation and the 
termination of interstate conflicts, it does not seem to be applicable to intrastate wars. In 
addition, neorealism offers an insufficient prescription for post-conflict resolution. 
Neorealists overlook the roles that international organizations and domestic institutions 
can have in securing a peace agreement, protecting the right of political participation, 
providing basic social services, and reinstating domestic order for the previously warring 
groups. On the other hand, constructivists make a good point stating that neorealists and 
neoliberals do not do a good job in explaining most of the international moral actions 
after the Cold War. However, their discussion of state involvements in international 
moral action seems to be somewhat exaggerated.  
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This chapter demonstrates that neoliberal institutionalism appears to be a more 
useful framework for explaining the phenomenon of domestic capacity and international 
assistance in the aftermath of civil wars. In the next section, I explore how neorealists 
explain the conditions associated with the causes and the cures of intrastate conflicts. 
Then, I present the discussion of neoliberal institutionalists and argue how international 
organizations and domestic institutions can play a role in promoting sustainable peace. 
Next, I discuss how constructivists emphasize the role of states and international 
organizations in international responsibility and how they take a different theoretical 
approach in explaining the international system compared with neorealists and 
neoliberals (scholars of rational choice). Finally, I reconcile the three schools of thought 
and demonstrate that the neoliberal institutionalists view can be a relevant framework for 
this study.       
II. The Neorealist Position 
Neorealism has mainly focused on analyzing the nature of interstate conflicts. 
Nonetheless, in recent studies, analysts of intrastate wars borrow neorealists’ views in 
order to scrutinize the causes and the cures of civil conflicts. In the neorealist view, 
neorealism can be applicable to intrastate conflicts.        
The Core Assumptions of Neorealism 
There are three major assumptions identified by the scholars of the Neorealist 
School. First, the essential nature of the international system, which is characterized by 
interactions among states, is anarchic. Grieco argues that the anarchical international 
system refers to the lack of a supreme authority to prevent other states from using 
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violence, or the threat of violence, to destroy or enslave.114 States in anarchy are 
preoccupied with power and security.115 According to Waltz, “anarchy is taken to mean 
not just the absence of government but also the presence of disorder and chaos.”116 For 
this reason, Waltz claims that the international system is a self-help system. “A self-help 
system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively 
than others, will fail to prosper.”117 While states have to boost economic capability, to 
increase military strength, and to develop effective tactics internally, they should also 
broaden their own alliance to weaken the military strength of potential enemies 
externally.118 Waltz argues that states are “unitary actors who, at minimum, seek their 
own preservation and, at maximum, drive for universal domination.”119 For neorealists, 
states’ most common and essential goal is to survive and maintain its status in the 
international system.  
Second, states are not only the most important actors in the international system 
but also they can be conceptualized as unitary actors.120 A state is unitary in that it is a 
“rational egoist” that seeks to maximize “national interests.” According to Waltz, states 
perform essential political, social, and economic functions which no other organization 
could possibly replace.121 In his view, the interactions among states essentially form the 
structure of the international political system.122  
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Third, the anarchical international system limits the cooperation between states.123 
According to Grieco, states are reluctant to cooperate with one another for two reasons. 
First, states are concerned about cheating. Most states strongly believe that it is extremely 
hard to monitor what others would gain and lose in the process of international 
cooperation. Because of this, Grieco maintains that international organizations are only 
marginally able to contribute to the promotion of international cooperation.124 Second, 
states are concerned about relative achievements of gains.125 States fears that 
“achievements of joint gains that advantage a friend in the present might produce a more 
dangerous potential foe in the future.”126 In the neorealist view, states are extremely 
concerned about what their partners would gain from the cooperation.  
Neorealists believe that the absence of a central authority that provides order and 
mediates disputes compels states to help themselves. A key concept of neorealism, the 
security dilemma __ an increase in one group’s security decreases the security of 
others127__ forces states to increase their own power, worry about the power of other 
states, and limit international cooperation. Arms races, forming balance of power 
coalitions,128 and war are inevitable under the anarchic system.  
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The Causes and the Cures of Civil Wars 
According to neorealists, neorealism can be applicable to understanding the 
causes and cures of intrastate conflicts.129 In their view, the anarchical international 
system resembles the absence of a central authority within war-torn societies. “The 
absence of authority among states in the international system parallels the lack of 
effective central authority within states at risk of domestic conflict.” 130 Under anarchy, 
domestic political groups fear for their security in the same way that states do in the 
international system.  
The security dilemma comes into play when domestic political groups’ security is 
no longer guaranteed. In the neorealist view, after a strong central government collapses, 
the groups suddenly monitor each other’s movements and interpret every act as a 
potential threat to their safety.131 At a minimum, they continuously maintain an 
approximate equilibrium of power against their rivals so that they can prevent the 
predominance of any single political group. Furthermore, each political group often 
strategically plans for military victory. Hence, the security dilemma increases the level of 
hostility among the contending parties and a chance for military showdown. “Efforts to 
provide for the security for the group create conditions that lead to both higher levels of 
collective insecurity and a great probability of violent intergroup conflict.”132  
 After presenting the conditions associated with the causes of civil wars, 
neorealists offer three mechanisms for the cures. First, since the causes stem from the 
domestic anarchy, the restoration of a hierarchic order through the use of force will be 
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one of the most effective means to end wars.133 One of the key concepts of neorealism, 
the hegemonic stability theory, comes into play when a stronger group achieves a military 
victory and dominates the weaker domestic groups. The hegemonic stability theory refers 
to the notion that the stability of the international system requires a single dominant state 
to articulate and enforce the rules of interaction among states.134 In the neorealist view, a 
powerful group exercises its hegemonic power135 to establish the basic rules and orders 
favorable to its own interests as well as the weaker groups.136 Under the conditions 
specified in the hegemonic stability theory, the lesser groups of a state comply with the 
authoritarian leadership for their security and benefit. Military victory is one of the 
effective means for ending civil wars according to neorealism. 
Second, a division of the population and territory of warring groups can be a 
solution for ending civil wars.137 Intrastate conflicts are generally more difficult to end 
than interstate wars because the warring groups cannot remain separate and retain their 
own armed forces. For this reason, neorealists suggest a mechanism that is designed to 
divide the country so that each of the major warring groups obtains its own sovereign 
state. The idea of partition stems from a core assumption of neorealism -- the balance of 
power system in which groups or states seek to maintain an approximate equilibrium of 
power among many rivals. In their case study of Bosnia, for example, Mearsheimer and 
Evera propose to split the state into two different ethnically homogenous independent 
countries: a Serb Republic and a Muslim-Croat Federation, each of which balances the 
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other.138 In their view, when a domestic group or a state fails to establish the balance of 
power, outsiders like the United States or the UN can step in to protect the weaker 
power.139 
Finally, civil wars can be ended by the intervention by outside powers. According 
to neorealists, even though most states are not tempted to intervene in the affairs of other 
states, they are often motivated to intervene when a civil conflict becomes a threat to their 
own interests and security. For neorealists, intervention can be an effective mechanism to 
accumulate more power and to pursue national interests.140 Humanitarian intervention, 
for example, generally signifies the exercise of public authority within a foreign 
jurisdiction without the consent of the local sovereign and aims to assist significant 
segments of a population suffering from a natural disaster, starvation, or the inability of 
government to provide the basic needs.141 Neorealists believe humanitarian intervention 
is a cover for expansionist policies aimed to increase the relative power of the 
intervener.142  
Mearsheimer asserts that states are expected to intervene in a humanitarian crisis 
only when their expected benefits exceed their expected costs.143 In addition, neorealists 
argue that an outside state can end internal wars by intervening as it “takes sides, tilts the 
local balance of power, and helps one of the rivals to win.”144 Neorealists expect that the 
interveners increase the relative power through a permanent occupation or inclusion of a 
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territory in their sphere of influence.145 For neorealists, since anarchy causes violence, 
establishing a strong hierarchical power is a significant factor for peace. However, the 
application of neorealism to internal war remains controversial and questionable. 
Neorealism, in fact, often faces several criticisms.  
Limitations of Neorealism   
 Even though the adoption of neorealist analysis has improved understanding of 
the processes by which intrastate conflicts may be initiated, it is nonetheless an 
insufficient approach to explain the conditions associated with the causes and the cures of 
civil wars. Neorealism may not be entirely applicable to internal conflicts since the 
anarchical international system is not fully comparable to the domestic anarchy, and civil 
war is not a small version of interstate conflict. 
There are several critical limitations of neorealism. First, neorealism offers 
inadequate explanations of the origins of civil wars. In the neorealist view, domestic 
anarchy is a given. This is wrong. It does not typically emerge without human 
intervention. Neorealism neglects to explain how anarchy emerges on the domestic level 
in the first place.146 Domestic anarchy generally emerges as the result of internal war (for 
example, in Liberia and Somalia), and most civil wars take place when governments 
continue to exercise at least some degree of control.147 Thus, domestic anarchy may not 
be fully equivalent to the anarchical international system. Internal wars hardly occur 
under anarchy assumed by neorealism. Second, neorealists consider only the material 
factors, such as military capability or economic powers, as being the causes and fail to 
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identify a wide range of other motivations that favor insurgency. Ethnic nationalism; lack 
of democratic rules, laws, and institutions; presence of political and economic 
discrimination against minorities; and state discrimination against minority religions or 
languages are commonly thought to fuel internal conflict.148  
However, even though these variables may be the underlying causes of violence, 
they are insufficient in explaining why civil wars break out. In fact, a number of analysts 
of intrastate conflicts have concluded that there is no single motivation that triggers 
violence. Walter and Snyder assert that elites often manipulate information for their self-
interests — maintaining prestigious political power and economic status —and 
deceptively create malicious images of a potential rival in order to obtain popular 
support.149 Then the elites make a decision to trigger violence based upon their evaluation 
of “how malicious or benign a potential rival might be.”150 Brown also comes to a similar 
conclusion that “bad leaders,” are one of the most critical factors that fuel internal 
conflicts (for example, Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan). Bad leaders typically trigger 
violence not to resolve the existing problems or to preserve peace for their citizens but to 
remain in power. Brown identifies four sets of proximate causes: internal, mass-level 
factors (bad domestic problems); external, mass-level factors (bad neighborhoods); 
external, elite-level factors (bad neighbors); or internal, elite-level factors (bad 
leaders).151 Though many civil wars are initiated by bad domestic problems, the vast 
majority are triggered by bad leaders.152 Neorealism assumes that a group makes a 
decision to go to war in support of its national interests. However, bad leaders in the vast 
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majority of civil wars act on behalf of their own interests, according to Brown’s 
conclusion. 
Third, restoring a strong government power through the use of force is an 
insufficient solution. Neorealists assert that the domestic anarchy causes internal violence 
and that the restoration of a strong government authority or hegemonic power is the best 
way to resolve conflict. However, neorealism is silent when it comes to discussing how to 
make a new government capable of accommodating various interests of the contending 
parties and how to create a new nonpartisan national military force. Neorealism offers no 
guidelines for establishing a strong government capable of resolving problems such as 
ethnic strife, the lack of democratic institutions to channel conflict, and the absence of an 
experienced bureaucracy.153  
In addition, reinstating a strong hierarchy power through military victory is a 
painful solution. According to Zartman, internal conflicts often reach a “mutually painful 
stalemate,” that is, a condition in which a government or rebel group realizes that the cost 
for staying in the conflict exceeds the benefits to be achieved. 154 As a result, neither side 
can win nor walk away defeated. However, the conflict usually goes on, because warring 
groups believe that it will bring political power or economic benefits. As a result, civil 
wars usually produce more devastating outcomes, such as massive casualties, displaced 
refugees, mass starvations, and last longer than international counterparts. After 
achieving military victory, a government traditionally tends to be hostile toward potential 
rebel groups in a way that diminishes the security dilemma. Snyder and Jervis argue that 
a government with predatory intentions against potential rebel groups can hardly be a 
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solution to the problem of insecurity.155 The predatory intentions can be a potential 
source of internal violence. Walter reports that the likelihood of a return to war would be 
increased when a former combatant’s quality of life remains at a critically low level, and 
there are barriers to political participation.156 
Fourth, separating populations for conflict resolution remains deeply controversial 
and problematic. Proponents of the partition support neorealism by arguing that conflict 
resolutions, such as disarming, institution-building and power-sharing, that aim to 
accommodate the interests of former combatants will not work because of the security 
dilemma. According to Kaufmann, “The security dilemma generated by intermixed 
populations ensures that ethnic wars always separate the warring communities; this 
process cannot be stopped except by permanent military occupation or genocide, or by 
not having the war in the first place.”157 Opponents claim that partition of warring ethnic 
groups side by side will increase the level of violence and only be achieved with 
producing vast numbers of casualties and refugees.158 Breaking of a state into mutually 
hostile entities possibly will promote internal peace at the expense of increased 
international war.159 In addition, it does not solve the problem with irreconcilable 
minorities who are left behind and often face a difficult-to-obtain international 
recognition. Furthermore, in his empirical study, Sambanis finds that partition is, in fact, 
positively associated with recurrence of ethnic war.160  
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Finally, neorealism pays little attention to situations in which humanitarian 
intervention cannot be explained by the strategic interests of the intervener. Neorealists 
view that states pursue their geographic or political interests through humanitarian 
intervention. However, they do not explain how and why the U.S. and the UN intervened 
in Somalia and Cambodia in the early 1990s. In fact, Somalia and Cambodia were 
strategically insignificant to the U.S. and to the other interveners under UN auspices.161 
The main purpose of the interventions was humanitarian. According to Finnemore, there 
has been a change in international norms of humanitarian intervention. In her view, 
contemporary humanitarian interventions in the 1990s were nonstrategic multilateral 
efforts, based on shared norms and principles of international responsibility.162  
In sum, even though neorealism makes a point that weak governments may invite 
internal violence, it still seems to be an insufficient framework for analyzing the origins 
and the cures of civil wars. Civil wars are essentially not comparable to their international 
counterparts. I turn to present the major arguments of neoliberals and how they offer 
explanations of the conditions associated with the termination of violence and the 
creation of sustainable peace in civil conflicts.  
III. The Neoliberal Institutionalist Position 
Ending civil wars requires not only the absence of physical violence but also the 
establishment of the preconditions for sustainable peace, such as building mutual 
confidence among former warring groups; creating the social, political, and economic 
infrastructures; and obtaining international assistance. Neorealists remain silent in 
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discussions about the conditions associated with reconciling a wide range of interests of 
former warring groups and with administering various aspects of transitions to peace. I 
underscore that institutions can play a critical role in promoting domestic stability, 
building mutual confidence among the former combatants, creating norms and rules in 
various sectors, and, hence, restoring domestic order. Even though neoliberals and 
neorealists both focus on the materially based interests of states, their theories contain 
very different assumptions.  
The Core Assumptions of Neoliberal Institutionalism 
The key assumptions of neoliberal institutionalism stem from neoliberal 
international theory. Neoliberals stress the rapid growth of transnational interdependence 
and the emergence of various types of international institutions and nonstate actors in 
world politics, especially in the post-Cold War period. Neoliberal institutionalism 
encompasses four assumptions. First, neoliberals, as do neorealists, recognize the 
anarchical international system. However, their interpretations are completely different 
from those of neorealists. According to Stein, neorealists emphasize a state’s independent 
decision-making process under the anarchic system; neoliberals emphasize a joint 
decision-making process among states through international institutions.163 Neoliberals 
believe that the anarchic system permits a variety of patterns of interactions among states 
based on a felt need to produce collective goods, resulting in pressures for “pooling 
sovereignty.”164 Humanitarian issues such as massive refugee migration, systemic 
genocide, mass starvations, and violence against women and children have become 
global problems and a threat to international peace and security and have given 
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international organizations such as the UN a basis for taking action. Hence, states 
increasingly interact jointly, since these issues and problems frequently occur outside of 
their jurisdictions, and make the potential role of international institutions significant. 
For example, UN peacebuilding operations can take place when civil conflicts 
create severe guerrilla warfare, massive refugees, and terrorism that spill over to the 
strategic allies of the intervener.165 For example, in 1994 an estimated 2 million refugees 
from Rwanda fled to neighboring the states of Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and the 
former Zaire.166 However, none of these host countries were in a position to provide 
goods and services to these refugees. Refugees impose a heavy burden on host states.167 
Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate rightly claim that states may hardly be expected to give up 
their sovereignty in the security field, but they still work with nonstate actors or 
multilateral institutions, such as NGOs, the World Bank, and the UN, in the economic, 
social, and humanitarian issue-areas.168   
Second, according to Zacher and Sutton, states have not always been concerned 
with maximizing their autonomy either as a core or instrumental value.169 States’ core 
values change in importance over time, and they often trade off autonomy to realize other 
important issues.170 They criticize neorealists by arguing that a state’s goals are not 
limited only to security and power. Promoting economic welfare, international justice, 
democracy, liberal values, and even peace can be goals of states.   
                                                 
165
 Löwenheim 2003, 26. See also Brown 1996, 8. 
166
 Central Intelligence Agency 2005. 
167
 Brown 1996, 7. 
168
  Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2004, 203. 
169
 Zacher and Sutton 1996, 21. 
170
 Ibid. 
 41 
Third, neoliberals tend to downplay the barriers to cooperation. According to 
Zacher and Sutton, there is a network of formal or informal international organizations in 
world politics that promotes the negotiation of mutually beneficial accords and greater 
transparency in states’ compliance with agreements.171 In contrast to neorealists,  
neoliberals stress that there are not many issue areas where states fear that gains by other 
states will pose serious threats to them.172 In addition, states are capable of monitoring 
what others would gain and lose in the process of the international cooperation by 
themselves. “States in the international system have devised a number of military and 
economic strategies to encourage cooperation even when incentives favor cheating.”173 
States are capable of forming alliances to impose military or economic sanctions against 
deceptive behaviors. Not only can states use economic coercion to enhance the 
desirability of seeking rewards from cooperation, but they can also withhold key 
resources or implement reciprocal punishment strategies to ensure that violations are 
punished.174  
Finally, neoliberals emphasize the role of institutions. Where neorealism presents 
a pessimistic view on the effectiveness of international institutions, neoliberal 
institutionalism stresses that institutions can reconcile various strategically motivated 
interests of states and promote transnational cooperation under the anarchical system. 
Hence, neoliberals recognize that not only states but also international institutions play a 
major role in world politics. They also attach importance to other nonstate actors, such as 
specialized international agencies, interest groups, transnational actors (multinational 
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corporations, etc.) and individual citizens.175 Rebuilding political, economic, and social 
institutions and reconstructing the infrastructure of war-torn societies require the special 
attention and effort of individual states, IGOs, NGOs, and individual citizens. In this 
process, neoliberals particularly stress the conflict-management roles that international 
organizations, like the UN, can potentially play. In fact, international peace can be 
realized through international cooperation. “Cooperation can include an acceptance of 
moral norms, adherence to international law, or collaboration through international 
organizations.”176  
Neoliberal institutionalism rejects most of neorealism’s propositions by arguing 
that security issues have had to compete for attention with other issues since the end of 
the Cold War and that states are increasingly focusing on ways in which they can become 
partners in order to pursue mutually beneficial interests. Neoliberal institutionalism offers 
a theoretical basis for examining the role of the UN in post-conflict resolution. In the next 
section, I adopt the neoliberal framework and discuss how domestic institutions can play 
a role in restoring domestic order. 
The Role of Domestic Institutions in War-Torn Societies 
 Domestic institutions are critical elements for securing peace, since they provide a 
mechanism that seeks to channel various interests and expectations of former warring 
groups. In the aftermath of internal conflicts, institutions play a role in making a peace 
accord more credible by setting priorities among the demands, coordinating conflicting 
objectives, ensuring effective implementation of the agreement, and managing political 
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factions to prevent the recurrence of war.177 Nye posits that the role of institutions is 
crucial since they make people believe there is not going to be a violent conflict.178 In 
particular, institutions can perform a critical role in decreasing the security dilemma. 
Furthermore, in recent years, the UN and humanitarian NGOs have increasingly joined 
domestic institutions to support efforts toward peace.    
Domestic institutions take a wide range of roles in encouraging former 
combatants to mutually develop governing bodies, secure a peace agreement, and restore 
domestic order. First, institutions provide “a sense of continuity”179 and community. As 
institutions continuously provide communication channels, security, and services, they 
can create an environment that allows former warriors to experience a sense of 
consistency, comfort, and cohesiveness. In the process of implementing the provisions of 
peace agreements and of making new governing bodies (rules, policies, and laws), 
members of war-torn societies slowly attain a sense that their demands and expectations 
should be balanced with other members and that their interests and needs can be 
coordinated and fulfilled when they work together. Especially allowing participation in 
the process of implementing peace accords indicates that the intentions of former warring 
groups are truly convincing. In this slow course of action, people increasingly develop a 
sense of belonging together and a shared faith that “mutual benefit comes from being 
together.”180 As a result, they gradually find a stronger attraction to the community and 
obtain emotional and physical security. 
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Second, institutions provide a prospect for reciprocity.181 Public hearings, 
seminars, forums, and other mechanisms can be offered for communicating with former 
combatants. In this process, institutions provide a flow of information regarding what to 
expect from new governing bodies and what to be expected from members of society. 
Institutions are capable of monitoring behavior to verify that citizens are acting in accord 
with governing rules.182 “Recognizing that noncooperative behavior has the potential to 
be reciprocated in the future serves as a strong incentive to behave in accordance with 
established norms.”183 Furthermore, in the process of establishing new governmental 
institutions, neoliberals strongly emphasize that former combatants must construct 
institutions that “seek to share, divide, and balance power”184 among them. This is to 
prevent the dominance of political, economic, and military power controlled by a single 
group.  
Third, institutions provide ways to prevent potential conflicts.185  Implementing 
the provisions of peace accords requires constant negotiations and bargaining processes 
among the contending parties. Institutions serve as a mediator by setting priorities among 
goals and by reconciling the conflict objectives. In addition, institutions are capable of 
monitoring and imposing coercive measures against any deceptive arrangements or rebel 
movements. As Hoddie and Hartzell correctly point out, institutions both encourage 
citizens to comply with governing rules and punish “those who act outside the boundaries 
of acceptable behavior.”186 For this reason, institutions can play a crucial role in shaping 
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the behavior of former combatants and in creating a climate that supports long-term 
peace.  
Fourth, domestic institutions conduct structural reforms in the political, economic, 
social, and judicial sector. War-torn societies often require comprehensive reform in 
almost all sectors of society. This involves creating new or reorganizing the existing 
institutions to address specific needs and to enforce socially accepted rules.187 Political 
reform implies the establishment of democratic norms, values, laws, and institutions that 
allow citizens to participate in the political process equally. Economic reform contains 
the establishment of a free-market economic environment. It also involves a restoration 
of economic institutions and activities that can be managed by socially accepted rules, 
regulations, and contracts governing business transactions and legal rights defining 
ownership of private property.188 Social reform requires two elements. One is to restore 
general social services providing health care, education, policing, and child welfare. The 
other is to help war victims resettle. Along with the UN and humanitarian NGOs, the 
efforts include providing shelter and humanitarian relief to refugees and internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) and offering rehabilitation services to war widows and sexually 
abused women.189 Providing humanitarian needs to these groups is a significant factor in 
developing political, social, and economic stability. At last, judicial reform seeks an 
establishment of an efficient and legitimate judicial system. The establishment of 
structural reforms attempts to accommodate various interests of antagonists. Creating or 
restoring basic infrastructures for war-torn societies seems to be a significant determinant 
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in improving the local capacity. The duration of peace after civil wars is likely to increase 
when the level of local capacity is increased.  
Institutions can play an important role in restoring domestic order and in 
promoting durable peace in the aftermath of civil wars resolved either by negotiated 
settlements or by a military victory of one side.190 Hoddie and Hartzell report on the 
strong correlation between efforts to implement peace accords through power-sharing 
institutions and the duration of peace.191 In her previous study, Hartzell reaches a similar 
conclusion that institutionalized peace settlements, which offer institutional guarantees 
for diminishing the security dilemma, tend to be stable.192 Though neoliberals maintain 
that institutionalism can be an appropriate theoretical framework for analyzing the 
conditions associated with the termination of internal conflicts and the initiation of peace, 
they agree with the neorealist position that more empirical studies have to be conducted 
to measure the effectiveness of institutions.  
Limitations of Neoliberal Institutionalism  
 The theoretical framework I develop focuses on the role of institutions in the 
process of building sustainable peace. The adoption of neoliberal institutionalism has 
significantly improved my understanding of the processes by which former warring 
groups seek to build mutually favorable governing bodies and to promote peace in the 
aftermath of civil wars. Although institutionalism represents a major advance in 
understanding various aspects of transitions to peace, it has several shortcomings. First, 
institutionalism pays insufficient attention to the distribution of power among the 
contending parties. Though neoliberals recognize that the unequal distribution of social, 
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economic, political and military power might invite internal violence in the future, they 
neglect to analyze how former warring groups compete and seize power.  
Second, neoberals overlook discussing how the most powerful group can be 
punished when it refuses or neglects to comply with mutual agreements. Failing to fully 
implement the provisions of a peace agreement is one of the most critical factors that 
invite the recurrence of internal violence. “Evidence of failure to act in a manner 
consistent with the agreement’s provisions increases the likelihood that individuals will 
lose faith in the good intentions of their competitors and will opt for a return to 
conflict.”193 When a hegemonic power violates the agreements, it is questionable whether 
weaker groups would impose a punishment on them.  
Third, neoliberals pay little attention to explaining why humanitarian NGOs are 
increasingly involved in costly international moral action. After the end of the Cold War, 
humanitarian NGOs have increasingly participated in humanitarian crises to relieve 
human suffering. However, according to constructivists, scholars of rational choice make 
assumptions based on utility maximization: among various options, an agent chooses the 
one that satisfies its best interests. Hence, neither neorealism nor neoliberal 
institutionalism sufficiently explains why humanitarian NGOs voluntarily engage in 
humanitarian relief efforts.194 Even though most humanitarian NGOs receive a significant 
amount of money from states, they do not necessarily result in governmental control of 
policy. NGO is typically a value-based nonprofit organization. In fact, some humanitarian 
NGOs such as, Amnesty International and Human Right Watch, refuse any governmental 
financial assistance. According to constructivists, they have a major advantage for 
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understanding humanitarian NGOs’ engagements along with states in international moral 
action compared with scholars of rational choice. I turn to present the majors assumptions 
of constructivists and to analyze how states are involved in international moral action.       
IV. The Constructivist Position   
 Constructivism takes an ontological approach in that the behaviors of political 
actors are shaped by their social-cultural settings. Constructivism holds that state interests 
are defined and changed within the context of internationally recognized norms.195 
According to constructivists, neither neorealists nor neoliberals can explain why states 
after the Cold War have increasingly intervened in other states to save lives of innocent 
people and to relieve human suffering.           
 The Core Assumptions of Constructivism   
 There are three major assumptions. First, states and structures mutually construct 
each other.196 According to Hopf, in world politics a structure is defined as “a set of 
relatively unchangeable constraints on the behavior of a state.”197 Structures limit and 
allow the behaviors of states, and states on the other hand make the context that 
constitutes the structures.198 Norms, beliefs, and identities are major social rules that 
constitute the social structure of world politics.199 In world politics, norms are shared 
understanding of appropriate action in international relations and define what is or isn’t 
acceptable behavior of actors.200 Beliefs are defined as shared understandings of the 
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world.201 Beliefs are intersubjective terms that are concerned with common values and 
that “make truth claims about the world.”202 Identities refer to sincerity claims about 
actors. 203 Identities are recognized by a set of interests and of choices that actors have 
made. Norms, beliefs, and identities may provide international actors “with understanding 
of what is important or valuable and what are effective and/or legitimate means of 
obtaining those valued goods.”204   
Second, social structures constitute the interests and identity of actors.  
Constructivists reject standard materialist views of world politics and stress that state 
interests are formed and shaped by the normative context. “State interests are defined in 
the context of internationally held norms and in understanding what is good and 
appropriate.” Constructivists stress that the normative context, which influences the 
behavior of decision-makers and of mass publics,205 changes over time, as internationally 
recognized norms change.206  
Third, material structures have meaning for actors only within the social context. 
While neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism focus on analyzing the behaviors of 
actors within material structures, like the balance of power or markets, constructivism 
concentrates on explaining what power or money means to states within the context of 
social structures.207 For instance, South Korea is more concerned about the small quantity 
of nuclear weapons held by North Korea than the vast quantity in the United States. In 
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the view of constructivists, an understanding of how nuclear weapons held by North 
Korea and the U.S. have different meanings for South Korea is important.      
In world politics, from the constructivist view, the behavior of a state or other 
actors like humanitarian NGOs is largely shaped by the ideational and normative context 
of social structures. Constructivists criticize neorealists and neoliberals for failing to 
explicate the content and source of state interests.208 They further argue that scholars of 
rational choice fail to make clear how state interests change over time. I turn now to a 
discussion of how changes in international norms occur and what their effects are with 
regard to international moral action.    
International Norms and International Assistance 
 During the post-Cold War era, the special efforts made by states and the UN 
directed at state-building in Cambodia, restoring domestic order in Haiti, and relieving 
human sufferings in Rwanda as well as in Somalia were seemingly driven by 
humanitarian impulses. In addition, humanitarian NGOs have undertaken the 
responsibility for protecting human rights, providing basic necessities for survival, and 
raising international awareness of humanitarian issues. Constructivists criticize 
neorealists and neoliberals for not providing sufficient explanations for these 
international moral actions. Constructivists note that none of the above mentioned 
countries were geographically, politically, or economically important. Constructivists 
believe that the behavioral changes of states, in particular after the Cold War, have 
closely corresponded to the change in international norms.209  
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There are two major changes in international norms after the Cold War. First, 
international norms of sovereign equality have changed.210 Sovereign equality implies the 
presence of a single sovereign power through which a measure of sovereignty is 
dispensed equally to participating nations. From a constructivist perspective, during the 
post-Cold War era, the UN has undertaken more peacebuilding missions than ever, since 
there has been a change in internationally held norms of state sovereignty within social 
and normative dimensions.  
During the Cold War, states reluctantly deployed their troops to protect citizens 
other than their own and to intervene in matters within the internal or domestic 
jurisdiction of a sovereign state. After the Cold War, states increasingly engage in 
multilateralism, acting through formal international organizations, primarily led by the 
UN. One of the reasons for multilateral actions is that they are more legitimate and 
relatively effective ways to gain public support compared with unilateral action. 211 
Furthermore, the principle of state sovereignty has gradually eroded after the Cold War. 
The erosion allowed for a new potential for multilateral action in internal affairs. The 
changes in understandings about sovereign equality as well as humanitarian issues altered 
how states respond to internal conflicts after the Cold War. 
Second, international norms of human equality and human rights have changed.212 
According to Finnemore, the change in understandings regarding humanity has altered 
the way states and humanitarian NGOs respond to humanitarian crisis.213 The definition 
of who qualifies as being human expanded in the late 20th century, compared with the 
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19th century. While only white Christians received protection in the 19th century, most 
of the protected populations were non-white and non-Christians groups in the late 20th 
century.214 All human beings are treated as equally deserving in the international 
normative context.215 In addition, the scope of human rights has been expanded. In the 
19th and the early 20th century, international norms focused on abolishing slavery and 
colonialism. International norms now seek to highlight human rights and humanitarian 
intervention in the aftermath of civil wars. In the late 20th century, human rights abusers 
were considered as being threats to international peace and security. As a result, states 
and humanitarian NGOs have increasingly participated in international moral actions.    
The changing norms of sovereign equality, human equality, and human rights are 
mutually reinforced and closely interconnected. Internationally held norms shape the 
interests of states and give purpose and meaning to action.216 They also influence the 
rights, values, and duties of states. The changes in understandings about state sovereignty 
and humanity have changed not only the way states use their force but also the way states 
promote peace in the aftermath of intrastate conflicts, especially during the post-Cold 
War era. Constructivists take a different approach compared with scholars of rational 
choice and offer a valuable explanation of the change in international norms. However, 
their arguments have some weaknesses.       
Limitations of Constructivism 
There are two major limitations of constructivism. First, constructivists pay little 
attention to explaining why a particular state would not respect internationally held norms 
so as to promote its own-interests rather than the common interest. A state could have its 
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own national interests, which do not necessarily reflect the prevailing international norms 
in the international society. It is unrealistic to expect that the norms will always come 
before those of a state’s in the decision-making process. Constructivists fail to explain 
why international norms have greater impact in some countries than in others.217 For 
example, in 2003, North Korea for the first time officially declared that it possessed 
nuclear weapons. The United States immediately claimed that the possession of nuclear 
weapons was a clear violation of the Geneva agreement of 1994 reached by President 
Clinton, and called for destroying them without delay. However, North Korea claimed 
that the weapons were a strategically important tool for its own survival. According to 
neorealists, it is very impractical to assume that the interests of states are mainly shaped 
by the normative context.    
Second, constructivists fail to explain how norms arise in the first place and to 
clarify the role of states or other actors in the process of mutual constitution of agents 
(states) and structures (norms).218 Constructivism primarily holds that the social 
structures shape states’ interests and behaviors. However, constructivists do not clearly 
discuss how agents play a role in the process of mutual constitution. As a result, 
constructivists pay little attention to explaining the issues surrounding power and 
domestic interests. Hence, constructivism fails to account for the fact that international 
norms diffuse differently and that, more important, states indeed create internationally 
held norms in the first place. “It overemphasizes the role of social structures and norms at 
the expense of the agents who help create and change them in the first place.”219 
Although constructivism better explains the sources of states’ and humanitarian NGOs’ 
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motivations for international moral action compared with neorealism and neoliberalism, 
its arguments seem to be somewhat overstated.  
V. A Theoretical Analysis of UN Peacebuilding 
 The primary goal of UN peacebuilding is to prevent the recurrence of war and to 
promote peace in the aftermath of civil wars. For war-torn societies, sustainable peace 
implies the absence of domestic violence, the creation of domestic infrastructure, and the 
acquisition of international assistance. The theoretical framework that I adopt focuses on 
understanding the conditions associated with the termination of intrastate conflicts and 
the creation of durable peace. Let me review neorealist, neoliberal, and constructivist 
arguments as they relate to intrastate war. 
The Absence of Domestic Violence   
 The level of domestic hostility would be increased with the breakdown of a peace 
accord, the barriers of political participation, and the insecurity of lives. Neorealists urge 
the restoration of a hegemonic power so that no lesser groups within a state can challenge 
against it. They also posit that separating populations can be an alternative way to 
decreasing hostility. However, neorealist solutions seem to be inappropriate for three 
reasons. Above all, neorealists do not clearly explain how a group can obtain hegemonic 
power in the first place and how it can create a government that accommodates such 
issues as ethnic nationalism, discrimination against minority religions or languages, and 
the absence of democratic rules and institutions. Second, a government with military 
victory usually has been inclined to be hostile toward potential rebel groups. The hostility 
eventually increases the security dilemma. Third, dividing the populations can be a 
temporary solution and will increase the chance for interstate conflict in the near future. 
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 Neoliberal institutionalism can be an alternative theoretical framework. Domestic 
institutions along with the UN and humanitarian NGOs can play a critical role in securing 
a peace accord, since they present mechanisms that seek to accommodate the conflicting 
interests among rivals systematically. Institutions can often play as a mediating role by 
setting priorities among agendas and by integrating the conflicting objectives. They also 
are capable of monitoring behavior to verify that former warriors act in accord with 
governing rules and of punishing any rebel movements. More importantly, neoliberals 
emphasize the creation of institutions that seek to balance the governing power.       
The Creation of Domestic Infrastructure 
 Neoliberal institutionalism, in particular, emphasizes the role of domestic 
institutions in enhancing the domestic capacity. Domestic institutions undertake a wide 
range of roles in developing governing bodies, securing a peace accord, and restoring 
domestic order. They provide a sense of continuity and community, a prospect of 
reciprocity, and a way for preventing potential violence. A sense of continuity and 
community implies mutual confidence, thereby reducing the level of hostility. A prospect 
of reciprocity allows former warriors to participate in the political process equally. As a 
way of preventing violence, institutions constantly monitor any deceptive movements. 
According to Harzell, institutionalized peace settlements, which diminish the security 
dilemma, tend to be stable and promising. Furthermore, institutions are significant 
mechanisms for carrying out political, economic, social, and judicial reforms in the 
aftermath of internal wars. Neorealism remains silent when discussing the role of 
domestic capacity in achieving durable peace.      
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The Acquisition of International Assistance 
 The degree of international assistance has been known to be a significant factor in 
estimating the duration of peace in the aftermath of civil wars. Neoliberals primarily posit 
that the anarchical system allows a joint decision-making process between states and 
international organizations. Neoliberals also heavily emphasize the conflict-management 
roles that international organizations like the UN can play in the aftermath of civil wars. 
From preventive diplomacy to multidimensional peacebuilding, the UN undertakes a 
wide range of post-conflict management missions. The emergence of global problems __ 
genocide, guerrilla warfare, refugees, and violence against women and children __ that are 
raised by civil wars causes states to collaborate, because these problems are a threat to 
international peace and security and occur outside of their jurisdiction. Hence, neoliberal 
institutionalism is a more useful framework for understanding the conditions associated 
with how the UN can play a critical role in post-conflict management compared with 
neorealism or constructivism.       
 I accept the constructivist position that the changes in international norms of 
sovereignty and humanity have caused the behavioral changes of states during the post-
Cold War era. Constructivism offers a theoretical basis for the role of humanitarian 
NGOs in international moral action. However, I believe that their arguments are 
somewhat exaggerated since they cannot account for how norms diffuse differently. It is 
also unrealistic to think that international norms override the domestic interests of a state.      
VI. Conclusion 
 Ending civil wars and promoting sustainable peace require the absence of 
physical violence, the creation of domestic infrastructure, and international assistance.       
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This chapter finds that neoliberal institutionalism is a more relevant theoretical 
framework for analyzing the conditions associated with the termination of violence and 
with the creation of peace compared with neorealism and constructivism. It offers an 
adequate explanation for understanding how international assistance takes place and how 
domestic institutions can play an important role in securing a peace agreement, 
developing governing rules, and restoring domestic order.  
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A Review of Literature on Civil War  
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
In recent years, a vast amount of research has explored the conditions associated 
with the initiation and the termination of intrastate wars. Conflict analysts have 
investigated how to prevent wars in the first place and focused on identifying the causes 
that favor insurgency. They also have examined how to reduce the duration of wars by 
examining the effectiveness of third-party intervention. Furthermore, many recent studies 
have examined how civil wars end.    
However, the conditions associated with the promotion of peace in the aftermath 
of civil wars have been significantly overlooked by such analysts. Even though there 
exists much literature on peacebuilding220 that investigates cases involving UN 
intervention since 1945, the success of these interventions has not been rigorously tested, 
nor has there been careful analysis of independent variables. It is surprising that very 
little work has been done to investigate empirically whether UN peacebuilding operations, 
indeed, help contribute to more stable peace. Previous research does not clearly indicate 
whether peacebuilding actually works in the aftermath of intrastate wars. Furthermore, 
the effectiveness of humanitarian NGOs in contributing to a durable peace in the 
aftermath of civil wars has not been thoroughly tested.  
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In general, conflict analysts agree that the conditions associated with the causes 
and the cures of civil wars have been known as significant factors in estimating the 
duration of peace and that more empirical research is required to measure the 
effectiveness of UN peacebuilding. I will conduct an empirical analysis of these 
conditions in Chapter 4. In this chapter, I review the existing literature related to the 
conditions associated with the absence of physical violence, the development of local 
capacity, and the initiation of long-term peace in the aftermath of civil wars.    
A literature review generally requires three major elements. First, it should 
concisely address the main arguments and the findings of existing research critically. 
Second, it should address the major problems or gaps that require additional research. It 
is important to discuss what questions the previous research has addressed and what 
issues have been ignored. 221 Third, it should address how one’s study builds on the 
existing research and contributes to the literature. In reviewing previous research, this 
chapter focuses on three aspects of intrastate wars: (1) the causes of war, (2) the reduction 
in the duration of ongoing conflicts, and (3) war termination. Finally, I examine previous 
research relating to the causes of peace in the aftermath of internal conflicts.         
II. The Causes of Civil Wars 
 As civil wars have become the dominant form of armed conflict in the world, 
conflict analysts have attempted to discover empirical evidences for the causes of these 
conflicts. Above all, they have focused on domestic attributes. Conflict analysts stress 
that rebellion222 may be largely explained by economic, political, and cultural causes 
found within societies.  
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Economic Causes 
A number of studies investigate the causes of civil wars with special emphasis on 
economic factors, such as income inequality and the level of economic development. In 
fact, recent studies report that political and cultural causes have been replaced by 
economic causes.223 Collier and Hoeffler examine whether civil wars have economic 
causes based on utility theory; war occurs when the expected benefits exceed the costs of 
rebellion.224 They argue that conflicts are far more likely to be initiated by economic 
opportunities than simply by grievance. Above all, by using the Singer and Small data set 
on civil wars during the period from 1960 to 1999, Collier and Hoeffler investigate how 
income (GDP per capita) is related to the risk of civil war and find that higher per capita 
income decreases both the probability and duration of civil wars.225 Collier and Hoeffler 
interpret this as “being due to the effect of higher income on the opportunity cost of 
rebellion.”226 In general, civil wars are likely to be initiated in low-income countries, and 
they will further reduce income substantially.227 The result is similar to the findings of 
Elbadawi and Sambanis.228 But according to Elbadawi and Sambanis, its impact on war 
continuation is statistically insignificant.  
For proxying economic development, while Collier and Hoeffler employ the 
degree of primary commodity exports, Henderson and Singer use the level of energy 
consumption.229 They all find a negative relationship between the level of economic 
development and the risk of civil wars. In short, most previous researchers arrive at a 
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similar conclusion, stating that extremely poor countries are likely to be at greater danger 
of civil war and that high economic development effectively eliminates the risk (Auvinen 
1997; Bannon and Collier 2003; Collier 1998 and 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 1998 and 
2001; Collier and Sambanis 2002; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Ellingsen 2000; 
Henderson and Singer 2000).230      
In addition to the two economic variables, Collier and Hoeffler report that the 
level of natural resource231 possession is positively related to the probability of intrastate 
conflicts since it adds to the taxable base of a state’s economy and attracts rebels to 
capture the state.232 This conclusion receives support from Ross, who also reports that 
natural resources play a critical role in triggering, prolonging, and financing these 
conflicts.233 Collier and Hoeffler posit that an effective rebellion is often determined by 
the capacity of a future rebel government to reward its supporters.234 In their view, greed-
driven rebellions are easier to set off than are grievance-driven rebellions, since the latter 
is likely to face collective action problems, which refer to the difficulty of getting a rebel 
group to act when its members benefit if others act, but incur a net cost if they act 
themselves.235  
Rebellion is expensive. Obtaining sufficient financing to purchase weapons, food, 
and other military equipments and to pay recruits seems to be the key to successful 
rebellion. Collier and Hoeffler emphasize that the availability of finance is central to the 
opportunity for rebellion. “Without adequate financing to procure arms and rebel labor, 
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rebel organizations cannot survive through the first stages of conflict.”236 Rebel 
organizations meet the high costs of organization through various financial sources: the 
extortion of natural resources (e.g. diamonds in Sierra Leone and Congo, and timber in 
Cambodia), the production of illegal drugs (e.g. cocaine in Colombia), and the aids from 
foreign governments (e.g. Southern Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe)’s financial and military 
assistance in creating the Renamo rebellion in Mozambique).237  
In his recent study, Collier asserts that these natural resources and economic 
endowments have often been associated with high risk of large-scale violent conflict.238 
Conversely, Collier and Hoeffler also find that at high levels, natural resources start to 
reduce the risk of war. According to their interpretation, a country with plenty of natural 
resources can increase its military capability to prevent any potential rebellion in 
advance.239   
Political Causes 
A state’s regime type or the level of democratization has been widely used by 
conflict analysts to forecast the likelihood of civil war. Above all, Auvinen claims that 
the type of political regime240 tends to affect the form of political conflict and has a role 
to play in both relative deprivation and resource mobilization theories.241 Relative 
deprivation refers to “a discrepancy between deserved and actual enjoyment of goods or 
conditions of life and, more generally, discontent with government performance and 
alienation from the political system.”242 Auvinen argues that the regime’s incapability to 
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provide economic goods and to allow a democratic participation in the making of 
political decision can be a source of relative deprivation.243 According to Auvinen, the 
likelihood of relative deprivation is likely to increase as a result of political 
authoritarianism, poor economic performance, ethnic domination, and a low level of 
economic development.244 Ethnic domination implies the predominance of the social, 
economic, and political power by a single group.  
In his book, Snow further develops Auvinen’s view by arguing that what triggers 
insurgence is not the existence of deprivation but the recognition and the realization that 
it should not continue.245 According to Snow, rebellion is likely to be initiated when there 
is a possibility of change through political action.246 Resource mobilization theory 
signifies that “the more democratic a regime, the greater extent of political conflict.”247 
Snow’s argument contradicts most research which argues that it is the more democratic 
states that are better able to avoid civil war.    
In general, full-fledged democratic regimes are more likely to experience more 
extensive protests248 and less likely to experience civil wars compared with autocratic 
regimes, due to the availability of legitimate mechanisms for dispute resolution.249 
According to Benson and Kugler, democratic countries with highly competitive and 
participatory institutions diminish violent conflict within their borders.250 On the other 
hand, authoritarian regimes are likely to generate a profound sense of injustice and 
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deprivation with a population, which may create intensive internal conflicts in the 
future.251 In their recent study, Regan and Norton reach a similar conclusion that highly 
repressive states are far more likely to experience a civil war since largely unorganized 
rebels seek to avoid state-led violence or abuse and to be protected by the rebel 
organizations.252  
In addition, Auvinen finds a positive relationship between the presence of an 
authoritarian regime and the likelihood of political conflict. This finding is also 
empirically supported by Rummel, who concludes that collective violence is highly likely 
to occur where political power is centralized, nondemocratic, and highly dependent upon 
one’s social group membership, such as ethnicity or region.253 However, Auvinen also 
reports that “the extent of conflict increases up to middle levels of political 
authoritarianism but decreases sharply with severe authoritarianism.”254 Moderately 
authoritarian regimes generally confront anti-dictatorship and pro-democracy 
demonstrations and often allow chances for the organized rebel movements. On the other 
hand, extremely autocratic regimes seem to be resistant to internal conflicts because 
“their use of repression often stifles dissent and undermines potential insurgency.”255  
Henderson and Singer also focus on how the degree of democratization is 
correlated with the likelihood of insurgency.256 Their political predictor, democratization 
(semi-democracy), is measured by the difference between the state’s democracy and 
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autocracy scores, using the coding from the Polity III data set.257 Henderson and Singer 
find that the political factor has the greatest impact compared with economic and cultural 
variables on the probability of civil war.258 Semi-democracy is significantly associated 
with an increased likelihood of civil war. Political stability within a state has been known 
to be a significant variable to reduce the risk of war. In her article, Walter also reports 
that the risk of war is increased when there are barriers to political participation.259  
However, some aspects of democratization seem to increase the risk of war. 
Mansfield and Snyder argue that democratization is a slow process rather than a sudden 
change.260 Democratization often creates a weak governmental authority that fails to 
reconcile the conflicting interests, and that may invite political conflicts.261   
Hence, formerly authoritarian states in a transition toward democracy are more likely to 
experience wars than are stable democracies or autocracies (e.g. the former Soviet 
Union).262 According to their empirical findings, states changing from a mixed regime to 
democracy are, on average, about 50 percent more likely to go to war than states that 
remained mixed regimes.263  
 Furthermore, Ward and Gleditsch report a similar result that rapid transitions to 
democracy may increase the risk of being involved in warfare.264 However, they also find 
“larger changes toward democracy associated with smaller probabilities of war 
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involvement.”265 The latter result is not consistent with the findings of Mansfield and 
Snyder. In addition, in their empirical study, Thompson and Tucker report that 
democratic transitions do not increase the vulnerability to war participation.266 However, 
conflict analysts, in general, agree that overall effects of democratization are to promote 
long-term peace (Auvinen 1997; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Ellingsen 2000; 
Henderson and Singer 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Reynal-Querol 2002; 
Thompson and Tucker 1997; Ward and Gleditsch 1998).  
Cultural Factors 
Beyond economic and political factors, ethnicity is one of the significant factors 
identified by conflict analysts. As neorealists claim, the security dilemma may come into 
play when domestic ethnic groups’ security is no longer guaranteed. As a government 
fails to provide protection, the groups abruptly monitor each other’s movements and 
interpret every act as a potential threat to their safety.267 Under the specified conditions in 
the security dilemma, ethnic groups seek to maintain an approximate equilibrium of 
power against their rivals so that they can prevent the predominance of any single 
political group. Furthermore, they often strategically plan for military victory. Hence, 
Posen asserts that the security of these groups is considered as a function of their 
solidarity.268 “Group solidarity reinforces military capability, and the intensification of 
group identity is viewed as both necessary to group survival and threatening to others.”269      
Kaufmann also argues that ethnic conflicts cannot be stopped except by permanent 
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military occupation or genocide, by not having the war in the first place, or by physical 
separation of the contending groups.270  
Kaufmann’s assertion is partially supported by Collier and Hoeffler’s finding of a 
positive relationship between ethnic diversity and the likelihood of civil war.271 
According to Collier and Hoeffler, societies most at risk are the ones in the middle of the 
range of ethnic diversity.272 However, highly fractionalized societies, like Indonesia, and 
highly homogeneous countries, such as South Korea, are not likely to invite internal 
conflicts due the high coordination costs of rebellion.273 Henderson and Singer also report 
a similar conclusion that the presence of politicized ethnic groups increases the risk of 
intrastate conflict.274 Ellingsen reaffirms that multiethnicity, which is measured by the 
size of the largest ethnic groups, the number of ethnic groups, and the size of the largest 
ethnic minority group, is positively correlated with the danger of domestic violence.275 
This is consistent with the findings of Elbadawi and Sambanis, who conclude that ethnic 
diversity may cause the risk of civil war, but the danger can be managed through 
promoting democracy and economic development.276  
However, not all civil wars are rooted in the same factors. Some civil wars are 
over state-building/ideological differences (e.g. Cambodia, Nicaragua, and Vietnam), 
while others are over ethnicity and “separatist” aspirations (e.g. Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and 
Cyprus). Hence, it is important to distinguish intrastate conflicts by different types. In his 
article, Sambanis analyzes the causes of ethnic civil war by separating the ethnic/identity 
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war from the revolutionary/ideological war.277 He reports that ethnic wars are largely 
rooted in political issues more than economic grievances. “Identity wars are 
predominantly caused by political grievances, and they are unlikely to occur in politically 
free (i.e., democratic) societies.”278 An important new finding is that countries that have 
land borders with countries at war or undemocratic neighbors are significantly more 
likely to experience an ethnic war of their own.279 In sum, a number of conflict analysts, 
in general, agree that the presence of ethnic diversity is likely to increase war occurrence 
(Brown 1996; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Ellingsen 2000; 
Henderson and Singer 2000; Kaufmann 1998; Posen 1993; Rummel 1997; Sambanis 
2001; Walter and Snyder 1999).   
 The factors that conflict analysts most consistently identify with the causes of 
intrastate conflict are income inequality, the level of economic development, the level of 
natural resource possession, the regime type or the level of democratization, and the 
presence of ethnic diversity. As I discussed in Chapter 2, previous research has concluded 
that there is no single motivation that triggers violence. Walter and Snyder hold that elites 
often manipulate information for self-interests — maintaining prestigious political power 
and economic status —and deceptively create malicious images of a potential rival in 
order to obtain popular support.280 Then the elites make a decision to trigger violence 
based upon their evaluation of “how malicious or benign a potential rival might be.”281 
Brown reaches the same conclusion that “bad leaders” are one of the most critical factors 
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that fuel internal conflicts (e.g. Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan).282 Bad leaders trigger 
violence not to resolve the existing problems or to preserve peace for their citizens but to 
remain in power. Brown’s conclusion is reaffirmed by Sambanis, who reports that “ethnic 
conflict may be the result of mobilization of ethnic groups by ethnic entrepreneurs or 
elites pursuing private interests and capitalizing on the availability of ethnic networks.”283 
I now turn to discuss how third-party intervention influences the duration of civil wars.    
III. Third-Party Intervention and the Duration of Internal Conflicts 
When civil wars break out, states or international organizations initially play a 
mediator role, acting as a bridge between the contending parties and encouraging them to 
negotiate. Mediation is a process of dialogue and negotiation in which a third party 
assists the warring groups to bring an end to the hostilities.284 While international 
mediation is occasionally useful and effective, it also can extend the duration of civil 
wars by insisting on fair treatment of the contending parties and interfering with the quest 
for unilateral military victory.285 “Mediation is useful, but it helps peacemaking most 
where peacemaking needs help least.”286 The effectiveness of international mediation 
remains controversial. However, according to previous research, the likelihood of the 
success of international mediation can be increased with low-intensity conflict, with high 
credibility of the mediator, and with a mediator’s ability to put pressure on one or both of 
the contending parties to accept a proposed settlement (Bercovitch and Langley 1993; 
Kleiboer 1996; Carment and Rowlands 1998).       
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When initial peacemaking efforts fails, states or international organizations plan 
for intervention. Most multilateral interventions, such as UN peacekeeping operations, 
traditionally have taken place when a peace accord between states or the contending 
groups has been reached.287 In the post-Cold War era, the interventions have often 
occurred before the initiation of armed violence or in the middle of war.288 There has 
been a growing body of research highlighting the motivations, the conditions, and the 
success of third-party intervention, which is defined as “convention-breaking military 
and/or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the 
authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power 
between the government and the opposition forces.”289 The primary goal of third-party 
intervention is to stop armed violence.  
Unilateral interventions were predominant throughout the Cold War, and 
multilateral interventions have become more common since. Unilateral interventions 
traditionally seek to shift or tilt local balance of power by biasing the intervention on 
behalf of a sitting government or opposing forces.290 On the other hand, multilateral 
interventions generally seek to maintain “a current balance at an agreed-upon level” and 
to reduce the violent consequences of the conflict.291 Multilateral interventions are 
contemplated when the violent phase of the conflict has passed, a cease-fire has been 
negotiated, and the contending parties are trying to reconcile their differences.292 Both 
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unilateral and multilateral interventions are delivered on the prospect of costs and 
benefits of a success outcome.293     
Motivations of Third-Party Intervention 
Making a decision on intervention involves a complicated decision-making 
process. In a unilateral intervention, Regan argues that states will self-select themselves 
out of potential interventions for many reasons related to both domestic and international 
considerations.294 The decision-makers within a state generally consider intervention 
under the following three conditions: (1) the existence of public support, (2) a reasonable 
expectation for success, and (3) the expectation for a short-term intervention.295 Regan’s 
assumption is partially supported by Fearon who argues that the degree of domestic 
public support is a significant factor for the decision-makers in an international crisis.296  
In addition, Smith seeks an international reason for third-party intervention in the 
case of interstate conflicts. He estimates the probability of third-party intervention by 
examining whether states would respect alliance commitments and support allies at wars. 
He refers to this as “alliance reliability.”297 According to his finding, states are likely to 
become involved in wars in which they expect allied support. However, his finding also 
indicates that estimating the probability of third-party intervention is problematic due to 
sampling bias.298 He then argues that whether an alliance is honored is only observed 
when a war actually occurs. Furthermore, according to Mullenbach, Smith’s concept of 
alliance reliability is applicable to intrastate conflicts. Mullenbach reports that a military 
                                                 
293
 Ibid. 
294
 Regan 2000a, 756. 
295
 Ibid., 757. 
296
 Fearon 1994, 585. 
297
 Smith 1996, 17. 
298
 Ibid., 34. In general, sampling bias means that the estimated parameter value is not representative of the 
true parameter.   
 72 
alliance between the government of the target state (civil war state) and the major global 
power or the major regional power decreases the likelihood of third-party peacekeeping 
missions in civil wars.299 One reason might be that major powers are reluctant to allow 
UN peacekeeping in their own spheres of influence.300     
Regan also empirically examines the conditions associated with the decision to 
intervene and reports two findings. First, when there is an increase in the intensity of 
intrastate conflict with multiple shared borders, the probability of an outside intervention 
decreases.301 One explanation might be that armed violence can be spread to neighboring 
states, and outside interveners would not take the responsibility for it.302 In addition, since 
a conflict with a high level of casualties generally requires a massive amount of resources, 
the probability of third-party intervention decreases. Second, when there is a 
humanitarian crisis associated with civil wars, the likelihood of an intervention sharply 
increases.303 This finding is consistent with Finnemore’s view that argues that states are 
increasingly involved in international moral action through multilateral interventions, 
particularly after the Cold War.304 As I discussed in Chapter 2, multilateral interventions 
in civil wars can be taken not only to maintain international peace and security but also to 
promote common interests. Cooper and Berdal support Regan’s view that a decision for 
intervention can be made by the mixture of various domestic and international 
circumstances, and therefore, the motives and strategies of intervention will always vary 
from case to case.305    
                                                 
299
 Mullenbach 2005, 449. 
300
 Ibid., 550. 
301
 Regan 2000a, 771. 
302
 Ibid., 774.  
303
 Ibid., 773. 
304
 Finnemore 2003, 81. 
305
 Cooper and Berdal 1993, 134. 
 73 
Conditions for Third-Party Intervention 
 Once a decision on intervention has been made, the decision-makers must 
consider how best to terminate physical violence in intrastate conflicts. Regan identifies 
85 civil conflicts involving 196 interventions306 between 1944 and 1995 and outlines 
several important conditions for successful third-party intervention in civil wars. First, 
the likelihood of successful intervention decreases as a conflict takes on a 
revolutionary/ideological character.307 One explanation might be that the solutions for 
ideological conflicts generally tend to be more intangible compared with ethnic/identity 
wars. When intrastate conflicts are over grievances related to the desires for ethnic or 
religious autonomy and equality, potential solutions to the conflict are more readily 
evident compared with ideological conflicts.308  
Second, military intervention along with economic sanctions or rewards can be an 
effective tool for stopping armed violence. Economic sanctions traditionally involve the 
threat or use of economic punishment, such as “trade embargoes, aid reductions or 
cutoffs, and asset-freezing.”309 Regan’s finding is partially consistent with Rogers’s 
finding in that economic sanctions can play a significant role in preventing, managing, 
and resolving internal conflicts.310 Rogers tracks the record of economic sanctions 
between 1914 and 1989 and reports that they are more effective in containing than in 
stopping or preventing civil wars. According to Rogers, economic sanctions or the threat 
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of sanctions not only prevent any outside powers from becoming involved in civil wars 
but also avert any belligerents from attacking neighboring states.311 Rogers also asserts 
that U.S.-led economic sanctions in the aftermath of the Cold War seem to be effective. 
Regan adds that the balance of military forces is a significant factor influencing the 
expected outcome of combatants.312 When there are equally matched forces, each party 
will continue and pursue military victory.  
Third, the involvement of major powers in the intervention increases the 
probability of successful intervention. Major powers like the United States and the United 
Kingdom often bring not only a greater degree of military forces but also a wide range of 
economic resources to ending the hostilities. Finally, the efficiency of third-party 
intervention is likely increased when the intervention takes place on behalf of a sitting 
government.  
Furthermore, neutrality and consent are important concepts and conditions for 
successful multilateral interventions in intrastate conflicts. Maintaining the status quo is 
an important part of negotiated settlements in intrastate conflicts. A neutral third party 
with mutual consent of the contending parties can best serve and ensure that the current 
relative local balance of power remains unchanged.313 In their study, Carment and 
Rowlands find that the credibility of the intervening party is critical to the outcome of the 
intervention.314 I now turn to explore the literature’s view on the overall success of third- 
party intervention in reducing the length of a conflict.         
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External Intervention and Civil War Duration 
Regan and Abouharb examine whether third-party intervention in the cases of 101 
intrastate wars reduces the expected length of a conflict.315 They start with an assumption 
that third-party intervention in intrastate conflicts is a form of conflict management that 
attempts to reduce the length of a conflict.316 According to Regan and Abouharb, 
“military or economic interventions can contribute to the termination of civil conflicts, 
but the current evidence demonstrates that unless well-timed, an intervention will 
increase the amount of time until a settlement is reached.”317 They also report that neutral 
interventions are likely to increase the duration of a conflict compared with biased 
interventions.318 This conclusion is reconfirmed by Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, who 
investigate the impact of third-party intervention on the duration of 156 civil wars 
between 1820 and 1992. According to their findings, when the contending parties of the 
conflict are supported by their own outside alliance (balanced intervention) and the 
distribution of third-party contributions is roughly equal, the duration of the civil war is 
increased.319 In addition, they report that when the third party increasingly supports either 
of the contending parties, the duration of the civil war significantly decreases.320  
However, in their preliminary findings, Elbadawi and Sambanis report that 
external intervention is positively associated with war duration.321 This finding 
contradicts previous research which claims that third-party interventions may be likely in 
order to reduce the duration of the war. Elbadawi and Sambanis assert that this evidence 
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does not necessarily show a casual relationship and that external interventions more 
likely take place in wars that are already long-lasting.322 Traditionally, a high- intensity 
conflict requires a massive amount of military and economic resources and tends to drag 
out.  
The duration of a conflict has been one of the most significant factors in 
peacebuilding success after the conflict is over. Generally speaking, longer wars are 
likely to increase hostility as they also increase the number of casualties. According to 
Doyle and Sambanis, “the greater the costs, the lower a society’s social and human 
capital, and the lower its ability to rebound after civil war.”323 In addition, Walter reports 
that longer wars are more likely to end in negotiated settlements than are short wars.324 It 
is because the duration of longer wars makes the parties tired of fighting and makes them 
realize that their chances of declaring military victory are gradually diminished.325  
IV. How Civil Wars End 
 Intrastate wars are more difficult to end than are interstate wars for three reasons. 
First, the security dilemma often compels the contending parties to continue fighting.   
In interstate wars, the warring groups can eventually draw back to their own territories. 
However, in the aftermath of civil wars, the opponents cannot remain separate and retain 
their own armed forces. As neorealists argue, the security dilemma comes into play when 
domestic political groups’ security is not guaranteed. The contending parties often 
believe that an increase in their opponent’s security decreases their own security. Second, 
civil wars are often triggered by bad leaders who act on their self-interests in order to 
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remain in power. Bad leaders are commonly motivated to take complete control over the 
country through military victory.326 Third, civil wars are very difficult to end through 
negotiation, because the stakes are very high and because no international or domestic 
institution can be trusted to enforce peace agreements.327 According to Licklider, of the 
57 civil wars that occurred and concluded between 1945 and 1993, 14 ended by 
negotiation, while the remaining 43 ended in military victory.328    
 In general, civil wars are eventually resolved by negotiated settlements or a 
military victory of one side. Licklider examines the relative success of negotiated 
settlements and military victories in terms of promoting durable peace. 329 According to 
Licklider, “negotiated settlements of civil wars are less likely to endure than are the 
results of military victories.”330 Wagner explains that negotiated settlements generally 
create a balance-power condition among the combatants that can allow the new 
government to function effectively for at least a while.331 As Organski and Kugler argue, 
the balance of power promotes peace as long as it is maintained.332 However, Wagner 
claims that maintaining the internal balance is as fragile as the international one because 
“many things happen that will lead antagonists to expect a more favorable outcome from 
the attempted use of force.”333 On the other hand, military victories will make potential 
rebels more difficult to organize in the future by disarming them and destroying the 
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organizational identity of the losers.334 As a result, military victories tend to endure 
compared with negotiated settlements.   
 Furthermore, Hartzell identifies the key elements in promoting the stability of 
negotiated settlements. According to Hartzell, the antagonists negotiating a settlement 
will seek to create laws and institutions that seek to balance, divide, or share power 
among them.335 In other words, they seek to construct the governing rules and bodies that 
would ensure their own security. Hartzell concludes that negotiated settlements are likely 
to be stable when they provide institutional guarantees for the security of the contending 
parties.336 Promoting the stability of negotiated settlements is one of the most significant 
objectives of peacebuilding. Cousens and Kumar reach a similar conclusion by arguing 
that peacebuilding efforts should focus on the factors that allow a stable political process 
to emerge.337 Post-conflict elections might be a good example. Despite negotiated peace 
settlements, war-torn societies are unstable, highly fragmented, and on the brink of 
violence. According to Kumar, the most significant objective of post-conflict elections is 
to transfer power to a democratically installed government that enjoys national and 
international legitimacy and to begin rebuilding the country.338 In this sense, Cousens and 
Kumar argue that “without stable political processes, even useful efforts to rebuild the 
economy, the environment, or the infrastructure will come to little longer-term effect.”339  
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V. The Causes of Peace  
 Previous research on civil wars has mainly focused on the conditions associated 
with the initiation and the termination of armed conflict and has largely neglected to 
discuss how to build peace in the aftermath of intrastate conflicts. Needless to say, more 
empirical studies are required in order to explore the causes of peace and the role of 
international assistance. I found only three studies that investigate the relationship 
between the duration of civil peace and third-party intervention. 
Third-Party Intervention and Peacebuilding    
Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild investigate whether multilateral third-party 
intervention is positively related to the short-term durability of negotiated civil war 
settlements (five years after the war).340 They seek to determine the key variables that 
would promote durable peace. According to their findings, third-party intervention, 
indeed, provides security and significantly increases the duration of peace.341 They report 
that “the most durable settlements are likely to be those that (1) involve states in which 
the previous stable regime was a democracy, (2) have civil conflicts of low intensity that 
lasted for extended periods of time, and (3) include in the peace agreement provisions for 
the territorial autonomy of threatened groups.”342 They find that third-party intervention 
and the level of hostility are significant variables in the promotion of a durable peace. 
Doyle and Sambanis investigate the effectiveness of UN peacebuilding operations 
in 124 civil wars from 1944 to 1997 and find that “multilateral, United Nations peace 
operations make a positive difference.”343 They developed an empirical model to 
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scrutinize the assumption that international assistance led by the UN would contribute to 
a sustainable peace. The dependent variable, “peacebuilding success,” is represented by 
durable peace. According to their findings, overall UN peacebuilding helps promote 
peace. In addition, as Boutros-Ghali emphasizes in An Agenda for Peace, Doyle and 
Sambanis claim that the level of economic development, social justice, and political 
stability within a state is positively related to peacebuilding success.344 However, UN 
enforcement and observer missions seem to have a positive role in ending a war, but they 
have no effect on building lasting peace.345 Surprisingly, Doyle and Sambanis report that 
traditional peacekeeping is not a statistically significant variable as well.  
 However, in her article, Fortna investigates the effects of UN involvement in the 
recurrence of both intrastate and interstate conflicts. Just like Doyle and Sambanis, Fortna 
reaches a similar conclusion by arguing that only some kinds of UN military operations 
are working.346 However, regarding the impact of UN military operations, Fortna’s 
finding is somewhat surprising. It indicates that “Chapter VII enforcement missions have 
not been as effective at maintaining peace and may even be detrimental to stable 
peace.”347 Fortna asserts that UN enforcement missions are likely chosen and carried out 
“where peace is most precarious.”348 In addition, while Doyle and Sambanis find that 
traditional peacekeeping does not help promote peace, Fortna’s finding indicates that it 
has a statistically positive effect on the duration of civil peace.349   
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 I have briefly presented the findings of studies investigating the effectiveness of 
peacebuilding in the aftermath of civil wars. The findings are somewhat mixed. While 
Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild find a significant effect, Doyle, Sambanis, and Fortna 
find that only some kinds of UN military operations are effective. In addition, Doyle, 
Sambanis, and Fortna differ from the other authors on the effects of the UN military 
operations. The existing research does not clearly show whether peacebuilding operations 
are effective. Their research methods and data sets are nonetheless useful, and I will 
incorporate them into this research. 
Humanitarian NGOs and Peacebuilding 
 The end of the Cold War marked the turning point for humanitarian NGOs in 
terms of enlarging the perspectives of their missions and of actively becoming involved 
in intrastate conflicts. The field operations of humanitarian NGOs in civil wars generally 
cover emergency aid for rehabilitation and development.350 In fact, NGOs have 
increasingly earned a reputation for being more caring, responsive, accessible, flexible, 
and accommodating than any other type of actor in the international community.351 As 
West claims, they are flexible and speedy, they disregard state borders, are cheaper in 
relative terms, have links at grass-roots levels, and are not bureaucratic.352 This 
distinguishes humanitarian NGOs from states or IGOs within the global system.  
 West effectively categorizes a wide variety of humanitarian relief operations, such 
as preventive, general, forcible, protective, relief, and restorative, and illustrates that 
humanitarian NGOs are engaged in almost every aspect of peacebuilding operations for 
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war-torn societies.353 Weiss also develops a list of various humanitarian NGO tasks in 
war zones and asserts that NGOs play three major roles: operational, educational and 
advocative missions. The delivery of emergency humanitarian relief aid is one of the 
most significant activities and a basis for the enthusiastic support from their donors.354 
Weiss argues that bilateral and multilateral organizations are increasingly relying on 
humanitarian NGOs as subcontractors.355 In addition to providing relief services to the 
victims of humanitarian crises, NGOs seek to educate and lobby their donors, publics, 
and governments, exerting influence on public opinion and governmental policies.  
Furthermore, Natsios raises an issue regarding the relationship between the major 
humanitarian NGOs on the one hand, such as the ICRC, Save the Children, World Vision, 
Oxfam, CARE, and Catholic Relief Services, and the UN on the other hand. Traditionally, 
the UN does its relief and development work at the governmental level and NGOs carry 
out their missions at the grassroots level. For this reason, the UN measures success by 
whether host governments are pleased; NGOs, by whether public and the private donors 
are satisfied.356 However, there are often overlapping functional claims and missions 
between the two sets of institutions in the middle of humanitarian crises, which imply 
“turf wars over competing roles and mandates.”357 Hence, Natsios notes the need to 
improve the current relief response system through the collaboration of the NGO 
community and the UN, although there has been some progress in improved 
collaboration in recent years. Domini supports Natsios’s proposition by arguing that the 
NGO community and the UN should develop efficient strategies for managing and 
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resolving the existing problems so that each side can be held accountable for its 
humanitarian relief operations.358 Furthermore, in her recent article, Reimann argues that 
NGOs increasingly gained formal and informal opportunities to participate in UN politics 
particularly in the 1990s. These opportunities signify a symbiotic relationship of mutual 
growth and interdependence among states, IGOs, and NGOs.359 Reimann concludes that 
the effect of UN-NGO relations should be further explored.    
Although there have been numerous case studies of humanitarian relief operations 
in both interstate and intrastate conflicts, they are mostly descriptions of specific missions 
and of assessments of the role of humanitarian NGOs. I have not found any statistical 
analysis examining the relationship between the success of UN peacebuilding and the 
presence of humanitarian NGOs, something this study seeks to explore.  
VI. Conclusion   
The existing literature focuses on the initiation and the termination of ongoing 
civil wars. It neglects to empirically examine the conditions associated with the 
development of domestic capacity and the range of conflict-management roles that 
international organizations, such as the UN and humanitarian NGOs, can play in the 
aftermath of intrastate conflicts. As I discussed in Chapter 1, I chose seven of the most 
significant humanitarian NGOs—World Vision, Save the Children, the ICRC, CARE 
USA, Catholic Relief Services, Oxfam UK, and the IRC—and will examine whether their 
participation influences the success of UN peacebuilding.  
My intention is to close the gap in the literature. Above all, this involves updating 
and reconstructing the data set used in the existing literature on UN peacebuilding. For 
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example, the data gathered by Doyle and Sambanis include civil wars between 1945 and 
1997. My data include wars that ended in 2002. In addition, it involves adding new 
variables in order to explore other aspects of UN peacebuilding operations, in particular 
the relationship between the presence of humanitarian NGOs and the success of UN 
peacebuilding. In addition, my hope is to clear up contradictions in the existing literature 
and to provide a sharper picture of the role that such variables as the level of hostility, the 
duration of war, and the type of war termination play in peacebuilding. I will draw on the 
sophisticated research techniques and the key variables of previous studies in my 
statistical model.   
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4 
 
Measuring the Effectiveness of International Organizations:  
A Quantitative Analysis of International Peacebuilding Operations  
in the Aftermath of Civil Wars, 1945-2002 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Preventing or stopping massive violence and promoting peace in the aftermath of 
intrastate conflicts are the most significant challenges that the international community 
faces today. International organizations, which are largely led by the UN and joined by 
many humanitarian NGOs, have often attempted to support efforts that prevent the 
recurrence of war and that relieve human suffering. In recent years, the UN and NGOs 
have often played active roles in providing political, economic, and social rehabilitation 
programs for demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, human rights-
monitoring, the resettlement of refugees and IDPs, and promoting reforms in agriculture 
and physical infrastructure to attract foreign investments.360 Despite the frequency and 
severity of intrastate conflicts, civil wars have been studied far less than interstate 
conflicts. It has not been determined whether UN peacebuilding operations have been an 
effective tool in producing a sustainable peace. Furthermore, it has also been empirically 
uncertain whether the efforts made by humanitarian NGOs have contributed to peace and 
security, particularly during the post-Cold War era. 
This chapter conducts an empirical analysis of the conditions associated with the 
termination of internal conflicts and the creation of a durable peace, including the role of 
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the UN and the five biggest humanitarian NGOs361 — the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), Save the Children, World Vision, CARE, and Catholic Relief 
Services — in the aftermath of civil wars. As I discussed in Chapter 1, the term 
“peacebuilding” did not exist before Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace in 1992. 
However, conflict analysts generally agree that the UN and NGOs have engaged in a 
wide range of missions that have aimed at building local capacities relating to sustainable 
peace since World War II. In addition, it is interesting to explore whether Boutros-
Ghali’s peace plan in the early 1990s has served as a significant road map for preventing 
states from relapsing into chaos. This study acknowledges that Boutros-Ghali’s peace 
plan may not be fairly tested, since it has not been fully implemented. However, I believe 
that I can nevertheless assess the potential validity of his assumptions and the potential of 
the various conflict roles he proposes for the UN. I will examine, in some detail, the 
nature of conflict cases after the Cold War and to what extent the UN has been successful 
in the different areas he identifies. 
The author classifies civil wars into two different time periods, the Cold War 
period and the post-Cold War era.362 By examining the effectiveness of UN 
peacebuilding in two different periods, I intend to explore the potential validity of 
Boutros-Ghali’s peace proposal in the context of two very different international systems. 
By using sustainable peace as my dependent variable, this chapter examines how (1) the 
level of hostility of a conflict, (2) the level of local development, (3) various types of UN 
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military operations, and (4) a variety of humanitarian NGO missions contribute to 
promoting durable peace. As I investigate the effectiveness of peacebuilding by 
examining the four key research puzzles, I should be able to find not only a way to 
measure the impact of peacebuilding but also a way to provide the most feasible 
possibilities for an enhanced and strengthened UN.       
My investigation into the success of peacebuilding is structured in the following 
manner. First, I discuss my research design, including statistical method, the data, 
variables, models, and hypotheses. Next, I conduct my empirical analysis by testing 10 
hypotheses and reporting the empirical findings. Then, I review the statistical findings, 
discuss the implication, address the limitations of my research, and subsequently, develop 
an agenda for future study.    
II. Research Design 
This chapter explores how peace duration is statistically related to the degree of 
war-related hostility, the level of a state’s capacity, and a wide range of international 
peace operations. As Boutros-Ghali predicted, my argument is that internal peace and 
security will be promoted as economic inequality, social injustice, and political instability 
are gradually decreased by reconstructing, reforming, and stabilizing economic, social, 
security, and political sectors through the UN and humanitarian NGO peace operations.  
This chapter discusses how the outcomes of UN peacebuilding after the Cold War 
would be different from those during the Cold War period. Since the UN has engaged in 
more civil wars during the post-Cold War period than the Cold War era, it is interesting 
to compare the effectiveness of UN peacebuilding in two different international systems. 
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In addition, by evaluating the effectiveness of international organizations, I should be 
able to determine whether they have been an efficient tool for conflict resolution.  
Research Method   
The primary research method that was used to analyze the data is a logit 
regression with “durable peace” as the dichotomous dependent variable. The logit model 
is a widely used statistical model with binary endogenous variables.363 In a logit 
regression analysis, I calculate predicted probabilities of Y (the dependent variable) 
conditional upon a set of values for the X variables (independent variables).364 In other 
words, the logit regression predicts the probability of the occurrence of a particular event 
(of the dependent variable).     
Data  
This chapter investigates a data set consisting of 124 cases of civil wars from 
1945 to 2002 that fit the definitions of civil wars employed by Doyle and Sambanis.365 
According to Doyle and Sambanis, a civil war is defined as “an armed conflict that 
causes more than 1,000 battle deaths in at least a single year, that challenges the 
sovereignty of an internationally recognized state, that involves the state as a principal 
combatant, that occurs within the recognized boundary of that state, that includes rebels 
with the ability to mount organized military opposition to the state, and that has parties 
concerned with the prospect of living together within a defined political unit after the end 
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of the war.”366 My data are gathered based on this definition of civil war. I have 
substantially reconstructed and updated the data set originally collected by Doyle and 
Sambanis by including more recent civil wars and creating new explanatory variables to 
examine the effectiveness of 57 humanitarian NGO peace operations during the post-
Cold War era.  
There were 10 ongoing civil wars at the end of my analysis period (Dec. 31, 
2002). The ongoing wars are excluded in my analysis since there were no significant 
peace agreements before that period. A selection of the recent civil wars is determined by 
three different data sets. First, Harbom and Wallensteen’s data set contain the conflicts 
that exceeded the minimum threshold of 25 battle-related deaths between 1946 and 
2004.367 They categorize intrastate conflicts by three different levels of intensity -- minor, 
intermediate, and war.368 Second, in his recent article, Sambanis lists 154 cases (13 
ongoing wars) from 1944 to 2002 and argues how the employment of different 
definitions of civil war among conflict analysts leads to different empirical results.369 
Finally, Mullenbach and Dizon identify 214 intrastate conflicts between 1945 and 2002 
on their Web site.370 One of the benefits of using Doyle and Sambanis’s data is that they 
include numerous aspects of civil wars. Primarily, Doyle and Sambanis make an effort to 
code how the level of hostility, the level of domestic capacity, and the level of 
international assistance through the UN military operations have an effect on promoting 
durable peace. However, as Fortna emphasizes, and because of the complicated nature of 
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civil wars and their repetitive stop-and-go nature, there is no data set that includes a 
comprehensive aspect of every single case of intrastate conflicts.371 In addition, because 
of limited resources, I must admit that my data may omit a number of short-lived cease-
fires that may be included in other intrastate conflict studies. Because most short-lived 
cease-fires take place before the presence of the UN peacekeeping forces, a 
comprehensive accounting of short-lived cease-fires is not feasible.372 Because of this 
selection bias in the data __ the probable underreporting of the true population of short-
lived cease-fires __ my empirical findings tend to be biased.373    
Dependent Variable 
The binary dependent variable in this study is “durable peace.” Durable peace 
refers to the time between the termination of armed conflict by declaring military victory 
or negotiated settlement and the ignition of another war. The dependent variable is 
measured by peacebuilding success (coded as 1) or failure (coded as 0) two years after 
the termination of the war. According to Doyle and Sambanis, successful peacebuilding 
must satisfy three conditions. First, it requires an end to the war. Second, it requires an 
end to residual low-level violence.374 Hence, it implies that there is no contested 
sovereignty or undivided sovereignty. Finally, it requires a minimum standard of 
democratization that eliminated the most extreme authoritarian regimes, according to 
Gurr’s democracy scores.375 Hence, “successful peacebuilding” implies an absence of 
                                                 
371
 Fortna 2004, 276. 
372
 Ibid., 276.   
373
 Note that a selection of the recent civil wars is determined by three different data sets. Hence, the data 
tend to underreport the actual number of all short-lived cease-fires.    
374
 In the reference section of his article, Sambanis clarifies the degree of residual violence after a particular 
civil war. My data are gathered based upon this information. See Sambanis 2004.        
375
 The level of democracy or autocracy is quantified based on “codings of the competitiveness of political 
participation, the openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive.” Gurr, Jaggers, 
and Moore 1990, 83 – 85. See also Jaggers and Gurr 1995, 471. 
 91 
residual violence, no war recurrence, and an improvement of political openness two years 
after the end of the civil war. My dependent variable, durable peace (pbs2s3), consists of 
43 peacebuilding successes (35 percent) and 81 failures (65 percent).376  
Explanatory Variables  
Durable peace is a function of (1) the local level of hostility, (2) the level of local 
capacity, and (3) the level of international assistance through the UN and humanitarian 
NGO peace operations. Proxy variables are employed in order to measure the impact of 
each explanatory variable. First, the level of hostility is measured with the natural log of 
deaths and displacements (logcost),377 the number of factions (faction),378 and the 
duration of the war (wardur).379 The level of hostility is one of the most significant 
variables determining both war duration (Licklider, 1995; Regan and Abouharb, 2002) 
and war recurrence. (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2003, 2004; Hartzell, Hoddie, 
and Rothchild, 2001; Walter, 1997.)   
Second, the level of local capacity is represented by two proxy variables. Previous 
history of democracy is measured by the average Polity score over the five years before 
the war (gurrlag5). According to Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, the history of 
democracy is one of the determinants of predicting war recurrence.380 In their view, “the 
most durable settlements are likely to be those that involve states in which the previous 
stable regime was a democracy.”381 Furthermore, a number of studies find that the level 
of democratization has been widely used by conflict analysts to forecast the likelihood of 
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civil war. (Auvinen 1997; Benson and Kugler 1998; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 
2001; Henderson and Singer 2000; Regan and Norton 2005; Rummel 1997; Snow 1996; 
Thompson and Tucker 1997.) However, Mansfield and Snyder report that 
democratization often creates a weak governmental authority that fails to reconcile the 
conflicting interests and that may invite political conflicts.382  
In addition, a number of conflict analysts investigate the causes of civil wars with 
special emphasis on economic factors, such as the level of economic development and 
income inequality. In fact, recent studies report that political and cultural causes have 
been replaced by economic causes.383 The level of economic development is measured by 
the level of energy consumption per capita (develop). Conflict analysts find that most 
previous researchers arrive at a similar conclusion, stating that extremely poor countries 
are likely to be at greater risk of civil war and that high economic development 
effectively eliminates the risk. (Auvinen 1997; Bannon and Collier 2003; Collier 1998 
and 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 1998 and 2001; Collier and Sambanis 2002; Elbadawi and 
Sambanis 2002; Ellingsen 2000; Henderson and Singer 2000.) 
Third to be measured is the effectiveness of international assistance. I will 
measure this by investigating various missions established by the UN as well as the five 
humanitarian NGOs. Investigating the individual impact of four different types of UN 
peace operations (observer missions, traditional peacekeeping missions, 
multidimensional peacebuilding missions, and peace enforcement missions384) is one of 
                                                 
382
 Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 79. See also Mansfield and Snyder 1997. 
383
 Keen 2000, 32. 
384
  Note that only two UN peace enforcement operations were conducted during and after the Cold War. 
Because of the lack of variation, the variable is excluded from my empirical analysis. See Tables 2 and 3. 
During the Cold War, UN peace enforcement operations were deployed only to liberate South Korea from 
North Korea’s invasion in 1950. UN peace enforcement was deployed solely to prevent the occurrence of 
civil war in the Congo in 1961, including arrangements for cease-fire, the halting of all military operations, 
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the research puzzles of this study. Recall the differences in the four operations. The 
purpose of observer missions is to monitor the negotiated treaty and to assist in the 
negotiation of a peace settlement with the presence of military and civilian observers. 
Traditional peacekeeping involves the insertion of UN troops between the armies of two 
or more hostile parties after a cease-fire has been agreed to by the parties in conflicts; 
disarmament becomes the most essential responsibility of the peacekeeping operations, 
because the contending parties in civil conflicts fight with light weapons.385 
Multidimensional peacebuilding refers to an arrangement of strategies to build a self-
sustaining peace, ranging from traditional peacekeeping operations to the development of 
local capacities and institutional rebuilding.386 In general, war-torn societies require 
comprehensive reform in their social, economic, political, and security sectors. This 
involves either creating new or reorganizing the existing institutions to address specific 
needs and to enforce the legitimate rules.387 Peace enforcement refers to a variety of 
enforcement mechanisms, such as direct military intervention and a range of economic, 
financial, and military sanctions. The deployment of UN operations by mission type 
(un2cint)388 is also included. This variable is designed to test the effectiveness of the 
different types of UN peacebuilding as a whole.  
                                                                                                                                                 
and the prevention of clashes. During the post-Cold War, UN peace enforcement missions were operated in 
Yugoslavia-Croatia in 1995 and Yugoslavia in 1998. In addition, UN peace enforcement missions in 
Somalia are excluded from the data since, the Somalian civil war is one of the ongoing wars as of 
December 31, 2002.     
385
 Jett 1999, 17. 
386
 Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 781.  
387
 Kumar 1997, 3.  
388
 This variable is designed to show how the presence of the four mandated operations is correlated to 
peacebuilding success as whole. Individual effects of the different operations will be discussed separately 
later in this paper. 
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 Fourth, this chapter examines how the five larger humanitarian NGOs contribute 
to internal peace during the post-Cold War era.389 The data include 57 civil wars during 
this period and categorize a wide range of humanitarian relief efforts into six different 
missions (preventive, general, protective, relief, restorative, and forcible) that fit the 
definitions employed by West.390 A preventive operation is designed to monitor potential 
humanitarian crises by raising international awareness. A preventive operation’s primary 
efforts include peace- and human rights-monitoring, lobbying, and information-
gathering/-sharing and putting pressure on various international actors, such as states, 
IGOs, and NGOs, to be responsive. A general operation primarily seeks to increase 
international awareness in general (not to deal with a particular case) regarding the issues 
surrounding humanitarian assistance. General action includes public hearings, seminars, 
and campaigning at the domestic and intergovernmental level. A protective mission aims 
to inspect minimum living conditions in refugee camps or prisons. Its mission includes 
separating civilians from combatants.  
A relief operation seeks to relieve human sufferings in conflict regions by 
providing water, food, sanitary facilities and medical care, tents, temporary shelters, and 
other basic necessities for survival. The restorative mission aims to assist in managing 
social, economic, psychological, and administrative rehabilitation programs. This mission 
also provides technical and financial assistance to agriculture and major industries and 
assists in constructing societal infrastructure for education, health care, housing, 
                                                 
389
 This research originally proposed to explore the success of the five biggest humanitarian NGOs in all 
cases of the civil wars from 1945 to 2002. Because of limited resources, the scope of this study is 
somewhat reduced. Of the 57 cases, all of the five NGOs launched their various humanitarian missions on 
56 cases. I sorted roughly about 250 various missions and determined which mission was the most 
dominant one for a particular case. The Web addresses of the larger NGOs can be found in the References 
section. Based upon my arrangement, I was able to create eight new variables representing the 
humanitarian efforts made by the NGOs.           
390
 See West 2001, 14.  
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communication, and so forth. Restorative-type operations have become among the most 
important efforts of humanitarian NGOs in the 1990s.391 Conflict analysts have urged that 
humanitarian NGOs should change their strategies from the short-term action in 
emergency aid to long-term work in institutional development.392 A forcible operation 
aims to impose sanctions on those who violate international humanitarian law. 
Traditionally, humanitarian agencies have worked with the UN to enforce penalties.  
Finally, this study includes a couple of additional dichotomous variables. One is 
the presence of a peace treaty (treaty). I would like to determine whether wars that end 
with a peace treaty have a positive relationship with the duration of peace. The other is 
the nature of civil war (wartype), which distinguishes ethnic, religious, and identity 
armed conflict from ideological and revolutionary wars.  
Statistical Model 
The theory underlying the construction of my empirical model is that internal 
peace and security will be promoted and maintained with a low level of hostility, 
economic development, and international assistance in the aftermath of civil wars. My 
theoretical assumption is that international assistance through the UN and the larger 
humanitarian NGOs has a positive impact on the likelihood of successful peacebuilding.  
My binary logit regression model will be composed of the following: 
Yi (durable peace) =  αi + β1(the level of hostility) 
                                                   + β2 (the level of local capacity)                   
                                                          + β3 (international assistance) + ui   
I now turn to briefly discuss 10 hypotheses by estimating logistic models of peacebuilding 
outcomes. 
                                                 
391
 Ibid., 17. 
392
 Edwards and Hulme 1995, 7. See also West 2001, 17. 
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Hypotheses 
I have chosen various interactive variables representing the dependent and the 
independent variables. There are 10 hypotheses to be tested in order to reveal the 
statistical conditions associated with the initiation and the termination of intrastate 
conflict and the creation of durable peace in two different time periods. The Cold War 
division on the UN Security Council made it difficult for the UN to become involved in 
civil wars. On the other hand, after 1989, the UN often more actively sought to uphold 
peace in the aftermath of internal conflicts. During this period, the UN peace operations 
focused on preventing the recurrence of war rather than on stopping physical violence. 
Furthermore, the practice of UN missions incorporated many more extensive civilian 
components, such as electoral observation, police training, civilian administration, and 
humanitarian assistance. The hypotheses are as follows: 
  Hypothesis 1: The higher the number of fatalities, the lower the likelihood                                    
of peacebuilding success.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the number of factions, the lower the likelihood  
                                   of peacebuilding success.    
 
Hypothesis 3: The duration of the war positively influences the likelihood  
                        of peacebuilding success.  
 
Hypothesis 4: The higher the level of energy consumption, the greater the 
                       likelihood of peacebuilding success. 
 
Hypothesis 5:  The higher the level of history of democracy, the greater the  
likelihood of peacebuilding success. 
  
Hypothesis 6: The practice of UN observer mission positively influences the  
                       likelihood of peacebuilding success.   
 
Hypothesis 7: The practice of traditional peacekeeping positively influences the                     
                       likelihood of peacebuilding success. 
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Hypothesis 8: The practice of multidimensional peacebuilding operations  
positively influences the likelihood of peacebuilding success.  
  
Hypothesis 9: The higher the likelihood of peacebuilding success when the  
                                   conflict ends with negotiated settlements. 
 
Hypothesis 10: The practice of humanitarian missions by NGOs 
 positively influences the likelihood of peacebuilding success. 
 
 Hypothesis 1 is based on my assumption that a higher number of human fatalities 
erects unavoidable emotional and psychological barriers between the contending parties. 
Hypothesis 2 is based on standard assumptions about increasing the number of players in 
any “game.” Hypothesis 3 presumes that a lengthy war makes the parties tired of fighting 
and makes them realize that their chances of declaring military victory are gradually 
diminished. Hypotheses 4 and 5 are designed to address Boutros-Ghali’s prediction and 
my theoretical assumption that peace and security would be promoted as the level of local 
capacity is increased. Hypotheses 6-8 are based on my argument that the practice of UN 
peace operations would promote durable peace. Hypothesis 9 is based on Hartzell’s 
finding that negotiated settlements are stable when they ensure the safety of the 
antagonists. Hypothesis 10 is based on my assumption that various types of humanitarian 
NGOs joined by the UN may improve the quality of life for the victims of armed conflict 
after civil wars.  
III. Empirical Results 
 
In general, the results of the analysis confirm the central argument of this study. 
According to Table 1, UN peace operations appear to be an effective tool in promoting 
internal peace. In addition, the empirical findings indicate that the conditions associated 
with internal peace in two different time periods are somewhat different.  
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Table 1. Effectiveness of UN Peacebuilding by Different Time Periods393  
 
 
Model 1 
From 1945 to 2002 
Model 2 
The Cold War 
Model 3 
The Post-Cold War 
Human Cost of War  
 
 
-.544*** 
 (.138) 
-17% 
-.507** 
(.208) 
-15% 
-.909*** 
(.334) 
-17% 
Factions 
 
 
-1.536** 
(.631) 
-11% 
-2.584** 
(1.045) 
-15% 
-.873 
(1.318) 
Duration of War 
 
 
.011*** 
(.003) 
23% 
.006 
(.007) 
.020** 
(.008) 
48% 
Economic Development 
 
 
.000 
(.000) 
.001 
(.001) 
-.000 
(.001) 
History of Democracy 
 
 
.064 
(.047) 
.118* 
(.063) 
14% 
-.124 
(.111) 
UN Peacebuilding 
 
 
.752*** 
(.273) 
22% 
.847** 
(.421) 
18% 
1.241* 
(.632) 
39% 
Treaty 
 
 
.966 
(.667) 
3.359** 
(1.317) 
27% 
1.158 
(1.158) 
Identity Wars 
 
 
-1.617*** 
(.570) 
-12% 
-2.681*** 
(.944) 
-16% 
-1.056 
(1.099) 
Humanitarian 
Operations 
 
N/A N/A -.311 
(.433) 
Observations 116 65 50 
Log-Likelihood -47.866 -22.558 -16.265 
Pseudo-R2 .359 .458 .502 
 
Table 1 presents the effects of local hostility, local capacity, and international 
assistance on the duration of peace after civil wars end and in three different time periods. 
Model 1 includes 116 intrastate cases and presents overall effects of UN peacebuilding, 
as well as other control variables on the duration of peace. Model 1 also presents the 
results of the logit analysis in terms of the coefficients associated with each of the 
explanatory variables. In broad terms, I can evaluate the effect of specific variables by the 
                                                 
393
 Coefficients are reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level; 
**significant at 0.05; *significant at 0.1; two-tailed tests. Predicted probabilities (%) of the successful 
peacebuilding are also reported.  
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sign of its coefficient; more substantive interpretation can be developed by analyzing the 
predicted probability of the dependent variable. The predicted probability is an efficient 
measurement to compare the significant effect of the individual variables on the duration 
of peace.394 In addition, I report the pseudo-R2 to discuss how well my models predict the 
likelihood of sustainable peace. Values of the pseudo-R2 range from 0 to 1. A value of 1 
indicates a perfect forecasting. According to Louviere, Henscher, and Swait, a model 
with good forecasting will have the pseudo-R2 in the range of 0.3 and 0.4.395 The values 
of the pseudo-R2 in my models range from 0.359 (Model 1) to 0.502 (Model 3), which 
imply that my models are statistically significant as a whole.      
From 1945 to 2002 
As Model 1 indicates, there is a negative relationship between Human Cost of 
War and the success of peacebuilding. As the number of battle deaths increases, the 
likelihood of a durable peace decreases. When holding other variables at their mean 
values, the likelihood of the success of peacebuilding decreases by 17 percent, with an 
increase in the level of hostility. In Model 1, Factions are also negatively associated with 
the dependent variable. From 1945 to 2002, while Duration of War is positively 
correlated to successful peacebuilding, its overall influence on the dependent variable 
seems to be considerable compared with other statically significant variables. According 
to Model 1, all of the three proxy variables for local hostility are statistically significant. 
Interestingly, the two proxy variables for local capacity, Economic Development and 
History of Democracy, do not seem to play a role in maintaining peace in this period.  
                                                 
394
 See Liao 1994, 16. Predicted probabilities are obtained by the following operation: 
 P(Y = 1/X) = exp(∑bkXk)/[1 + exp(∑bkXk)]. This equation computes the predicted probability for a given 
set of values of the independent variables. To be clear, it computes the predicted probability of an 
independent variable and sets the values in other variables at their sample means.  
395
 Louviere, Henscher, and Swait 2000.  
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 In Model 1, 2, and 3, there is some evidence that UN peace operations (without 
specifying individual operations), indeed, positively contribute to peace and security in 
the aftermath of civil wars, regardless of the different time periods. In Model 1, the 
likelihood of a durable peace increases by 22 percent when the UN launches its 
peacebuilding missions, holding other variables constant. The variable is significant at 
the 1 percent level. The overall effect of Identity Wars is negatively correlated with 
peacebuilding success. Hence, identity wars (e.g., ethnic or religious) have a lower 
likelihood of peacebuilding success than do nonidentity wars (e.g., ideological or 
revolutionary). From 1945 to 2002, when holding other variables constant, civil war 
duration and UN peacebuilidng seem to have more considerable effects on the duration of 
peace after civil wars than other explanatory variables.  
During the Cold War 
Two proxy variables for the level of hostility, Human Cost of War and Factions, 
continue to have a negative relationship with the dependent variable. Civil war duration is 
positively correlated, but it has no statistical implication. Though the level of energy 
consumption per capita (Economic Development) has a positive correlation, unexpectedly, 
it shows no empirical significance during the three different time periods. However, 
History of Democracy becomes statistically significant only during this period.  
UN Peacebuilding and Treaty show positive signs of their coefficients and are both 
significant at the 5 percent level. With the presence of a peace treaty signed by the 
contending parties, the likelihood of a sustainable peace increases by 27 percent, holding 
other variables constant. Whereas UN peacebuilding is the second-largest (18 percent) 
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and has a positive impact in this model, Identity Wars show a negative effect on peace.    
After the Cold War 
Model 3 presents the results of the logit analysis of how the humanitarian NGOs, 
joined by the UN as well as other control variables, contribute to internal peace during 
the post-Cold War era. According to the model, unpredictably, the overall effect of 
various humanitarian missions reduces the duration of peace but has no statistical 
significance. Compared with the Cold War period, the effectiveness of peacebuilding, 
joined by the humanitarian NGOs, becomes greater in the post-Cold War era. This 
finding partially supports Boutros-Ghali’s assumption that international assistance, which 
is largely led by the UN, will promote international peace and security after the Cold War. 
The number of factions is no longer significant after 1989.  Duration of War becomes 
significant at the 5 percent level, and its effect is greater than any other variable. When 
holding other control variables constant, the likelihood of durable peace increases by 48 
percent with an increase in the duration of civil wars. Economic Development and 
Identity Wars are negatively correlated but have no statistical implication.  
Testing Hypotheses   
 Tables 2, 3, and 4 present the main findings of this study. Tables 2 and 3 
demonstrate the empirical results of the effectiveness of UN peacebuilding by mission 
type during the Cold War and the post-Cold War era, respectively. While Table 1 reports 
the overall effects of UN peacebuilding and the humanitarian NGOs (Model 3), Tables 2 
and 3 note the individual impact of the UN military operations. Table 4 presents the 
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individual effect of five different types of humanitarian missions performed by the five 
NGOs during the post-Cold War era.396  
Table 2. Effectiveness of UN Peacebulding by Mission Type During the Cold War Period397 
 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Human Cost of War  -.562** 
(.226) 
-15% 
-.510** 
(.214) 
-25% 
-.407** 
(.185) 
-14% 
Factions -2.511** 
(1.030) 
-14% 
-1.936** 
(.954) 
-18% 
-2.287** 
(1.013) 
-15% 
Duration of War 
 
 
.006 
(.007) 
.005 
(.006) 
.007 
(.006) 
Economic Development 
 
.001 
(.001) 
.002 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
History of Democracy 
 
.113 
(.062) 
.086 
(.061) 
.094 
(.061) 
No UN Operation -2.807** 
(1.217) 
-13% 
----- ----- 
UN Observer Mission 
 
----- 2.858** 
(1.408) 
9% 
----- 
Traditional 
Peacekeeping  
 
----- ----- 1.924 
(2.120) 
Treaty 
 
3.308** 
(1.395) 
26% 
3.392** 
(1.413) 
12% 
3.389*** 
(1.222) 
28% 
Identity Wars -2.844*** 
(1.006) 
-16% 
-2.053*** 
(.949) 
-7% 
-2.488*** 
(.894) 
-8% 
Observations 65 65 65 
Log-Likelihood -21.647 -22.509 -24.281 
Pseudo-R2 .480 .459 .416 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
396
  No forcible mission was carried out during the post-Cold War era. 
397
 Coefficients are reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level; 
**significant at 0.05; *significant at 0.1; two-tailed tests. Predicted probabilities (%) of the successful 
peacebuilding are also reported.  
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Table 3. Effectiveness of UN Peacebuilding by Mission Type During the Post-Cold War Period398 
 
 
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Human Cost of 
War  
-.905*** 
(.324) 
-30% 
-898*** 
(.324) 
-29% 
-.834*** 
(.303) 
-30% 
-.931*** 
(.333) 
-24% 
Factions -.176 
(1.130) 
.373 
(.983) 
.320 
(1.005) 
-.317 
(.157) 
Duration of War .016* 
(.007) 
40% 
.017** 
(.007) 
42% 
.015** 
(.006) 
37% 
.014** 
(.007) 
36% 
Economic 
Development 
 
-.000 
(.001) 
-.000 
(.001) 
-.000 
(.001) 
-.000 
(.001) 
History of 
Democracy  
-.137 
(.108) 
 
-.153 
(.109) 
-.139 
(.109) 
-.196* 
(.117) 
-16% 
No UN Operation 
 
-1.712 
(1.213) 
----- ----- ----- 
UN Observer 
Mission 
 
----- -2.009 
(1.532) 
----- ----- 
Traditional 
Peacekeeping  
 
----- ----- -.174 
(1.517) 
----- 
Multidimensional 
Peacebuilding 
 
----- ----- ----- 2.999** 
(1.389) 
25% 
Treaty 
 
1.732 
(1.282) 
 
2.983** 
(1.303) 
36% 
2.717** 
(1.257) 
33% 
2.006 
(1.312) 
Identity Wars 
 
 
.441 
(1.119) 
.819 
(1.111) 
.682 
(1.131) 
.958 
(1.219) 
Humanitarian 
Assistance 
 
-.246 
(.386) 
-.280 
(.374) 
-.277 
(.354) 
-.469 
(.419) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 
Log-Likelihood -17.874 -17.822 -18.952 -16.077 
Pseudo-R2 .453 .455 .420 .508 
                                                 
398
 Coefficients are reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level; 
**significant at 0.05; *significant at 0.1; two-tailed tests. Predicted probabilities (%) of the successful 
peacebuilding are also reported  
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Table 4. Effectiveness of the Humanitarian NGO by Mission Type During the Post-Cold War Period399 
 
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Human Cost of 
War  
 
-.965*** 
(.323) 
-28% 
-.949*** 
(.331) 
-25% 
-972*** 
(.320) 
-26% 
-.945*** 
(.331) 
-25% 
-.978*** 
(.322) 
-26% 
Factions -.881 
(1.301) 
-1.086 
(1.372) 
-1.037 
(1.353) 
-.890 
(1.328) 
-.939 
(1.326) 
Duration of 
War 
 
.021** 
(.008) 
49% 
.020**  
(.008) 
49% 
.020** 
(.008) 
48% 
.019** 
(.008) 
47% 
.019** 
(.008) 
47% 
Economic 
Development 
 
-.000 
(.001) 
-.000 
(.001) 
-.000 
(.001) 
-.000 
(.001) 
-.000 
(.001) 
History of 
Democracy 
  
-.100 
(.114) 
-.137 
(.120) 
-.103 
(.111) 
-.114 
(.110) 
-.104 
(.113) 
UN 
Peacebuilding 
 
1.250** 
(.617) 
40% 
1.201** 
(.120) 
39% 
1.201** 
(.594) 
39% 
1.191* 
(.610) 
39% 
1.187** 
(.600) 
38% 
Preventive 
Mission 
 
1.134 
(2.557) 
----- ----- ----- ----- 
General 
Mission 
 
----- .902 
(1.537) 
----- ----- ----- 
Protective 
Mission 
  
----- ----- -.684 
(1.352) 
----- ----- 
Relief Mission 
 
----- ----- ----- -.576 
(1.178) 
----- 
Restorative  
Mission 
 
----- ----- ----- ----- .299 
(1.018) 
Treaty 
 
 
.560 
(1.347) 
.639 
(1.404) 
.457 
(1.362) 
.578 
(1.389) 
.486 
(1.371) 
Identity Wars 
 
 
-.225 
(1.220) 
-.276 
(1.269) 
-.519 
(1.361) 
-.164 
(1.251) 
-.331 
(1.271) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 
Log-
Likelihood 
-16.435 -16.355 -16.395 -16.405 -16.484 
Pseudo-R2 .497 .494 .498 .498 .495 
 
 
 
                                                 
399
 Coefficients are reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***Significant at the 0.01 level; 
**significant at 0.05; *significant at 0.1; two-tailed tests. Predicted probabilities (%) of the successful 
peacebuilding are also reported. 
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Hypothesis 1 (Human Cost of War): Accepted 
 According to all 15 models, Human Cost of War is significant and negatively 
associated with the success of peacebuilding. As the number of fatalities increases, the 
likelihood of peacebuilding success decreases from 14 percent (Model 6) to 30 percent 
(Models 9), holding other variables constant. Generally, the contending parties of civil 
wars remain within a defined geographical boundary rather than draw back to their 
territories, as they do in interstate wars. The higher number of battle deaths and 
displacements would eventually generate the inevitable emotional and psychological 
barriers, as well as resentments among the contending parties. These antagonistic 
emotions can be critical factors in initiating an armed conflict for revenge. According to 
Doyle and Sambanis, in many cases, the contending parties never overcome the social-
psychological barriers and initiate another war.400    
Hypothesis 2 (Factions): Accepted in Models 4 Through 6; Rejected in 
Models 7 Through 15 
 In Models 4 through 6, Factions are negatively correlated with the dependent 
variable. When holding other variables constant, the likelihood of peacebuilding success 
decreases from 14 percent to 18 percent, as the number of contending parties is increased 
during the Cold War period. This is consistent with my assumption that it would be 
harder to unify the different socio-economic interests among many contending parties. 
However, after 1989, the variable becomes statistically insignificant, and Models 8 and 9 
even show a positive sign of its coefficient. The finding contradicts my hypothesis. 
Hence, I must reject my second hypothesis in Models 7 through 15.   
                                                 
400
 Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 785.  
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Hypothesis 3 (Duration of War): Accepted in Models 7 Through 15; Rejected in 
Models 4 Through 6 
According to Models 7 through 15, Duration of War becomes statistically 
significant following the Cold War and has a positive correlation with the likelihood of 
successful peacebuilding. One explanation might be that longer wars make the 
contending parties tired of fighting and make them realize that their winning chances are 
gradually diminished.401 In addition, in longer wars, the antagonists eventually suffer 
from insufficient social, economic, and military resources. The lengthy wars reduce the 
capability of the contending parties to rebound. In addition, Duration of War has the most 
effect on promoting long-term peace after 1989 compared with other explanatory 
variables. When there is an increase in war duration, the likelihood of peacebuilding 
increases from 36 percent (Model 10) to 49 percent (Models 11 and 12), holding other 
variables constant. The empirical finding is consistent with Walter’s assumption that 
intensive hostilities reduce the capability of the contending parties to rebound and 
reinitiate war.402 However, this finding somewhat contradicts with my empirical findings 
from the first two hypotheses. It is important to note here that when civil war duration 
prolongs, there will be usually two consequences. Above all, as the number of fatalities 
increases, emotional barriers and resentments are expected to grow. On the other hand, 
the long-lasting civil wars are likely to decrease the military and economic capabilities of 
the contending parties to initiate another physical violence. These somewhat complex and 
contrasting natures of civil wars can be offered in order to explain the lack of a statistical 
                                                 
401
 Walter 1997, 354. 
402
 Ibid. 
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relationship between war duration and the success of peacebuilding during the Cold War 
period. Hence, I must reject the third hypothesis in Models 4 through 6. 
Hypothesis 4 (Economic Development): Rejected 
Surprisingly, all my 15 models indicate that the level of economic development 
has no statistical relationship with peacebuilding success. This does not support the 
findings of many conflict analysts that economic variables, such as the level of energy 
consumption, income inequality, and the level of natural resource possession, are 
significant factors in estimating the duration of peace. Although the variable is positively 
correlated during the Cold War and becomes a negative relationship with peace, it has no 
statistical implication. 
Hypothesis 5 (History of Democracy): Rejected 
 Two proxy variables for local capacity, Economic Development and History of 
Democracy, are included in order to explore Boutros-Ghali’s reflection on the perspective 
of neoliberalism that peace and security would be promoted as the level of economic 
development and the level of political stability are increased. In addition, my argument is 
that a state’s previous practice and experience of democratic laws, values, political 
processes, and institutional structures before the war are significant factors in maintaining 
peace. Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild make a similar argument by stating that a state in 
which the previous stable regime was a democracy will increase the probability that a 
peace settlement will endure.403 However, surprisingly, I have no statistical support for 
Boutros-Ghali’s assumption and my argument after 1989. Looking at Model 10, a state’s 
history of democracy has a negative effect on peace and becomes significant at the 10 
percent level.  
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 Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001, 202. 
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Hypothesis 6 (UN Observer): Accepted in Model 5, and Rejected in Model 8 
During the Cold War, the UN military operations heavily focused on the 
termination of interstate conflicts, and their occasional deployments in internal conflicts 
relied on either the UN observer or on the traditional peacekeeping missions. In Model 5, 
UN Observer Mission positively contributes to internal peace and is significant at the 5 
percent level. The likelihood of durable peace increases by 9 percent with the presence of 
UN observer missions, holding other variables constant. Observer missions appear to 
have the largest effect on peace during the period compared with other types of UN 
missions. However, after 1989, it becomes statistically insignificant and is negatively 
correlated with the dependent variable. This finding is partially consistent with Fortna’s 
empirical findings. According to her findings, observer missions are statistically 
significant during the entire post-World War II period (1947-1999) and the post-Cold 
War era (1989-1999).404 However, Doyle, and Sambanis find the variable insignificant in 
their study.405      
Hypothesis 7 (Traditional Peacekeeping): Rejected  
Does UN peacebuilding after civil wars indeed build peace, as Boutros-Ghali 
expected? He argued that the scope of UN traditional peacekeeping had to be expanded 
beyond interstate wars since internal conflicts had become the most common form of 
armed conflict after the Cold War. While UN traditional peacekeeping missions in the 
post-World War II period heavily focused on ending interstate conflicts or assisting 
decolonization within a state, UN efforts in the post-Cold War era have been refined to 
prevent the recurrence of internal conflicts by undertaking multidimensional 
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peacebuilding missions. Looking at Table 1, overall, the practice of UN peacebuilding 
missions maintains peace. In addition, its effect seems to be considerably strong relative 
to the other variables, particularly after the Cold War, when the international community 
more actively attempted to maintain peace in internal conflicts.  
Table 5. Types of UN Military Operations During the Cold War and the Post-Cold War 
UN Military Operations The Cold War The Post-Cold War 
None 
 
55 (82%) 32 (56%) 
UN Observer 
 
6 (9%) 9 (16%) 
Traditional Peacekeeping 
 
3 (5%) 5 (9%) 
Multidimensional Peacekeeping 
 
1 (2%) 9 (16%) 
UN Enforcement 
 
2 (3%) 2 (4%) 
Total Cases 
 
67 (100%) 57 (100%) 
 
Table 5 presents the number of UN peace operations that took place. Interestingly, 
of 67 civil wars during the Cold War, the UN did not launch any peace missions in 55 (82 
percent) cases. This supports my argument, presented in Chapter 1, that the UN was 
reluctant to become involved in keeping peace among the contending parties within states 
during the Cold War. There were six UN observer missions (9 percent), three traditional 
peacekeeping (5 percent), only one multidimensional peacebuilding (2 percent), and two 
military enforcements (3 percent). After 1989, the UN has been more involved in 
intrastate conflicts by deploying its troops in 25 cases. The number of multidimensional 
peacebuilding missions rapidly increased during this period. While there had been only 
one multidimensional peacebuilding effort in nearly 45 years, there were nine within 12 
years. This finding is consistent with Boutros-Ghali’s argument that there was growing 
attention being paid to not just stopping hostilities but also to initiating long-term 
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peacebuilding that seeks to diminish the existing or potential internal threats and to 
develop the social, political, and economic infrastructure in order to stabilize or improve 
domestic capacities.  
According to Model 4, when there were no UN peace operations, the likelihood of 
durable peace decreases by 13 percent during the Cold War, holding other variables 
constant. After 1989, there is still a negative relationship between the absence of UN 
missions and the duration of peace, though the variable has no statistical implication.  
In addition, Traditional Peacekeeping is positively correlated with peace but has no 
statistical implication during the Cold War. After 1989, it is negatively correlated with a 
sustainable peace when they are joined by the humanitarian NGOs and has no statistical 
significance.         
Hypothesis 8 (Multidimensional Peacebuilding406): Accepted in Model 10  
According to Model 10, it positively influences the promoting of sustainable 
peace during the post-Cold War era. After 1989, the likelihood of durable peace increases 
by 25 percent with the presence of multidimensional peacebuilding operation, holding 
other variables constant. Fortna, as well as Doyle and Sambanis, also reports a similar 
finding that multidimensional peacebuilding missions appear to lower the risk of war.407 
Looking at Table 5, of the 25 cases where UN peace operations were implemented, more 
than one-third (36 percent) of the UN peace missions were multidimensional after 1989. 
It outnumbers Traditional Peacekeeping and UN Enforcement during the post-Cold war 
period.          
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Hypothesis 9 (Treaty): Accepted in Models 4 Through 6, 8, 9; Rejected in Model 7  
 
and Models 10 Through 15 
 
In all models, Treaty positively correlates with the likelihood of peacebuilding 
success. The models during the Cold War indicate that the presence of a peace accord is 
one of the most effective variables in estimating sustainable peace and is significant at the 
5 percent level. Even after 1989, three models demonstrate that signing a peace 
settlement is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Its overall effect seems to be 
strong relative to other variables. A negotiated settlement with a formal peace treaty is a 
strong indicator of the contending parties’ will to end belligerence. Hartzell finds a 
similar conclusion, which states that the contending parties would sign a treaty that would 
ensure the security and the participation in the political decision-making process through 
constructing social, economic, and political infrastructures.408 The result is partially 
consistent with the finding of Doyle and Sambanis, who report that treaties are one of the 
most statistically significant variables that sustain durable peace during the entire post-
World War period (1944-1997).409 However, Fortna finds no statistical relationship 
between a peace settlement and peace duration.410   
Hypothesis 10 (Humanitarian Assistance): Rejected 
 Surprisingly, I have no statistical support for my assumption that the efforts made 
by the larger humanitarian NGOs improve previous warriors’ living conditions and 
contribute to the recovering of trust and to a sense of community for the victims of armed 
conflict. Hence, various humanitarian missions can contribute to internal peace. My 
assumption is based on Walter’s report; the likelihood of a return to war would be 
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increased when a former combatant’s quality of life remains at a critically low level and 
there are barriers to political participation.411  
Table 6. Types of Humanitarian Assistant Missions by NGOs After the Cold War412 
Types of Missions The Post-Cold War 
Preventive 
 
3 (5%) 
General 
 
8 (14%) 
Protective 
 
7 (13%) 
Relief 
 
20 (36%) 
Restorative 
 
18 (32%) 
Forcible 
 
None 
Total Cases 
 
56 (100%) 
 
 Table 6 reports how various humanitarian missions are implemented after  
1989. 413 Of the 56 cases, Relief (20) and Restorative (18) missions are the most dominant 
ones compared with Preventive (3), General (8), and Protective (7). Relief and 
restorative missions are primarily designed to relieve human suffering in conflict regions 
by providing water, food, clothing, shelter, and medicine and to provide political, 
economic, and social rehabilitation programs for the victims of armed conflict.  
Although it is insignificant, Models 7 through 10 indicate that Humanitarian 
Assistance has a negative effect on peace when I control for an individual UN peace 
operation. Table 4 explores the individual impact of the six different types of 
humanitarian assistance missions. While none of them is significant, Protective and 
Relief Mission are negatively associated with durable peace. There was no Forcible 
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Mission launched by the NGOs, and the variable is excluded from the regression analysis 
In Models 11 through 15, it is interesting to note that the overall effect of UN 
Peacebuilding is statistically significant and has the second-largest effect on peace while 
all five humanitarian missions are insignificant. 
IV. The Causes of Peace 
 The results of my analysis point to interesting inferences about the conditions 
associated with the causes of and the cures for civil wars. This chapter began with an 
assumption that the conditions associated with durable peace during the Cold War may 
have been different from those after 1989. This is because the UN was involved in more 
intrastate conflicts than interstate wars during the post-Cold War period. It is evident that 
the conditions during the two different time periods for a sustainable peace are quite 
different. That is, the four research puzzles have dissimilar influences on peace. I now 
turn to review my empirical findings and to discuss their implications. 
The Level of Hostility 
Three findings are reported. The higher the number of fatalities, the harder it is to 
maintain peace, according to my findings. Emotional resentments and psychological 
barriers would hardly allow the development of a sense of belonging and a shared faith. 
As a result, emotional and physical insecurity are increased, and potential solutions can 
be hard to find. Fortna reaches a similar conclusion, stating, “A high death toll apparently 
fuels animosity and makes post-civil war reconciliation harder.”414  
In addition, my empirical models partially support that it is harder to maintain 
peace among many factions. As Weaver and Rockman argue, when a government fails to 
coordinate various conflicting parties, the risk of recurrent war is increased 
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significantly.415 Finally, although it is partially evident, those who participate in a weary, 
protracted war are not likely to fight again, because of the lack of resources and 
motivation. Hence, the longer that the war lasts, the more likely that peace will last.  
The Level of Local Capacity 
 I started out stating that internal peace and security would be promoted as the 
level of economic development and the level of political stability are increased. In 
general, rebellion can be largely explained by economic, political, and cultural causes 
found within societies. A number of conflict analysts report that high economic 
development effectively eliminates the risk and that democratic regimes are more likely 
to experience more extensive protests and less likely to experience civil wars compared 
with autocratic regimes, due to the availability of legitimate mechanisms for dispute 
resolution.416 However, surprisingly, there is no statistical relationship between peace and 
the level of local capacity, according to my results.  
Two explanations are considered. First, my analysis only focuses on the degree of 
local development during the first two years after civil wars. It may be the case that two 
years are not enough time to stabilize economic and political conditions of war-torn 
societies. It could take an extensive amount of time to build the necessary political, 
economic, and social infrastructure for improving or stabilizing local capacities. Second, 
although it is weak evidence, my finding is partially consistent with Mansfield and 
Snyder’s argument, which says that democratization may create a weak governmental 
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power that is unable to reconcile a wide range of interests, and that may cause the 
recurrence of war in near future.417  
Furthermore, the presence of formal written agreements between the contending 
parties creates legal obligations to stop physical violence and to initiate an effective peace 
process. Even though not all of my modes are statistically significant, the findings imply 
that the presence of a peace accord increases peace duration. Hartzell arrives at a similar 
conclusion, stating that the contending parties would sign a treaty that would ensure the 
security and the participation in the political decision-making process through 
constructing social, economic, and political infrastructures.418  
International Assistance 
 My empirical findings regarding the effectiveness of UN peace operations and of 
humanitarian NGOs should be carefully analyzed. Above all, the lack of a UN peace 
operation has a negative effect on peace, particularly during the Cold War. UN 
peacebuilding, indeed, positively contributes to internal peace. These findings suggest 
that the UN should actively launch its peace operations not only to stop physical violence 
but also to build a long-term peace in the aftermath of civil wars. However, the results of 
various UN military operations are somewhat unexpected. I have no strong statistical data 
that support that each operation would have a positive effect on peace. Only UN observer 
missions during the Cold War and multidimensional peacebuilding missions during the 
post-Cold War era appear to be successful, reducing the risk of war and promoting 
durable peace.  
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One explanation is that in many cases, the UN peacebuilding encompasses a wide 
range of post-conflict management missions. It extensively ranges from the observer 
mission to the multidimensional peacebuilding, including the development of local 
capacities as well as institutional rebuilding. Peacebuilding is designed to address the 
specific needs of a particular conflict. A different type or level of a peace operation can 
be planned and often launched at the same time to address a different type or level of a 
particular conflict. For example, while observer missions are launched to monitor the 
negotiated treaty and to assist in the negotiation of a peace settlement, multidimensional 
peacebuilding can also be implemented in order to assist the victims of armed conflict by 
providing health care, education, policing, and child welfare. As Cousens and Kumar 
argue, implementing various UN peace operations to address the specific needs of a 
conflict is a strategy of UN peacebuilding.419 As a result, the individual effect of various 
UN missions may not be fairly tested. Instead of measuring the effectiveness of each 
operation, it may be more appropriate to measure the overall impact of UN peacebuilding. 
Because there were not enough UN peace missions, I was not able to examine their 
individual effect during my analysis period. As Fortna argues, the principle of state 
sovereignty often presented an argument against UN action in the internal politics of a 
state.420 Furthermore, the UN traditionally suffered from budgetary problems and the lack 
of a reserve body of trained forces.  
Moreover, my empirical findings demonstrate that humanitarian assistance by the 
larger NGOs does not contribute to internal peace. Two explanations should be 
considered. First, although the larger NGOs have strived to relieve human suffering by 
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providing clothing, shelter, food, medicine, and other basic necessities for survival, their 
missions are mainly focused on the fieldwork at the grass-roots level. While the efforts 
made by humanitarian NGOs may improve the living conditions for the victims of armed 
conflict, their humanitarian works are not specifically designed to resolve the underlying 
reasons for war.  
Second, the humanitarian NGOs may have limited resources and strategies with 
which to fully respond to humanitarian crises. After a highly intensified conflict, war-torn 
societies usually call for a massive amount of resources and a labor-intensive operation at 
the grass-roots level. For example, delivering emergency aid; maintaining refugee camps; 
providing health and specialized medical services; reconstructing roads, buildings, 
irrigation systems, and community infrastructures; removing mines from rural and urban 
areas; educating local population, providing assistance and tools for agriculture; and 
assisting to reconcile psychological and political problems generally require an enormous 
amount of money, labor, and time.421 The humanitarian NGOs simply are not capable of 
providing a wide range of relief missions for war-torn societies alone. “NGOs have a 
problem of scale in their field programs; they produce patches of green in barren 
landscapes, patches that are small, fragile and usually unconnected to each other.”422 
Hence, conflict analysts stress that humanitarian NGOs must actively coordinate their 
operations with other relief actors, such as the UN. According to Natsios, humanitarian 
NGOs often need to concede their managerial and program autonomy and to integrate 
their work with other actors toward the goal of greater strategic coherence or managerial 
                                                 
421
 West 2001, 205. 
422
 Natsios 1996, 76. 
 118 
efficiency.423 As Boutros-Ghali emphasized in Agenda for Peace, maintaining peace 
requires coordination and cooperation among the macro- and the micro-level actors 
around the world.   
V. Conclusion 
  In this chapter, I discussed the conditions that are associated with the causes of 
and the cures for intrastate conflicts by empirically examining the four main research 
puzzles of this research. Consistent with a growing body of literature, my results indicate 
that, overall, the level of local hostility is a significant factor in estimating the duration of 
peace. My results suggest that international assistance through the UN can play 
significant post-conflict management roles after civil wars and should more actively 
engage in a wide range of peacebuilding for war-torn societies. Boutros-Ghali’s 
assumption is partially supported. The number of multidimensional peacebuilding 
operations has increased following the Cold War, and they indeed contribute to 
promoting peace. However, it is important to note that the UN still falls behind in 
assuming a post-conflict management role. Surprisingly — and inconsistent with the 
majority of research — the level of local capacity has almost no effect on peace. One 
explanation is that reconstructing war-torn societies and building peace are time-
consuming procedures and require special attention from all international actors.      
The scope of this study can be expanded by exploring the relationship between 
the conditions of war-torn societies and international assistance for longer than two years 
after civil wars and by adding more recent cases of civil wars. In addition, I must 
acknowledge that because of limited resources, I was not able to fully quantify a wider 
range of the humanitarian aid missions of the NGOs. It will be also interesting to explore 
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how the NGOs were involved in the cases of intrastate conflict during the Cold War 
period. In the next chapter, I discuss the prospect of future UN peacebuilding and the 
ways in which the international community can efficiently assist war-torn societies.       
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Appendix : Cases of Civil Wars 1945-2002 
Country Name The First 
Year of the 
War  
The Last 
Year of the 
War 
UN Mission Type NGOs 
Mission 
Type 
Peacebuilding 
Success or 
Failure 
India-partition 1946 1948 Observer N/A Success 
China-Taiwan 1947 1947 None N/A Failure 
Paraguay 1947 1947 None N/A Success 
Israel-Palest. 1947 1997 None Restorative Success 
Costa Rica 1948 1948 None N/A Success 
Yemen 1948 1948 None N/A Success 
Burma 1948 1951 None N/A Failure 
Malaysia 1948 1959 None N/A Success 
Colombia 1948 1962 None N/A Success 
Indonesia-Mol. 1950 1950 None N/A Failure 
China-Tibet 1950 1951 None N/A Failure 
Philippines 1950 1952 None N/A Success 
Korea 1950 1953 Enforcement N/A Failure 
Bolivia 1952 1952 None N/A Success 
Indonesia-Dar. 1953 1953 None N/A Failure 
Guatemala 1954 1954 None N/A Success 
Argentina 1955 1955 None N/A Success 
Indonesia 1956 1960 None N/A Failure 
Lebanon 1958 1958 Traditional PKO N/A Success 
Cuba 1958 1959 None N/A Failure 
Iraq-Shammar 1959 1959 None N/A Failure 
Congo/Zaire 1960 1965 Enforcement N/A Failure 
Laos 1960 1975 None N/A Failure 
Vietnam Rep of 1960 1975 None N/A Failure 
Iraq-Kurds 1961 1975 None N/A Failure 
Algeria 1962 1963 None N/A Failure 
Yemen-N/Arab Rep 1962 1969 Observer N/A Success 
Cyprus 1963 1964 Traditional PKO  N/A Failure 
Rwanda 1963 1964 None N/A Failure 
Sudan 1963 1972 None N/A Failure 
Dominican Rep. 1965 1965 Observer N/A Success 
India-Kashmir 1965 1965 Observer N/A Failure 
Burundi 1965 1969 None N/A Failure 
Chad 1965 1979 None N/A Failure 
Namibia 1965 1989 Multidimensional  N/A Success 
Uganda 1966 1966 None N/A Success 
Guatemala 1966 1972 None N/A Failure 
Congo-Kisanguni 1967 1967 None N/A Failure 
China 1967 1968 None N/A Failure 
Nigeria-Biafra 1967 1970 None N/A Failure 
Thailand-Commun. 1967 1985 None N/A Success 
Burma 1968 1982 None N/A Failure 
Northern Ireland 1968 1994 None Protective Success 
Cambodia 1970 1975 None N/A Failure 
Jordan 1971 1971 None N/A Failure 
Pakistan-Bngl. 1971 1971 None N/A Success 
Sri Lanka (JVP I) 1971 1971 None N/A Success 
Burundi 1972 1973 None N/A Failure 
Zimbabwe/Rhodesia 1972 1980 None N/A Failure 
 121 
Philip.-NPA 1972 1992 None Protective Failure 
Pakistan-Blch 1973 1977 None N/A Failure 
Bangladesh--Hill 1973 1994 None Restorative Success 
Cyprus 1974 1974 Traditional PKO N/A Failure 
Ethiopia-ideol 1974 1991 None Protective Success 
Eritrean 1974 1991 None Restorative Success 
Guatemala 1974 1994 Multidimensional  Restorative Success 
Lebanon 1975 1978 None N/A Failure 
Congo-Shabba I&II 1975 1979 None N/A Failure 
Indonesia-East Tim. 1975 1982 None N/A Failure 
Morocco/WestSah 1975 1989 Observer N/A Failure 
Angola 1975 1991 Observer Relief Failure 
South Africa 1976 1994 Observer Restorative Success 
Ethiopia-Ogaden 1977 1985 None N/A Failure 
Iran-Revol. 1978 1979 None N/A Failure 
Nicaragua 1978 1979 None N/A Failure 
Uganda 1978 1979 None N/A Failure 
Afghanistan 1978 1992 None Relief Failure 
Cambodia 1979 1991 Multidimensional  Relief Success 
El Salvador 1979 1992 Multidimensional  Restorative Success 
Mozambique 1979 1992 Multidimensional  Restorative Success 
Chad 1980 1994 Observer General Success 
Peru 1980 1996 None General Failure 
Nigeria-Muslim 1980 1984 None N/A Failure 
Uganda 1980 1986 None N/A Failure 
Iran 1981 1982 None N/A Failure 
Nicaragua 1981 1989 Observer N/A Success 
Lebanon 1982 1992 Traditional PKO Restorative Failure 
Sri Lanka (Tamil) 1983 2002 None Protective Failure 
Burma 1983 1995 None Relief Failure 
Sudan 1983 2002 None Relief Failure 
India-Sikh 1984 1994 None General Success 
Turkey-Kurds 1984 1999 None General Failure 
Zimbabwe/Rhodesia 1984 1984 None N/A Success 
Indonesia 1986 1986 None N/A Failure 
Yemen-S/Peoples R 1986 1987 None N/A Failure 
Sri Lanka (JVP II) 1987 1989 None N/A Success 
Papua NG 1988 1991 None General Failure 
Burundi 1988 1988 None N/A Failure 
Somalia 1988 1991 None Relief Failure 
Azerbaijan 1988 1996 None Relief Failure 
Iraq-Kurds 1988 1996 None Restorative Failure 
Romania 1989 1989 None N/A Success 
Liberia 1989 1992 Observer Relief Failure 
Rwanda 1990 1994 Traditional PKO  Relief Success 
Mali 1990 1995 None Restorative Success 
Haiti 1991 1994 Observer Protective Failure 
Yugoslavia-Croatia 1991 1991 Traditional PKO Relief Failure 
Iraq-Shiites 1991 1994 None Relief Failure 
Djibouti 1991 1995 None Relief Success 
Sierra Leone 1991 1996 None Relief Failure 
Georgia-Abkhazia 1991 1993 Observer Restorative Failure 
Kenya 1991 1993 None Restorative Failure 
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Moldova 1992 1994 None None Failure 
Mexico 1992 1994 None Preventive Success 
Tajikistan 1992 1994 Observer Preventive Failure 
Afghanistan-Taliban 1992 1996 None Preventive Failure 
Yugoslavia-Bosnia 1992 1995 Multidimensional  Protective Failure 
Angola 1992 1994 Traditional PKO Restorative Failure 
Georgia-Ossetia 1992 1994 Observer Restorative Failure 
Congo Brazzaville 1992 1996 None Restorative Failure 
Liberia 1993 1996 Observer Protective Failure 
Yemen 1994 1994 None General Success 
Russia-Chechnya 1994 1996 None Relief Failure 
Haiti 1995 1996 Multidimensional  General Success 
Central Africa 1995 1997 Traditional PKO General Success 
Yugoslavia-Croatia 1995 1995 Enforcement Relief Success 
Congo/Zaire 1996 1997 None Restorative Failure 
Sierra Leone 1997 2001 Multidimensional  Relief Success 
Angola 1997 2002 Multidimensional  Relief Failure 
Congo-Brazzaville 1998 1999 None Relief Failure 
Guinea-Bissau 1998 1999 None Relief Failure 
Congo-Zaire 1998 2001 Multidimensional  Relief Failure 
Yugoslavia 1998 1999 Enforcement Restorative Failure 
Indonesia 1999 2002 None Restorative Failure 
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5 
 
United Nations Peace Operations for the New Century  
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
  
 The empirical findings from Chapter 4 indicate that, overall, UN peacebuilding 
operations can be an effective tool in post-conflict management roles. An implication of 
the findings is that UN peace missions should have been resorted to more often in order 
to maintain international peace and security. According to my data, of the 67 civil wars 
during the Cold War period, the UN was absent in 55. Although the UN has been more 
involved in the aftermath of civil wars during the post-Cold War era, it has still lagged 
behind in responding to the demand for conflict resolution. From 1989 to 2002, of the 57 
intrastate conflicts, the UN played post-conflict management roles in only 25. Simply 
stated, there are not enough UN peace missions worldwide.  
The effectiveness of UN peace missions remains controversial in some cases. The 
UN has been harshly blamed for its ineffectiveness in a number of civil wars, such as 
those in Somalia and Cambodia, and for its not stopping the 1994 Rwandan genocide and 
the 1995 massacre in Bosnia. On the other hand, conflict analysts claim that, despite 
limited military and economic resources, the UN has often played important conflict-
management roles, providing a path to peace such as in El Salvador and Mozambique.  
Recall the reasons why the UN was not involved more often in intrastate conflicts 
during and after the Cold War era. Traditionally, the divisions on the UN Security 
Council, the issue of state sovereignty, the absence of standing armed forces, and the 
insufficient budget all made it difficult for the UN to respond effectively and to become 
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aggressively involved in intrastate conflicts. As of today, the UN still faces these 
challenges. Sixty-one years old, the UN now finds itself at a “critical juncture.”424 
Members of the UN should decide to reduce their demands on the UN or they should 
recognize the necessity of improving and enlarging its post-conflict management roles by 
increasing resources and powers.425  
 Reforming the UN for the 21st century is long overdue. The challenges 
surrounding the UN were briefly discussed in Chapter 1. This chapter revisits the current 
problems and discusses several recommendations for an enhanced and strengthened UN. 
Above all, this chapter explores the conditions associated with the sluggish involvement 
of the UN in internal conflicts during and after the Cold War era and the special 
challenges it faces today. This chapter, then, seeks to investigate the ways in which UN 
peace missions can become more effective tools for post-conflict resolution in the new 
century.          
II. Challenges Facing UN Peace Missions  
 Even before the end of World War II, in September 1945, 50 states had already 
signed the UN Charter and hoped that the UN would surpass the League of Nations and 
provide collective security.426 The concept of collective security implies that members of 
the UN would join forces to oppose any aggression. However, the UN’s collective 
security system did not work during the Cold War period.427 The success of collective 
security is usually determined by three conditions. First, the members must keep their 
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commitment to the group, even if it can be very costly to repress aggression by any 
actor.428 Second, the members must agree on determining the identity of the aggressor.429 
Third, it will work best when the five permanent members do not use the veto power.430 
Hence, to be successful, there must be no free-riders, an agreement on defining 
aggression, and there must exist the will of the international community to preserve 
international peace and security. The idea of collective security was problematic, because 
not all UN member states accepted these three precepts.  
For example, the Korean War in 1950 was the focus of a contest between 
collective security and the unilateral use of force.431 President Truman viewed the Korean 
War as a case of thinly veiled aggression by the Soviet Union, through its North Korean 
proxy, upon the sovereign Republic of Korea, the establishment of which had been 
sponsored by the both the United States and the UN. The U.S. was able to mobilize UN 
troops in Korea under Chapter VII of the Charter, because the Soviet Union was 
boycotting the Security Council at that time.432 The Soviet Union criticized the 
involvement of the UN in the Korean War, claiming that it was a civil war and that the 
UN had no business getting involved.433 The Korean War illustrates how members of the 
Security Council were ideologically divided, how their participation was politically 
motivated, and how difficult it was to define aggression. During the Cold War, the 
members of the Security Council had little agreement on “what was a legitimate use of 
force, and great problems arose in defining aggression.”434  
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 Because of the East-West ideological conflict during the Cold War era, the 
international community called for a new mechanism that would allow the UN to behave 
“within carefully defined limits when the major powers agreed or at least acquiesced.” 435 
The idea of peacekeeping emerged in order to break the UN impasse on collective 
security.436 Even though the term peacekeeping was not stated in the UN Charter, it 
became a major peace mechanism for the UN in order to preserve international peace and 
security.437 Hence, instead of identifying and punishing aggression, UN peacekeeping 
was designed to mobilize politically neutral troops and to deploy them with the consent 
of all the parties concerned in order to prevent the recurrence of war, particularly 
interstate wars. The change in the nature of UN peace operations was made by realities of 
power politics within the Security Council. UN peacekeeping activities during the Cold 
War era tended to be “small, diverse, low-level observer missions,”438 often entailing the 
creation of a buffer zone in an effort to separate the warring parties. UN troops were 
generally lightly armed, strictly neutral, and had limited rules of engagement.439  
In addition to the East-West ideological division within the Security Council, the 
UN faced a number of additional challenges during the Cold War period — the lack of a 
legal basis within the UN Charter, the issue of sovereignty, the lack of standby armed 
forces, and budgetary problems — that often hampered and delayed peace operations and 
that were to persist into the post-Cold War period.        
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The Lack of a Legal Basis  
 The international balance of power during the aftermath of World War II was 
characterized by bipolarity. Within a bipolar system, the two major powers — the United 
States and the Soviet Union — needed to worry about only the capabilities and actions of 
each other. In doing so, each state shared an interest in preserving the status quo and 
avoiding direct military confrontation. As neorealists argue, states during the Cold War 
era maintained “a self-help system” and mostly were preoccupied with power security for 
their own survival.440 The UN Charter was, primarily, created under the realities of power 
politics to prevent the third world war and to manage interstate wars.441 Hence, states 
during the Cold War period did not pay much attention to internal conflicts and to 
protecting citizens other than their own.  
The concept of traditional UN peacekeeping operations became implemented 
when members of the UN enlarged the scope of Chapter VI, Article 33 of the Charter to 
resolve any dispute by peaceful means  in a creative way.442 Since there is no clear 
provision expressed in the UN Charter for peacekeeping, the roles and goals of UN 
troops have been often assigned unclearly and unrealistically. In addition, implementing 
UN peacekeeping operations has not been an easy task, since the warring parties must 
agree to invite UN forces and must to act in accordance with resolutions adopted under 
the UN Charter. Chapter VII, particularly Article 42 of the UN Charter, allows the 
Security Council to take military or nonmilitary actions to restore international peace and 
security as a last resort when there is “a threat to the peace.”  
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Because of the lack of specific reference to UN peace missions, the Security 
Council often has faced difficulties determining which roles UN troops are expected to 
play, defining what constitutes aggression, and setting goals of UN peace missions for 
particular conflicts. Under the circumstances, UN peace missions have often suffered 
from being “unrealistic, unsupported, too vague, or too weak.” 443 Furthermore, “the lack 
of a clear international constitutional basis makes a consensus definition of peacekeeping 
difficult, particularly because peacekeeping operations have been improvised in response 
to the specific requirements of individual conflicts.”444  
As Jett rightly claims, when the members of the UN have different definitions for 
the roles for UN troops and in determining the type of UN peace operations, they will 
have different goals, objectives, and expectations for a particular conflict. In the case of 
the Somalia civil war in the early 1990s, for example, before the U.S. decided to turn 
over the Somalia operation to the UN, the Clinton administration’s view on the role of 
peacekeepers was somewhat different from those of the other members of the Security 
Council.445 While the Clinton administration primarily sought to relieve human suffering 
by providing basic human needs, the UN aimed to restore a stable government through 
UN peace enforcement operations.446 However, the U.S. and the UN later realized that 
providing humanitarian assistance and engaging in state-building in Somalia were too 
unrealistic to achieve.447 The U.S. troops withdrew from Somalia in 1994, followed by 
UN forces in 1995, without succeeding in accomplishing their goals. 
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Implementing UN peace missions can be even more complicated and problematic 
when UN troops are to play post-conflict management roles in intrastate conflicts 
compared with interstate wars. In civil wars, the scope of UN missions is expanded 
substantially and UN troops must deal with “the underlying causes of conflicts,”448 which 
generally are hard to resolve and require a long-term commitment. 449 As intrastate 
conflicts commonly have “societal roots,”450 peacebuilding missions primarily seek to 
provide social, political, and economic development, institution-building, and 
humanitarian assistance. Conflict analysts warn that third-party intervention in civil wars 
may inadvertently prolong civil wars when the goal of intervention is not clearly 
defined.451 To effectively respond to civil wars, conflict analysts claim that the UN 
Charter needs to be reconstructed to reflect the nature of intrastate conflicts, as civil wars 
have become the dominant form of armed conflict in the global system.   
The Issue of Sovereignty 
 Sovereignty, which refers to a supreme authority within a state, has been one of 
the most important concepts in the study of international relations and is associated with 
the anarchical nature of the international system. According to Article 2 (7) of the UN 
Charter, “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or 
shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present 
Charter.”452 In other words, the UN Charter was designed to protect state sovereignty and 
to limit foreign intervention, which generally refers to “external actions that influence the 
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domestic affairs of another sovereign state.”453 The principle of state sovereignty, indeed, 
has often presented an argument against UN action in the internal politics of a state, 
although, the added language in Article 2 (7) — “this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Charter VII”454 — has allowed an opening for 
UN intervention.   
 During the Cold War era, UN troops were mostly dispatched to interstate conflicts, 
where the two superpowers’ strategic interests were not directly confronted.455 Typically, 
the troops were deployed as peacekeepers, with the consent of the parties. Their role was 
to help the conflicting parties observe the cease-fire agreement and to encourage them not 
to violate the peace accord.456 This is consistent with my data indicating that of the 67 
civil wars, the UN played a post-conflict management role in only 12 cases. Of the 12 
cases, UN troops conducted six observer missions and three traditional peacekeeping 
operations, which sought not to violate state sovereignty. During the Cold War, there 
were two UN peace enforcement operations. UN troops were deployed to liberate South 
Korea from North Korea’s invasion in 1950 and to prevent the occurrence of a civil war 
in the Congo in 1961.  
It has been uncertain under what circumstances the UN should intervene in 
domestic affairs. It has also been one of the most controversial subjects, even when the 
UN has intervened for humanitarian assistance. Opponents claim that humanitarian 
intervention is usually designed by several great powers and can be abusively used to 
pursue their strategic interests. Weak states cannot resist outside diplomatic pressures, 
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and their sovereignty can be easily infringed under the name of humanitarian 
assistance.457 On the other hand, proponents claim that most of the UN humanitarian 
assistance takes place in extremely poor countries, in which the major powers do not 
have many political and economic interests. In addition, proponents argue that UN 
missions are designed to prevent further violation of international humanitarian law, to 
relieve human suffering by monitoring human rights, and to provide basic human needs. 
Throughout the post-Cold War era, state sovereignty has weakened. The changes 
in the nature of international armed conflicts, the rapid growth of IGOs, and NGOs, the 
development of global telecommunications, and the expansion of economic 
interdependence in the form of globalization have diminished the centrality of the state as 
the primary actor in world politics.458 The principle of state sovereignty has been 
gradually eroding during the past few decades. This erosion created a new potential for 
multilateral action in internal affairs.459 In addition, as constructivists claim, there has 
been a change in the context of internationally recognized norms to protect the lives of 
innocent people and to relieve human suffering. Multilateral forms of intervention are 
considered to be legitimate and effective, as the norms for sovereign equality have 
changed.460 More importantly, the end of the Cold War was a turning point for the UN in 
terms of enlarging the scope of its peace missions and of becoming more engaged in 
internal conflicts compared with the Cold War era. Even though the issue of humanitarian 
intervention remains contentious, it seems to constitute a new norm in international 
affairs. In this and in other ways, the post-Cold War environment poses new challenges 
                                                 
457
 Glennon 2002, 2. See also Weiss 1995, 4-6. 
458
 Mingst and Karns 2000, 11.  
459
 Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2004, 105. 
460
 Finnemore 2003, 17. 
 132 
and opportunities for the UN in internal politics. Humanitarian issues, such as massive 
starvation, refugees, and genocide, have now become global problems and have given 
international organizations, such as the UN, a basis for taking action.461 This is consistent 
with my empirical findings that of the 57 civil wars between 1989 and 2002, the UN 
responded to 25 cases (44 percent) compared with 12 cases (18 percent) during the Cold 
War period. However, critics argue that the UN is still lagging behind in playing post-
conflict management roles.     
The Lack of Standby Armed Forces 
 In general, it is easier to prevent war than to deal with its consequences. Conflict 
analysts have argued that preventive deployment of UN troops can be an important part 
of preventive diplomacy in the prevention of war.462 The need for and the role of standby 
armed forces have been examined by conflict analysts. The UN could have more 
effectively dealt with both interstate and intrastate conflicts if it had standby armed 
forces.463 Sutterlin argues that one of the most significant elements in the prevention of 
conflict is the availability of a “deterrence instrumentality.”464 An availability of rapidly 
deployable UN troops can deter potential physical violence. According to Sutterlin, UN 
peacekeeping forces that are deployed to play a mediating role and to decrease the 
likelihood of both interstate and intrastate conflicts can be an example of such 
instrumentality.465 In addition, conflict analysts emphasize the significance of well-
trained UN forces that address the special needs of war-torn societies, since conflict 
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continues to be predominantly internal in nature. More discussions on the need for 
standby armed forces will be discussed later in this chapter.           
Budgetary Problems 
One observer has called attention to the endemic budgetary problems that have 
plagued the UN: “If all governments paid their assessed contributions in full and on time, 
there would be no serious UN financial problem, at least at its present level of operation. 
Late payments and failure to pay debilitate an organization that is not permitted to go into 
debt, especially when a proliferation of emergency peacekeeping operations is putting 
new strains on the old budgeting system.”466 The UN and all of its agencies, programs, 
and funds spend nearly $20 billion annually. This is a very small budget compared with 
what the U.S. government and many others spend on their armed forces. For example, in 
2005, the U.S. spent roughly $478 billion on its military467 and spent nearly $90 billion 
on the war in Iraq alone.468 Traditionally, the UN suffers from financial difficulties, and it 
has been forced to reduce the scope of important programs in all areas.469 Most members 
of the UN, particularly the U.S., have not paid their full dues on time and have often cut 
their donations to the UN’s voluntary funds.  
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Table 1. The Contributions Owed to the UN by All Member States 1996 – 2006470 
                               Regular Budget          UN Peacekeeping          Total Debt 
 All 
Member 
States   
Total Debt 
U.S.        
Total Debt 
All        
Member    
States         
Total Debt 
U.S.          
Total Debt 
All     
Member 
States     
Total Debt 
U.S.        
Total Debt 
1996 511 377 (74%) 1,633 926 (57%) 2,144 1,303 (61%) 
1997 474 373 (79%) 1,574 940 (60%) 2,048 1,313 (64%) 
1998 417 316 (76%) 1,594 976 (61%) 2,011 1,292 (64%) 
1999 244 168 (69%) 1,482 995 (67%) 1,726 1,163 (67%) 
2000 222 165 (74%) 2,054 1,144 (67%) 2,276 1,309 (58%) 
2001 240 165 (69%) 1,823 691 (38%) 2,063 856 (41%) 
2002 305 190 (62%) 1,335 536 (40%) 1,640 726 (44%) 
2003 441 268 (61%) 1,066 482 (45%) 1,507 750 (50%) 
2004 357 241 (68%) 2,570 722 (28%) 2,927 963 (33%) 
2005 333 252 (76%) 2,919 843 (29%) 3,252 1,095 (34%) 
2006 661 526 (80%) 2,542 799 (31%) 3,203 1,325 (41%) 
 
Table 1 presents the amount of the contributions owed to the UN by all member 
states for the period between 1996 and 2006. According to Table 1, as of October 2006, 
members’ total debt to the UN Regular Budget471 reached $661 million, of which the 
United States owes $526 million.472 This has caused serious financial difficulties for the 
organization, and the Secretary-General often has had to cross-borrow money from 
peacekeeping operations in order to cover shortages in the UN Regular Budget, thereby 
reducing the scope of UN peace missions or delaying the deployment of peacekeepers in 
conflict regions.473    
The UN system, which consists of various components including “specialized 
agencies, voluntary funds and programs, peacekeeping operations, and the parent United 
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Nations organization itself,”474 is primarily financed by contributions from its member 
states. The members usually make two payments to the UN system: voluntary 
contributions and assessed contributions. These two payments have different purposes. 
The voluntary contributions support a variety of ancillary UN funds and programs. The 
Regular Budget for core functions of the UN and its peacekeeping operations are covered 
by the assessed contributions. Both voluntary and assessed contributions also pay for 
specialized agencies.475 Since the assessed contributions are based on a country’s gross 
national income, the rich countries pay more.476 Traditionally, UN financial problems 
have been caused by late payments by the UN’s largest contributor, the U.S. In addition, 
most member states do not pay their dues on time. For example, as of 2006, more than 
150 members failed to make their payments on time. Furthermore, member states tend to 
pay more voluntary contributions than their mandatory dues because “countries dedicate 
voluntary contributions to those UN funds and programs that deem them most promising 
and compatible with their own agenda.”477  
Expenditures for UN peacekeeping operations skyrocketed right after the end of 
the Cold War, as the international community was more committed to preserving 
international peace and security compared with the Cold War era. Table 2 presents the 
annual expenditures for UN peacekeeping operations from 1947 to 2005. Graph 1 
presents how rapidly the cost of UN peace missions increased after the end of the Cold 
War period. According to Table 2, the cost of traditional peacekeeping operations 
gradually increased during the Cold War period and sharply jumped from $141 million to 
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$3,364 million between 1985 and 1995. Table 3 illustrates how much the six largest 
contributors still owe to the UN Regular Budget for peacekeeping operations. Overall, the 
amount of the unpaid mandatory contributions for UN peace missions has steadily 
increased. Again, Table 3 shows that the U.S. has one of the largest debts to the UN, 
along with Japan. These unpaid balances have not only caused UN financial problems but 
also impacted peacekeeping.  
Table 2. UN Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) Expenditures 1947 – 2005478 
Year UN PKO Expenditures Year UN PKO Expenditures 
1947 0 1977 153 
1948 4 1978 202 
1949 7 1979 186 
1950 7 1980 141 
1951 6 1981 141 
1952 6 1982 141 
1953 6 1983 141 
1954 6 1984 141 
1955 6 1985 141 
1956 9 1986 242 
1957 26 1987 240 
1958 30 1988 266 
1959 26 1989 635 
1960 76 1990 464 
1961 126 1991 490 
1962 126 1992 1,767 
1963 127 1993 3,059 
1964 91 1994 3,342 
1965 45 1995 3,364 
1966 45 1996 1,405 
1967 37 1997 1,160 
1968 24 1998 995 
1969 24 1999 1,324 
1970 24 2000 2,139 
1971 24 2001 2,700 
1972 24 2002 2,702 
1973 37 2003 2,727 
1974 131 2004 3,645 
1975 153 2005 4,737 
1976 153 2006 N/A 
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Graph 1. UN Peacekeeping Operations Expenditures 1947 – 2005479 
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 Table 3. The Contributions Owed to the UN for Peacekeeping Operations 1995 – 2005480 
UN 
Members\Year 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
USA 816 926 940 976 995 1,144 691 536 482 722 843 
Japan 3 78 89 98 96 303 473 312 154 759 845 
Germany 23 12 10 9 14 9 9 3 0 103 103 
France 13 2 9 5 24 78 138 0 0 109 100 
Russia 404 209 136 126 80 62 37 0 0 N/A N/A 
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 26 88 
 
As a result of the financial difficulties, the UN has had to postpone remuneration 
for countries that send troops,481 resulting in a slow deployment of UN forces in conflict 
regions. Regan and Abouharb stress the significance of well-timed intervention in 
intrastate conflicts to stop hostilities and to restore peace. In their view, third-party 
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intervention can end civil conflicts. More importantly, they argue that “unless well-timed, 
an intervention will increase the amount of time until a settlement is reached.”482  
 The traditional challenges — the ideological division within the Security of 
Council, the lack of a clear legal basis within the UN Charter, the issue of sovereignty, 
the lack of standby UN troops, and budgetary problems — have often caused the scaling 
down of the scope of UN peace missions, making it difficult for the world’s largest 
organization to be responsive and effective during and after the Cold War period. To 
overcome these shortcomings, the international community has strived to reform the 
world’s largest organization so that it can meet the demands of 21st century peace 
missions. I will now discuss several proposals that could result in a United Nations that is 
more responsive and effective in resolving conflicts.    
III. UN Peace Missions for the New Century 
 After having failed to accomplish the assigned goals in Somalia and Cambodia 
and to stop the systemic genocide in Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s, the international 
community began to look for ways to revitalize and reform UN peace operations. It was 
evident that without an increased commitment, the UN would not satisfy its purposes, as 
stated in Article 1 of the Charter, which states that the UN is “to maintain international 
peace and security, and to that end, to take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to peace.”483 While Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for 
Peace is a good road map for multilateral conflict-management roles that the UN might 
play after the Cold War, conflict analysts have often noted that his proposal could not be 
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implemented and tested since it was somewhat broad, idealistic, and impracticable.484 
That is, it exceeded the capacities and expectations of individual states and the UN.  
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan requested a high-level group of experts, led by 
Lakhdar Brahimi, to make realistic and practical recommendations for change. In August 
2000, the UN released the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 
commonly called the “Brahimi Report.”485 The Report addressed the significant 
weaknesses in the UN’s ability to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war,”486 as stated in the Charter, and recommended “sweeping changes”487 in the way 
that UN peace operations were carried out. The Brahimi Report is considered to be a 
significant road map for improving the UN’s ability to resolve conflicts in the 21st 
century. Several recommendations of the Report are discussed below.  
The Need for Clearly Identified Goals 
The lack of a clear constitutional basis often caused a discord among the members 
of the Security Council, keeping them from intervening and to assuming a post-conflict 
management role in the aftermath of civil wars. In addition, the lack of full support from 
the Security Council on peace operations in internal conflicts frequently caused a vague 
and unobtainable goal of the mission. Above all, conflict analysts suggest that the UN 
needs to clarify the scope of the Security Council’s mandate.488 As internal conflicts 
become the dominant form of armed conflict, the Security Council must adapt to this new 
reality by expanding the scope of UN peace missions and by developing a more 
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progressive interpretation of what becomes a threat to international peace and security.489 
The cross-border flow of refugees, systemic genocide, massive starvation, extreme 
poverty, and the violation of human rights and international law can be examples of new 
threats in the 21st century.  
In addition, the Brahimi Report recommends the need for clear, credible, and 
achievable mandates. Conflict analysts have often argued that “imprecise, ambiguous, 
erroneous, insensitive, and timid mandates approved by the Security Council directly 
contributed to flawed UN peacekeeping efforts in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda.”490 
Faulty mandates caused the deaths of UN peacekeepers, humanitarian assistance 
personnel, and civilians trapped in conflict regions.491 According to the Brahimi Report, 
in numerous civil wars after the Cold War, the Security Council and the Secretariat did 
not have sufficient knowledge of how different types of UN military operations would 
address specific needs of war-torn societies.492 The lack of information, knowledge, and 
understanding not only have often caused unclear and unachievable mandates but also 
improperly prepared, planned, and executed peace operations.493 To reduce this problem, 
according to the report, member states that contribute peacekeeping troops should be 
invited to consult with the members of the Security Council and should be responsible for 
establishing the mandates that become a guide for UN peace missions.494             
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The Need for Well-Trained Standby Forces  
In the post-Cold War era, UN troops have increasingly been asked to perform 
various types of tasks with which they were not familiar. The practice of peacebuilding 
has involved much more extensive civilian components, such as electoral observation, 
police monitoring/training, civilian administration, and humanitarian affairs.495 However, 
UN troops, in most instances, have not been trained to manage the issues of deploying 
civilian police officers, installing temporary judiciaries, monitoring human rights, and 
restoring civil society that could contribute to long-term conflict prevention.496 “The 
UN’s security mechanism was not designed to deal with violence and wars of this kind, 
and the blue helmets have encountered their most significant problems in attempting to 
quell internal wars.”497 In the early 1990s, the post-conflict management roles undertaken 
by the UN immediately after the Cold War were first played in Namibia, Angola, 
Cambodia, and El Salvador. The tasks included investigating human rights violations in 
El Salvador, carrying out land reform, educating and registering voters in Namibia, 
supervising the cease-fire in Angola, and managing the demobilization and disarming in 
Cambodia.498 In all of the above cases, the UN realized that it was ill-equipped to play the 
post-conflict management roles and acknowledged the urgent need for improving its 
capabilities to manage the new challenges.499 The UN has learned that successful 
peacebuilding operations require not only the commitments from the warring parties to 
observe peace settlements but also the speedy deployment of well-trained UN troops for 
the new tasks.  
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Conflict analysts repeatedly have pointed to the significance of standby UN 
armed forces for “rapid and effective deployment capabilities.”500 Rapid and effective 
deployment is highly important because it can prevent conflicts from spiraling out of 
control.501 According to the Brahimi Report, the first six to 12 weeks after a peace 
settlement is made is the most important period to establish durable peace and the 
credibility of UN troops. Hence, the Report proposed that the UN develop the operational 
capabilities to deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days and to install 
multidimensional peacebuilding operations within 90 days.502 More importantly, the 
Report points out that rapid deployment of well-trained troops alone may not be enough. 
For rapid and effective deployment, there is a need for planning, having mission leaders 
selected, having well-trained civilian police on call, having budgets available, and having 
transport arranged.503 In other words, the UN must be always ready for any new conflicts 
by establishing ready-to-go strategic deployment arrangements. Conflict analysts argue 
that developing rapid and effective deployment capabilities can be a significant step for 
the UN and will be achieved only when the UN members, the secretariat, and the 
Security Council are fully committed.504 Although the Brahimi Report addresses 
improving UN peace operations, critics argue that it is questionable whether its proposals 
would be fully implemented and whether they would resolve the current challenges.      
The Need for a Sufficient Budget 
 The UN does not respond to every request for its post-conflict management role. 
One of the biggest challenges that the UN faces is its current budgetary environment. 
                                                 
500
 The Brahimi Report 2000, 15. See also Annan 1998, 181. 
501
 Urquhart and Heisbourg 1998, 190. 
502
 The Brahimi Report 2000, 15. 
503
 Puchala, Laatikainen, and Coate 2006, 141. 
504
 Ibid. 
 143 
Essentially, the financial problem stems from the lack of enthusiasm and commitment 
from the UN members. Critics argue that the UN could have responded to a number of 
internal conflicts during the 1990s and saved millions of lives. The world’s largest 
organization could not implement peacebuilding operations rapidly and effectively in 
numerous cases of civil wars because “too few people were too often asked to do too 
much with too little.”505 For example, in the late 1990s, the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DKPO) had about only 300 staff members supporting approximately 60,000 
personnel who were deployed in more than a dozen peace missions.506 Peacebuilding 
attempts to eliminate the underlying causes that can trigger the recurrence of war. Hence, 
it requires effort, time, budget, staff, supplies, preparation, cooperation, and commitment. 
The UN needs more money. It needs more money to hire more professional personnel 
who can gather “more information and engage in planning and preparation.”507 It needs 
more money in order to pay more UN peacekeepers and to stock sufficient supplies and 
equipment.  
There have been several proposals aimed at relieving the current financial 
problems. First, the U.S. suggested that mandatory contributions should be based on 
states’ purchasing power parity,508 which would yield a higher amount of contributions 
from rising economies, such as China and India.509 Second, Japan proposed that the five 
permanent members of the Security Council pay at least 3 percent of their annual budget 
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to the UN budget, which is not the case for China and Russia.510 Third, reducing the 
current Regular Budget ceiling rate from 22 percent to 10 percent was proposed. It 
implied less the amount of mandatory contributions for the U.S. and Japan at the expense 
of other countries and also would relieve the heavy dependence on particular states.511  
The Brahimi Report urged a substantial increase in the amount of money devoted 
to peacekeeping and related missions and reminded members of their obligations to pay 
their full mandatory dues on time.512 The Brahimi Report warned that “changes that the 
Panel recommends will have no lasting impact, unless Member States summon the 
political will to support the UN politically, financially, and operationally.”513 I have 
briefly highlighted several proposals that could make UN peace operations a more 
effective mechanism. Even though these recommendations seem to be essential and 
considerable, I must acknowledge that it is uncertain how seriously members of the UN 
would take them into consideration.     
IV. Conclusion 
To prepare for 21st century conflicts, the international community must have a 
comprehensive understanding of the complex nature of today’s typical conflicts. 
Successful peacebuilding requires not only the commitment of the warring parties to 
preserve peace but also well-trained and rapidly deployable UN troops, along with 
sufficient budgets. The Brahimi Report and other proposals discussed in this chapter 
certainly pointed out the possibility of revitalizing UN peace missions in the future. 
However, it is important to look into how the recommendations would be implemented 
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and carried out in the future. The concluding chapter that follows will summarize key 
findings and how they fit into the existing theoretical literature, and will suggest how the 
scope of this study might be enlarged in the future. 
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6 
Conclusion 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 The goal of this research is to determine whether UN peacebuilding operations are 
promising mechanisms for preventing the recurrence of war in the aftermath of intrastate 
conflicts. One of the motivations for having chosen to investigate intrastate conflicts as a 
unit of analysis is the fact that civil wars have become the common form of armed 
conflict in the international system. Even though civil wars have produced a larger 
number of human causalities than interstate wars and have resulted in catastrophic human 
suffering, they have not received much attention until recently. Surprisingly, not many 
studies have empirically explored the effectiveness of UN peace operations following a 
peace accord or military victory within a state. Hence, the intention of this study is to 
explore the conditions associated with the causes of and the cures for civil wars and to 
consider how the UN might play a post-conflict management role in the aftermath of 
internal conflicts. In addition, I researched how several humanitarian NGOs contribute to 
promoting internal peace in cooperation with the UN. In this chapter, I briefly review the 
findings of this study.           
 II. Theoretical Framework 
 UN peacebuilding seeks to not only address the current problems surrounding a 
conflict but also to remove the underlying causes. Hence, it is closely related to the 
political, social, and economic conditions within a state. The theoretical framework I 
developed emphasizes the significant role that both international and domestic 
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institutions play in war-torn societies. Neoliberal institutionalism offers a theoretical 
basis for understanding how international organizations, such as the United Nations, 
assume post-conflict management roles. Humanitarian issues, for example, are no longer 
considered to be domestic problems that can be managed by any one state. By pooling 
sovereignty, states join together to manage global problems. Neoliberal institutionalism 
also improves our understanding of the processes by which the conflicting parties attempt 
to build peace and by which domestic institutions perform structural reforms in the 
political, economic, social, and judicial sector for restoring stable domestic order. 
 Constructivism rightly claims that neither neorealism nor neoliberalism can 
provide adequate explanations for changes in international norms in the post-Cold War 
period. Constructivism offers a good theoretical basis for the role of humanitarian NGOs 
taking moral action internationally. Although neorealism’s core concepts — the security 
dilemma, the balance of power, and hegemonic stability theory — may offer an 
explanation for the causes of and the cures for interstate conflicts, they are not as 
applicable to internal conflicts.  
III. Literature Review 
Previous studies, to the extent that they focused on the conditions associated with 
the initiation and the termination of intrastate conflicts, largely neglected to address how 
to build durable peace in war-torn societies. Economic inequality, the degree of economic 
development, the level of political democratization, a state’s regime type, and the level of 
ethnic diversity are commonly identified as the causes of civil wars. A relationship 
between the degree of third-party intervention and the duration of internal conflicts 
remains controversial. Typically, civil wars end as a result of negotiated settlements or a 
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military victory. While the former tends to be fragile, the latter is likely to endure. One 
explanation is that many military victories tend to make potential rebels difficult to 
challenge in the future through massacre and disarmament. The effectiveness of third- 
party intervention in promoting sustainable peace in the aftermath of civil wars remains 
controversial.  
IV. Empirical Findings 
 I began my research with four different research puzzles in Chapter 1 and 
empirically tested their implications. With regard to the level of hostility, the higher the 
human costs, the harder it is to preserve peace. This finding indicates that emotional 
resentment and psychological barriers among the conflicting parties are critical factors 
that make post-civil war reconciliation difficult. The existence of various factions 
increases the risk of recurrent war. Furthermore, I find that in longer wars the warring 
parties suffer because of the lack of social, economic, and military resources. Hence, 
lengthy wars reduce the capability of the contending parties to rebound. Surprisingly, 
there is no statistical relationship between peace and the level of local capacity. The two 
years following civil wars may not be enough time during which to install stable and 
democratic political infrastructures, as well as to build sustainable economic systems.  
 My empirical findings indicate that, overall, UN peacebuilding operations can be 
effective in promoting sustainable peace in the aftermath of civil wars. This study implies 
that the UN should actively respond to requests for peacebuilding. However, the 
individual impact of various UN military operations is somewhat unexpected. I have no 
empirical findings that support whether each operation has a positive effect on 
sustainable peace. Only UN observer missions during the Cold War and 
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multidimensional peacebuilding missions during the post-Cold War era appear to have 
been successful, reducing the risk of war and promoting durable peace. In many cases, 
UN peacebuilding performs a wide range of post-conflict management missions. Often, it 
includes the observer mission, multidimensional peacebuilding, development of local 
capacities, and institutional rebuilding. Peacebuilding seeks to address the specific needs 
of a particular conflict. A different type or level of a peace operation can be planned and 
often launched at the same time to address a different type or level of a particular conflict. 
As a result, the individual effect of various UN missions has not been rigorously tested. 
Instead of measuring the effectiveness of each operation, measuring the overall impact of 
UN peacebuilding would be more appropriate. According to my findings, the presence of 
a peace accord is one of the most effective variables when estimating sustainable peace. 
A formal peace treaty can be a strong indicator of the contending parties’ will to end 
belligerence. Moreover, there is no relationship between the role of humanitarian NGOs 
and the duration of sustainable peace. One of the reasons may be that the NGOs, 
primarily, attempt to relieve human sufferings rather than to remove the causes of internal 
conflicts.  
V.  UN Peace Missions of the Future 
 To overcome the traditional shortcomings, several ways in which to enhance UN 
peace mission capabilities were discussed. The Brahimi Report and other reform 
processes inspired the creation of an intergovernmental advisory body that would help 
countries transition from war to peace. At the UN World Summit in 2005, the world's 
leaders agreed to establish a Peacebuilding Commission to assist war-torn countries with 
their post-conflict peacebuilding, reconstruction, and development efforts. The goal of 
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this advisory body is to keep countries from relapsing into war. With the Peacebuilding 
Commission, the UN has made clear its commitment to peacebuilding efforts. Even 
though the world’s largest organization faces serious challenges to preserving 
international peace, hopefully it can better prepare itself for conflict in the 21st century. 
Surely the organization will require commitment from all of its member states.    
VI. Conclusion 
This study has made an initial step to close the gap in the existing literature. The 
scope of this study can be enlarged by investigating the statistical relationship between 
the political and economic conditions of war-torn societies and international assistance 
for a longer period of time and by adding more recent cases of civil wars. It can be also 
expanded by exploring the role that regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization and African Union, play in civil wars. It would be of value to 
compare the role and the impact of global and several regional organizations. 
Furthermore, it would be instructive to explore the effectiveness of NGOs in intrastate 
conflicts during the Cold War era. There have been few areas of inquiry riper for and 
more worthy of systematic analyses than the correlational dynamics of intrastate war, 
whereby such conflicts begin, persist, and ultimately end. The human condition in the 
21st century will depend, in no small measure, on our ability to better understand and 
cope with such conflicts. 
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